{"id":335093,"date":"2025-04-28T19:20:51","date_gmt":"2025-04-28T16:20:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/uacrisis.org\/rosiya-sabotuye-peremyr-ya-shhob-vygraty-chas"},"modified":"2025-05-01T16:11:06","modified_gmt":"2025-05-01T13:11:06","slug":"rosiya-sabotuye-peremyr-ya-shhob-vygraty-chas","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/uacrisis.org\/en\/rosiya-sabotuye-peremyr-ya-shhob-vygraty-chas","title":{"rendered":"“Russia is Sabotaging the Ceasefire to Buy Time”"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In an interview for the Romanian analytical portal Karadeniz Press<\/strong>, Volodymyr Solovian, Head of the Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group, spoke about the latest developments surrounding peace negotiations, Ukraine’s role in regional security, relations with Romania, and electoral prospects amid the ongoing war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Considering the ongoing conflict and current regional dynamics, how has Ukraine adapted or revised its national security strategy recently?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In my opinion, as for now it is too early to talk about comprehensive concept of the national security strategy, as we are still in the midst of the war. The key parameters of Ukraine\u2019s postwar security will depend on the ceasefire or peace agreement conditions. Regardless possible international security guarantees; Ukraine will develop within the paradigm of preparing for a new war. Obviously, priority must be given to reforming the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and developing Ukraine\u2019s defense industry to ensure combat and technological superiority over an enemy that relies on numerical advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Secondly, the Russia-Ukraine war has brought significant changes in the understanding of modern warfare tactics and strategies. For example, the evolution of UAV technology has fundamentally changed the use of armored vehicles and the protection of communication lines. Last year, both sides prioritized saturating their units with FPV drones; today, logistics on both sides is targeted by fiber-optic-controlled drones. Unlike FPV drones, which can be jammed by electronic warfare systems, no effective countermeasures have yet been found against fiber-optic drones. The active use of such drones by Russia was one of the factors that forced the AFU to withdraw from Kursk region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is just one example illustrating that long-term planning is currently complicated due to the rapid technological advancements in weaponry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Anti-drone net along the road is one of the few ways to protect communications from drones on fiber optics. <\/em>
Sumy region, 2025<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

From Kyiv’s perspective, what are the non-negotiable “red lines” in peace talks with Russia, and how much room is there for compromise amid international pressures?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

First, any legal recognition of Russia\u2019s annexation of sovereign Ukrainian territories, including Crimea, is unacceptable. Revising the borders is impossible given the complex procedure of amending the Constitution, which would require a nationwide referendum, approval at two parliamentary sessions (with one requiring a constitutional majority \u2013 at least 300 MPs), and a decision by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, it is procedurally practically impossible at the very least.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, Ukraine cannot agree to limitations on the size of its Armed Forces as well as the range of weapons produced by its defense industry. Various security guarantees are currently being discussed behind closed doors, including the deployment of military contingents in Ukraine or extending NATO’s Article 5 protection to territories under Kyiv’s control. However, these initiatives remain theoretical, as even among European members of the “coalition of the willing,” there is no consensus. Moreover, the U.S. is limiting its involvement in “Europe’s problems,” raising questions about the operational capabilities of European countries to support their contingents in Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even more, the key issue often ignored by those proposing the deployment of Western forces in Ukraine is Moscow\u2019s fierce rejection. Given that NATO is mortally afraid of even a minor incident of direct confrontation with Russia, and European societies are not prepared to accept casualties among their own troops in Ukraine, this option remains  improbable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under these circumstances, the Armed Forces and Ukraine\u2019s own defense industry remain the only effective security guarantees for the foreseeable future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Additionally, Ukraine firmly rejects any compromises that would allow Moscow to block Ukraine’s accession to international organizations such as NATO and the EU. However, given NATO\u2019s current reluctance to consider Ukraine’s membership, some temporary compromises on timelines may be possible during peace negotiations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What concrete expectations does Ukraine currently have from the EU, NATO, and the broader international community regarding support during the war and subsequent reconstruction?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The year 2025 is pivotal for Ukraine as it marks the beginning of EU accession talks. The government and the president have announced plans to open all six negotiation clusters within the year. These steps are crucial for Ukraine’s postwar recovery, including attracting investments and European funds for rebuilding destroyed infrastructure and developing  renewed energy system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As for NATO membership, I think that this issue will remain the subject of tough negotiations with Moscow. Unfortunately, the Trump administration, trying to engage Putin in direct negotiations, has “burned” the NATO membership card for Ukraine early. I think that at least during Trump\u2019s presidency this issue will be on hold. By the way, the relevant changes are also noticeable in the latest official documents of the Alliance. In particular, the recently published annual report of the NATO Secretary General  does not  mention of Ukraine becoming a member of the Alliance in the future, unlike a similar document for 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Coalition
Meeting of the “Coalition of the Willing,” Paris, March 27, 2025<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

