Opposition Platform \u2013 For Life<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n![\"Victor](\"data:image\/svg+xml;charset=utf-8,%3Csvg)
<\/a>Victor Medvedchuk. Photo credit: UNIAN<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\nThe political party led by Viktor Medvedchuk remains a key advancer of pro-Russian sentiment in Ukraine, dissuading its target audience from building partnership with the European Union and NATO, promoting the idea to reestablish ties with the Russian Federation and lift the sanctions, and consistently underlining that historically and culturally Ukraine and Russia belong together. To gain voter support \u2013 and to do Kremlin\u2019s bidding \u2013 OPFL relies on the Russian rhetoric about the state it adapts for its target audience<\/strong>. In addition to claims about Russophobia and the rise of far-right, it constantly promotes the idea that Ukraine is under \u201cexternal governance\u201d on behalf of the Western states and international institutions, which is a reframed Kremlin\u2019s narrative on Ukraine being \u201ca puppet of the West\u201d. In order to \u201cregain sovereignty\u201d and get rid of the so called external governance, OPFL calls for drastic measures including rejection of many anti-corruption policies portrayed as Western supervision over Ukrainian economy \u2013 and even for default. <\/p>\n\n\n\nIt is worthwhile to note here that these ideas were shared by part of the presidential \u201cServant of the People\u201d party, specifically by deputies linked to oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky. Another party, \u201cFor Future\u201d, which received donations from company linked to the same oligarch, has also advocated for them \u2013 but in electoral terms failed miserably, as the rhetoric is firmly associated with OPFL<\/strong>. One of the crucial elements of OPFL\u2019s success is its access to the media<\/strong>\u2013 in addition to 3 national channels (ZIK, 112, NEWSONE) linked to Viktor Medvedchuk, the empire broadens with the launch of regional channels in Kyiv and Odesa (Kyiv.live and Odesa.live) with plans to reach at least Kharkiv, Dnipro and Lviv as well. The plans were clearly set in preparation for the local elections that brought OPFL substantial amount of votes in the city councils of Odesa (23,66%), Kharkiv (16,99% – preliminary results), Mykolaiv (28,57%), Mariupol (31,4% – preliminary results) as well as other cities mostly in south-eastern regions of Ukraine. In particular, it gained 38,6% in the formerly occupied city of Slovyansk, which showcases the failure of Ukraine\u2019s government to build an effective communication strategy so as to counter Russian and pro-Russian media influence<\/strong>. <\/p>\n\n\n\nSharii\u2019s party<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<\/a>Anatolii Sharii<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\nAnatolii Sharii, a notorious blogger currently residing outside of Ukraine, made his second attempt to enter Ukrainian politics \u2013 the first one, undertaken during the parliamentary elections, was not successful. It appears that things have somewhat changed, since his party managed to pass the barrier to at least several city councils, including major points on political landscape such as Odesa, where the party seems to have gained more than 7% of votes. Preliminary results demonstrate that cities where Sharii gained relative support are the same ones where OPFL scored<\/strong>, which is not surprising. Abovementioned TV-channels associated with Medvedchuk, including the regional ones, heavily promoted Sharii, giving him substantial amount of time on air, inviting him to comment on important issues regardless of his expertise and overall enhancing his visibility. Moreover, Medvedchuk personally insisted that his party considers Sharii an ally<\/strong>, clearly indicating the proximity of their views. When elections came closer, ZIK, 112 and NEWSONE ceased promoting other candidates, focusing mostly on OPFL and Medvedchuk personally, but the deed had already been done.<\/p>\n\n\n\nArguably, Sharii\u2019s support is mostly based on the failure of \u201cServant of the People\u201d \u2013 as the President and his parliamentary force initially gave mixed signals and avoided clear language, often resorting to populism (not that other candidates did not), it allowed them to foment impressive numbers in 2019. With the passing of time, however, they began to drop, and part of the voters switched to Sharii, who shares ideas of OPFL but presents them in a less conservative form, which initially attracted many supporters of Zelensky and his party. Notably, party leadership<\/strong>(namely Antonina Beloglazova, former party leader and currently editor of its web-site and Sharii\u2019s assistant) reportedly <\/strong>has<\/strong><\/a> ties with the Russian far-right movements<\/strong> and those involved in pro-Russian attempts to seize administrative buildings in eastern Ukraine in 2014-15. Taras Plaksii, party coordinator in several regions who comes from a family heavily associated with Russian Orthodox Church, in 2017 took part<\/a> in an event organized by Russian Ministry of Defense. Taking this into consideration, distribution of promo materials picturing Ukraine without Crimea, rhetoric consistently aimed at polarizing Ukrainian population and support of Russian narratives by Sharii\u2019s party and the blogger personally come as no surprise. <\/p>\n\n\n\nVictory of Palchevsky <\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<\/a>Andrii Plachevsky. Photo credit: BBC.