After losing access to the Eurovision stage, the Kremlin\u2019s propagandists declared the contest a \u201cpoliticized gathering of perverts and freaks\u201d, which has no place for Russia and its \u201ctraditional values\u201d. Notably, Putin\u2019s ideologists were able to quench Russians\u2019 interest in Eurovision to a certain degree. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, the Kremlin did not forget the \u201cbread and circuses\u201d principles. In a situation where the Russian population will have less access to material goods due to inflation caused by sanctions and war costs, the need to shift the attention of the masses to \u201centertainment\u201d grows.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Therefore, on February 3, 2025, Vladimir Putin signed<\/a> a decree restoring Intervision, an analog of the Eurovision Song Contest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The direct control over the competition by the \u201chigh command\u201d proves the significance of the propaganda value the Kremlin attaches to it. Thus, the organizing committee of the competition is led by Deputy Prime Minister Dmytiy Chernyshenko (he headed the organizing committee of the Sochi Olympics in 2014), and First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Serhiy Kiriyenko (known as the unofficial \u201ccurator of Donbas\u201d, as well as being responsible for the ideological direction in the occupied territories) as a part of the supervisory board. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also got involved in the promotion of the alternative Eurovision. The head of Russian diplomacy stated that over 20 countries have already expressed their desire to participate in the contest. In the coming months, Lavrov’s department will likely be tasked with attracting the maximum number of representatives from \u201cfriendly\u201d countries to participate in the Kremlin’s anti-Eurovision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, the Kremlin started a promo campaign for the competition using state media, though the date when it should go public was not announced yet. Pro-government channels are fueling the interest of their Telegram audience with surveys that are supposed to demonstrate public interest. For example, the \u201cMoskvich\u201d media reported that according to the results of their Telegram survey, 58% of respondents expressed a desire to watch Intervision. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Well forgotten old <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The idea to create an analog for Eurovision is not new for the Kremlin. In 2009 Vladimir Putin, who was Prime Minister at the time, initiated the Intervision project, which was supposed to be organized primarily with the participation of the countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Notably, the Kremlin did not come up with the name and idea of \u200b\u200bthe festival. In the countries of the socialist bloc, a song contest with the identical name was held from 1965 to 1980. Later, Russian leadership returned to the idea of \u200b\u200bIntervision in 2014, but the project entered a \u201cstandstill\u201d due to the world\u2019s reaction to the annexation of Crimea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In December 2023, the idea was reanimated. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order to hold the competition in 2024 in St. Petersburg. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Even with significant war spending, the Kremlin did not spare any expenses for \u201cthe image building\u201d project. In 2023, 600 million rubles were already allocated for Intervision. Notably, Russian Z-patriots, who often preach for more resources to be allocated to the army, were not outraged by such a big investment. Organizing the competition will \u201cpull\u201d over one hundred million rubles from the Russian budget, but state media will convince ordinary Russians of the necessity and justification of the costs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The unwillingness of international show-business representatives to participate in the Kremlin\u2019s \u201cgames\u201d due to possible reputational repercussions became the main obstacle to the competition\u2019s organization. Launching events with foreign visitors in Russia would only be possible with the help of allied bordering countries (Belarus) or \u201cfriendship merchants\u201d, such as North Korea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moscow tried to solve this situation by involving political and economic organizations, with BRICS as its main bet. Mikhail Shvydkoy, the Russian president’s special representative for cultural cooperation, promised the presence of all BRICS member countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russian authorities believe that BRICS makes it possible to get China interested in the event as the Kremlin’s main partner in ideological opposition to the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia is trying to \u201csell\u201d the idea of Intervision to its \u201cChinese allies\u201d involving high-level diplomacy. For example, in October 2024, during a conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Russian president reminded his counterpart of the idea of \u200b\u200bcreating a \u201chigh-level festival like Intervision\u201d with the support of \u201cChinese friends.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, Beijing has yet to show any concrete interest. This situation might explain why the project was delayed. China is reserved in its assessment of the Kremlin\u2019s attempts to transform BRICS into an ideological platform that opposes \u201cthe global West\u201d. For the PRC, participating in international organizations is linked to entering new economic markets and gaining beneficial investments. Secondly, China’s soft power potential is limited due to the isolation of Chinese culture. Ideological, cognitive, and language barriers hinder the popularity of Chinese show-business outside the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The rest of the BRICS countries are also skeptical about the prospect of the organization’s activities expanding to the cultural sphere. Manoj Kewalramani, head of the Indo-Pacific Research Program studies at the Takshashila Institution research center in the Indian city of Bangalore, noted<\/a> that BRICS members aim for “non-ideological, pragmatic participation” and do not want to choose sides. Instead, participation in BRICS is a way for them to increase their economic capacity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A notable situation occurred in the sports industry as well. Moscow, along with its economic partners, promotes substitute projects for the Olympic Games and other competitions from which Russia was excluded in 2022. However, none of the Kremlin’s attempts to create an alternative were unsuccessful. For example, at the BRICS Games 2024 in Kazan a Russian swimmer became the winner only because there were no other competitors. In December 2024, the Russian president canceled the \u201cWorld Friendship Games\u201d, which Russian propaganda promoted as an \u201cOlympics\u201d for the non-Western world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n ____<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, for the Kremlin, the Intervision project has ideological value in two dimensions \u2013 domestic and international. For the domestic value, holding a high-profile competition with participants from the \u201cfriendly countries\u201d should distract the Russian public from economic problems and support the narrative of Russia not being isolated. As for the international value, the Kremlin strives to become an alternative \u201cpole of attraction\u201d in the cultural sphere, which will be at the forefront of the ideological struggle against \u201cWestern values\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
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