How realistic is it to conduct democratic elections in Ukraine while the country remains at war, and how does Ukrainian society view holding elections in such difficult circumstances?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ukrainian legislation prohibits elections during martial law, which will remain in effect until war ends. Obviously, elections under high-intensity warfare are impossible from a security perspective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, Ukrainian electoral law experts and members of the Central Election Commission suggest varying timelines for preparing elections after the war, typically estimating about six months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, if elections are expedited under pressure from Moscow as part of a peace agreement, this could lead to dangerous consequences. The Kremlin would likely focus on undermining the legitimacy of Ukraine\u2019s leadership by disrupting the electoral process, notably through security threats and cyberattacks targeting government servers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Do you see potential for increased military and political collaboration between Ukraine and Romania within NATO or EU frameworks, and if so, in what specific areas?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Romania will remain a strategically important partner for Ukraine. Maritime security is vital for Ukraine\u2019s economy, while Kyiv is interested in developing military-technical cooperation with Romania.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Potential areas of cooperation include demining the Black Sea, developing unmanned maritime systems, assisting in rebuilding Ukrainian Naval Forces, and joint development of anti-ship missiles based on the R-360 “Neptune” platform.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Romania could also play a leading role in the maritime monitoring under the future peace agreement. However, this is currently a matter of hypothetical possibilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\u0417\u043e\u043a\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0430
Romania plans to cooperate with Ukraine on the development of the R-360 Neptune anti-ship missile.
Source: unian.ua<\/a><\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

In the context of the war and growing geopolitical tensions in the Black Sea region, how do you see relations between Ukraine and Romania developing in the near future?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is crucial for Ukraine to maintain Bucharest\u2019s support for Ukraine\u2019s European path. Strengthening relations with Romania is critical for transit routes of Ukrainian exports and the logistics of Western arms supplies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, upcoming presidential elections in Romania may bring turbulence due to potential information provocations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If George Simion, known for his skepticism towards Ukraine, wins the Romanian presidency, Kyiv will have to reload relations with new-elected president from a low starting point. Yet given Simion\u2019s need to work with a pro-European parliamentary majority, significant confrontation with Ukraine seems unlikely. Anyway, Simion’s stance will largely depend on the Trump administration\u2019s position regarding the Russia-Ukraine war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, in general I do not think that  Romania\u2019s internal political turbulence may somehow affect the positive attitude of Ukrainians towards Romania as a country that consistently supports Ukraine’s struggle. A vivid example of this is Romania’s transfer of one Patriot air defense system to Ukraine last year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\u0412\u0438\u0431\u043e\u0440\u0438
Leader of The Alliance for the Union of Romanians, Gheorghe Simion<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