<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\nIronically, the \u201cVictory of Palchevsky\u201d party faced a rather crushing defeat during the local elections. We have previously taken a look<\/a> at Andrii Plachevsky\u2019s links with the Russian government and how his campaign relied on manipulative sociology and support of Medvedchuk-linked channels. This support was combined with an extremely early start of the campaign and a substantial amount of funds for advertising in big cities, namely in Kyiv, where Palchevsky hoped to challenge the incumbent head of city council Vitalii Klychko. Not only did he fail in the capital, where Klychko enjoys<\/a> visibly more support than his competitors and might avoid a second round altogether, but his party also did not<\/a> manage to cross an electoral threshold in other city councils. It appears that one of the key tasks Palchevsky and his team faced \u2013 to disassociate from the links to Russia, which are unpopular in Kyiv \u2013 was failed. <\/p>\n\n\n\nThese links are rather explicit, and the discovery<\/a> that Palchevsky apparently still holds Russian citizenship (with dual citizenship being prohibited in Ukraine) is just one of their manifestations. Openly in favor of \u201crebooting\u201d relations between Ukraine and Russia, where he spent much of his life (including education at the MoD-affiliated university) and even attempted to be elected to the State Duma, a promoter of \u201cexternal governance\u201d narrative, Palchevsky was quite obviously in league with OPFL. This cooperation reached an extent at which OPFL has reportedly<\/a> attempted to transfer some of its votes to Palchevsky\u2019s party so as to enhance pro-Russian presence in the city council. His attempts to be simultaneously pro-Russian and not affiliated with it, however, might have made a heavy contribution to disorienting his target audience, which mostly voted for the party they are already familiar with \u2013 OPFL. <\/p>\n\n\n\nShould Palchevsky have gained a substantial amount of votes, it would have been a rather successful pro-Russian project. Failure to do so, however, does not by any means imply that local agents of influence have to be disregarded \u2013 results shown by OPFL and Sharii\u2019s party evidence this clearly. Moreover, they are expected to strengthen and solidify their influence (as well as expand the available network of media resources) in preparation for the next parliamentary elections. Kremlin is likely to be in favor of Medvedchuk and Sharii, who proved to be effective. While it still might invest in a new pro-Russian political force in Ukraine, Palchevsky\u2019s failure is discouraging in that regard. So it is all the more likely it will focus on supporting its proven allies, attempting to win over some representatives of the current government \u2013 and polarizing Ukrainian population at the same time. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
![\"Victor](\"https:\/\/uacrisis.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/11\/936206-r0-cover-medium.jpg\")
<\/a>The political party led by Viktor Medvedchuk remains a key advancer of pro-Russian sentiment in Ukraine, dissuading its target audience from building partnership with the European Union and NATO, promoting the idea to reestablish ties with the Russian Federation and lift the sanctions, and consistently underlining that historically and culturally Ukraine and Russia belong together. To gain voter support \u2013 and to do Kremlin\u2019s bidding \u2013 OPFL relies on the Russian rhetoric about the state it adapts for its target audience<\/strong>. In addition to claims about Russophobia and the rise of far-right, it constantly promotes the idea that Ukraine is under \u201cexternal governance\u201d on behalf of the Western states and international institutions, which is a reframed Kremlin\u2019s narrative on Ukraine being \u201ca puppet of the West\u201d. In order to \u201cregain sovereignty\u201d and get rid of the so called external governance, OPFL calls for drastic measures including rejection of many anti-corruption policies portrayed as Western supervision over Ukrainian economy \u2013 and even for default. <\/p>\n\n\n\n It is worthwhile to note here that these ideas were shared by part of the presidential \u201cServant of the People\u201d party, specifically by deputies linked to oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky. Another party, \u201cFor Future\u201d, which received donations from company linked to the same oligarch, has also advocated for them \u2013 but in electoral terms failed miserably, as the rhetoric is firmly associated with OPFL<\/strong>. One of the crucial elements of OPFL\u2019s success is its access to the media<\/strong>\u2013 in addition to 3 national channels (ZIK, 112, NEWSONE) linked to Viktor Medvedchuk, the empire broadens with the launch of regional channels in Kyiv and Odesa (Kyiv.live and Odesa.live) with plans to reach at least Kharkiv, Dnipro and Lviv as well. The plans were clearly set in preparation for the local elections that brought OPFL substantial amount of votes in the city councils of Odesa (23,66%), Kharkiv (16,99% – preliminary results), Mykolaiv (28,57%), Mariupol (31,4% – preliminary results) as well as other cities mostly in south-eastern regions of Ukraine. In particular, it gained 38,6% in the formerly occupied city of Slovyansk, which showcases the failure of Ukraine\u2019s government to build an effective communication strategy so as to counter Russian and pro-Russian media influence<\/strong>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Anatolii Sharii, a notorious blogger currently residing outside of Ukraine, made his second attempt to