When the Lithuanian government recently published a survival manual, informally dubbed the \u201cRussian Invasion Manual\u201d, for\u00a0 its citizens, the news was met with mixed reactions in Lithuania and internationally. The pamphlet, officially titled \u201cHow to act in extreme situations or instances of war\u201d, provides general survival tips as well as instructions for how to resist foreign occupiers.
\nWestern news media followed the story with a level of amused credulity, wondering if the pamphlet will soon be available in schools and public libraries. Russian press was, predictably, less sanguine in its assessment.
\nAt a press conference announcing the release of the manual, Lithuanian Defense Minister Juozas Olekas made the point of the manual quite clear. \u201cRussia\u2019s recurring aggression against its neighbors – presently in Ukraine,\u201d has made \u201cthe manual\u2019s publication all the more urgent,\u201d he said. “When Russia started its aggression in Ukraine, here in Lithuania our citizens understood that our neighbor is not friendly.”
\nThe manual instructs Lithuanians how to survive foreign occupation and war, advising citizens on how to both stay safe and organize nonviolent resistance. Lithuanians are asked to stage protests, strikes, take to social media, and even target the enemy\u2019s cyber infrastructure through hacking. In addition, the Lithuanian government advises that people either avoid work or at\u00a0 the very least underperform.
\nDespite the apparent novelty of the Lithuanian government publishing the survival guide, this is no joke. Vilnius\u2019 concerns\u00a0 of a Russian \u2018hybrid war\u2019 against the Baltic states is to many far from alarmist in the wake of the annexation of Crimea and war in eastern Ukraine. The Baltic states\u2019 large ethnic Russian population, small geographic size, historical subjugation, and territorial proximity make the Russian threat particularly salient. Despite Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia\u2019s NATO memberships, there are valid fears that the NATO alliance will be unwilling or unable to mount effective resistance against the Russian Federation in the case of invasion. After all, vague security assurances for Ukraine from the United States and United Kingdom did not prevent the annexation of Crimea and de facto loss of a chunk of eastern Ukraine.
\nNeither is the idea of \u201ccivilian defense\u201d particularly ground-breaking as a defense strategy. In fact, a forward-looking
\npolicy of organized civil resistance in the event of foreign occupation is at least centuries old. For smaller countries flanked by much more powerful neighbors, conventional deterrence and military resistance is unlikely to be successful. However, advance preparation in the threat of potential invasion, commitment to nonviolent resistance and disruption by civilians, and even preparation in underground active self-defense are proven strategies.
\nKarl Mueller, Ph.D., a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation global think tank, describes civilian defense
\nas a strategy to make a foreign occupation unpalatable for the occupying army. In a telephone interview with Mueller through his office in Arlington, Virginia, he explained, \u201ccivilian defense is mostly non-violent and is focused on making a country or territory indigestible to an occupier\u201d and \u201cwould involve non-violence, non-cooperation, and slacking at work\u201d to undermine the foreign occupation. Such a strategy must make the probable costs of an invasion higher than the possible benefits. \u201cIt is something that you would most associate with a country that is on its own,\u201d that is not a participant in a military alliance, said Mueller. Such a strategy should prepare its citizenry for the possibility of foreign invasion, and make this threat credibility to potential occupiers.
\nIt would also give its citizens a unifying sense of purpose that would otherwise be crushed by the occupation.
\nThe concept of \u201ccivilian defense\u201d has long been the core of Switzerland\u2019s defense strategy. As a tiny, neutral, and landlocked nation bordered by much larger neighbors and potential adversaries, the Swiss have fostered a culture of both civilian resistance and armed insurgency in the case of invasion. While Swiss military resistance to invasion would likely be futile, Switzerland could make any occupation of their land far too costly with a combination of civil disobedience, resistance, local militias, and national solidarity. Effective deterrence need not require military parity.
\nIn the wake of increased violence in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, as well as clear evidence that the Russian government is only increasing its material and financial support for its proxies, the Ukrainian government can likely benefit from the historical experience of Switzerland and recent moves by Lithuania. What Ukraine lacks in conventional deterrence can be at least partially compensated by a citizenry armed with knowledge of how to ensure both personal safety and carry out acts of civil disobedience against occupiers. Like Lithuania, Ukraine needs to direct how its citizens can respond should their region come under the control of the Russian military or its proxies.
\nThe Ukrainian government, in cooperation with the various civil society groups that have emerged since Euromaidan, should work on a similar survival manual that develops a strategy for civilian defense. Many components of such a civilian defense plan have actually emerged spontaneously in the wake of Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine. The proliferation of private initiatives to expose and counter Russian propaganda, groups supporting Ukrainian soldiers and civilians in the east, and even the volunteer battalions have all raised the costs of Kremlin intervention.
\nThe key, however, is whether the Russians believe that Ukrainians will actually carry through with meaningful resistance.
\n\u201cIs it a credible threat, or will it be too hard to coordinate?\u201d said Mueller.
\nSome Ukrainian security experts also agree that a civilian defensive approach at the state-level can benefit the country.
\nOleksiy Melnyk, the director of Foreign Relations and International Security Program at the Kyiv-based Razumkov Centre think tank, believes that the Lithuanian initiative is a positive development that Ukrainian authorities can adopt. \u201cSuch a decision serves two roles,\u201d said Melnyk in a telephone interview. \u201cFirst, the Lithuanian population gains essential knowledge of what to do in case of an external military aggression,\u201d and second a potential aggressor \u201cmay reconsider its expansionist plans due to the rising costs of invasion.\u201d Although Ukrainian civil society has already raised awareness about some aspects of civilian defense, this has not been nearly sufficient. \u201cThe state should fulfill its functions,\u201d as \u201cvolunteers and civic activists can only contribute but not replace state mechanisms.\u201d
\nThe Ukrainian people and government can greatly benefit from such a plan in the case that Russia is seriously considering expanding its territory, which the recent offensive in Donbas at least partially corroborates. A citizenry armed with knowledge for personal safety, as well as the tools to effectively resist occupation through both peaceful and possibly more confrontational means could be an important adjunct to Ukraine\u2019s defense strategy. At the very least, it wouldn\u2019t hurt, say Melnyk and Mueller. Even if civilian defense fails to prevent further aggression on its own, plans for civilian resistance can garner more international sympathy to the situation and global support for Ukraine\u2019s territorial integrity.
\nWhile there are some risks of such a proposal\u2014particularly increased militarization of the country and proliferation of a \u201cbesieged\u201d mentality\u2014a civilian defense strategy that focuses on education and safety in conjunction with civilian resistance has the potential to serve as a potent tool in the Ukrainian defensive arsenal.
\nChris Dunnett (@ccdunnett), Ukraine Crisis Media Center<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"