What role can Ukraine play in regional security and stabilization efforts? Specifically on Transnistria, how does Kyiv view its potential role in resolving this longstanding conflict, and what tangible actions could Ukraine take to facilitate a solution?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kyiv will coordinate its politics regarding Transnistria with the pro-European government in Chisinau. It is vital for Ukraine that Moldova maintains its orientation toward the EU and its commitment to deterring Russian aggression. Thus, possible radicalizing the situation in Transnistria, which could affect Moldova\u2019s October elections, contradicts Ukraine’s interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From a military standpoint, Transnistria does not pose a threat to Ukraine. Russian forces stationed there lack sufficient logistical support. Moreover, Moscow\u2019s plans to use Transnistria as a foothold in their 2022 attempt to occupy Odesa and possibly Moldova have failed since Ukraine has destroyed a third of the Black Sea Fleet and forced the remaining ships to retreat to Novorossiysk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, after a ceasefire, Russia may increase espionage and sabotage operations from Transnistria. Some limited drone warfare may occur, but a prolonged conflict seems unlikely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What can we expect after the recent evolutions regarding peace negotiations?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Currently, there are two draft lists of conditions that could form the basis for a peace agreement. The first was presented by U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff on April 17.  The second – a Ukrainian counter-proposal supported by European partners – was submitted to Washington a few days later. The Ukrainian package incorporates elements of the U.S. plan but includes key clarifications  regarding a monitoring mission and security guarantees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ukraine insists on three “red lines”: non-recognition of Russian claims to any Ukrainian territory, no restrictions on Ukraine\u2019s military forces or defense industry, and no veto over Ukraine\u2019s membership in international organizations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Last Friday, Witkoff met with Putin, but Russia\u2019s counter-proposals have not yet been disclosed. Currently, all the “insider” reports that Putin is supposedly ready to give up the unoccupied territories of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia regions do not have proper confirmation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On Sunday evening, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated Moscow\u2019s position: a ceasefire is possible only if Western arms supplies to Ukraine cease. This is an undisguised sabotage of the American administration\u2019s peace proposals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even if the United States unilaterally complies with Moscow\u2019s demands, Europe will continue its supplies, as any delay could severely weaken the AFU. The Russian leadership is fully aware of this, which is why it keeps putting forward conditions aimed at stalling for time and provoking misunderstandings between the American and the Ukrainian-European negotiating groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, Putin continues to pursue his main goal – to negotiate with Trump against the backdrop of ongoing aggression. By carrying out brutal attacks on civilian infrastructure across Ukraine, resulting in numerous casualties, the Russian leader seeks to make the American president an accomplice to his own war crimes, at least in the eyes of Europeans. Therefore, the Kremlin will only make rhetorical concessions, attempting to keep Trump engaged in the negotiation process for as long as possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\u0417\u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0456\u0447
Trump and Zelenskiy meet one-on-one in Vatican<\/em>. April 26, 2025<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Could we see a change in Trump’s positions if Putin will continue his ilegal invasion?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moscow\u2019s unwillingness to conclude a long-term ceasefire has clearly been a disappointment for Trump. I believe this is reflected in the harsher-than-usual rhetoric directed at Putin, which has been evident in several of Trump’s latest statements. Recent threats to impose secondary sanctions stand in stark contrast to previous initiatives such as joint resource extraction projects in the Arctic or the revival of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline with the support of American investors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Is Trump ready to abandon his initial approach toward Russia, which focused on rapid freezing war in Ukraine and economically pulling Russia away from China\u2019s influence? I believe that, for now, the White House is not ready to fundamentally revise its Russia policy, even though its naivety is becoming increasingly obvious with each passing day.
However, if Trump does not receive the desired “gift” from Moscow – namely a ceasefire – within the next few weeks, it is highly likely that the U.S. president\u2019s interest in the Russia-Ukraine conflict will begin to fade rapidly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I think that the White House will shift its focus to finding an optimal scenario for scaling down diplomatic engagement. This may involve the continued delivery of weapons to Ukraine that were contracted under the Biden administration, although the approval of new aid packages appears unlikely.\u00a0 Meanwhile, diplomatic contacts between Washington and Moscow may continue along other tracks, particularly concerning the Iranian nuclear deal and strategic arms control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Source: \u00a0karadeniz-press.ro<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In an interview for the Romanian analytical portal Karadeniz Press, Volodymyr Solovian, Head of the Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group, spoke about the latest developments surrounding peace negotiations, Ukraine’s role in regional security, relations with Romania, and electoral prospects amid the ongoing war. 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