enter Ukrainian politics \u2013 the first one, undertaken during the parliamentary elections, was not successful. It appears that things have somewhat changed, since his party managed to pass the barrier to at least several city councils, including major points on political landscape such as Odesa, where the party seems to have gained more than 7% of votes. Preliminary results demonstrate that cities where Sharii gained relative support are the same ones where OPFL scored<\/strong>, which is not surprising. Abovementioned TV-channels associated with Medvedchuk, including the regional ones, heavily promoted Sharii, giving him substantial amount of time on air, inviting him to comment on important issues regardless of his expertise and overall enhancing his visibility. Moreover, Medvedchuk personally insisted that his party considers Sharii an ally<\/strong>, clearly indicating the proximity of their views. When elections came closer, ZIK, 112 and NEWSONE ceased promoting other candidates, focusing mostly on OPFL and Medvedchuk personally, but the deed had already been done.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Arguably, Sharii\u2019s support is mostly based on the failure of \u201cServant of the People\u201d \u2013 as the President and his parliamentary force initially gave mixed signals and avoided clear language, often resorting to populism (not that other candidates did not), it allowed them to foment impressive numbers in 2019. With the passing of time, however, they began to drop, and part of the voters switched to Sharii, who shares ideas of OPFL but presents them in a less conservative form, which initially attracted many supporters of Zelensky and his party. Notably, party leadership<\/strong>(namely Antonina Beloglazova, former party leader and currently editor of its web-site and Sharii\u2019s assistant) reportedly <\/strong>has<\/strong><\/a> ties with the Russian far-right movements<\/strong> and those involved in pro-Russian attempts to seize administrative buildings in eastern Ukraine in 2014-15. Taras Plaksii, party coordinator in several regions who comes from a family heavily associated with Russian Orthodox Church, in 2017 took part<\/a> in an event organized by Russian Ministry of Defense. Taking this into consideration, distribution of promo materials picturing Ukraine without Crimea, rhetoric consistently aimed at polarizing Ukrainian population and support of Russian narratives by Sharii\u2019s party and the blogger personally come as no surprise. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Ironically, the \u201cVictory of Palchevsky\u201d party faced a rather crushing defeat during the local elections. We have previously taken a look<\/a> at Andrii Plachevsky\u2019s links with the Russian government and how his campaign relied on manipulative sociology and support of Medvedchuk-linked channels. This support was combined with an extremely early start of the campaign and a substantial amount of funds for advertising in big cities, namely in Kyiv, where Palchevsky hoped to challenge the incumbent head of city council Vitalii Klychko. Not only did he fail in the capital, where Klychko enjoys<\/a> visibly more support than his competitors and might avoid a second round altogether, but his party also did not<\/a> manage to cross an electoral threshold in other city councils. It appears that one of the key tasks Palchevsky and his team faced \u2013 to disassociate from the links to Russia, which are unpopular in Kyiv \u2013 was failed. <\/p>\n\n\n\n These links are rather explicit, and the discovery<\/a> that Palchevsky apparently still holds Russian citizenship (with dual citizenship being prohibited in Ukraine) is just one of their manifestations. Openly in favor of \u201crebooting\u201d relations between Ukraine and Russia, where he spent much of his life (including education at the MoD-affiliated university) and even attempted to be elected to the State Duma, a promoter of \u201cexternal governance\u201d narrative, Palchevsky was quite obviously in league with OPFL. This cooperation reached an extent at which OPFL has reportedly<\/a> attempted to transfer some of its votes to Palchevsky\u2019s party so as to enhance pro-Russian presence in the city council. His attempts to be simultaneously pro-Russian and not affiliated with it, however, might have made a heavy contribution to disorienting his target audience, which mostly voted for the party they are already familiar with \u2013 OPFL. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Should Palchevsky have gained a substantial amount of votes, it would have been a rather successful pro-Russian project. Failure to do so, however, does not by any means imply that local agents of influence have to be disregarded \u2013 results shown by OPFL and Sharii\u2019s party evidence this clearly. Moreover, they are expected to strengthen and solidify their influence (as well as expand the available network of media resources) in preparation for the next parliamentary elections. Kremlin is likely to be in favor of Medvedchuk and Sharii, who proved to be effective. While it still might invest in a new pro-Russian political force in Ukraine, Palchevsky\u2019s failure is discouraging in that regard. So it is all the more likely it will focus on supporting its proven allies, attempting to win over some representatives of the current government \u2013 and polarizing Ukrainian population at the same time. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Sharii\u2019s party<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
<\/a>Victory of Palchevsky <\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
<\/a>