The unexpected first-round victory of independent candidate C\u0103lin Georgescu on November 24, 2024, was a catalyst for the surge in popularity of Romania\u2019s radical right. Initially a little-known figure, Georgescu gained attention through manipulative rhetoric and the use of conspiracy theories. Backed by nearly 23% of voters, his performance was a shock to political analysts and dealt a serious blow to the ruling Social Democrats (PSD) and national-liberals (PNL), whose candidates fell behind the populist outsider.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, the darker side of Georgescu\u2019s success soon became clear. Romanian authorities revealed intelligence indicating that his campaign had violated election laws, with serious suspicions of foreign interference, specifically Russian.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On December 6, 2024, Romania\u2019s Constitutional Court annulled the first-round results. Georgescu was later charged by the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office with inciting actions against the constitutional order and with creating or supporting a fascist organization. On March 9, the Central Electoral Bureau officially rejected his candidacy, a decision upheld days later by the Constitutional Court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite the charges, Georgescu retained strong support among anti-establishment voters. At the time of his disqualification, his polling numbers were climbing and had reached nearly 40%<\/p>\n\n\n\n Flirting with MAGA<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Framing himself as a political \u201cvictim,\u201d Georgescu sought to capitalize on his image internationally. His efforts coincided with the Trump administration\u2019s use of the Romanian election scandal to criticize the EU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the Munich Security Conference in February 2025, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance stated that \u201cRomania simply annulled its election results based on vague intelligence suspicions and intense pressure from European neighbors.\u201d He went on to argue that if such a democracy can be destabilized by foreign advertising campaigns costing a few hundred thousand dollars, then it wasn\u2019t particularly strong to begin with.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In March, Georgescu appeared on the U.S.-based podcast The Freeman Report<\/em>, where he declared that Romania is a \u201cslave of the European Union\u201d and called for a referendum on leaving both the EU and NATO. Soon after, he gave an interview to controversial commentator Tucker Carlson, where he promoted conspiracy theories\u2014including the notion that Romania is merely a pawn in Brussels\u2019 alleged plan to provoke war with Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He went further, accusing the presidents of France and Moldova, as well as former U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, of planning to turn NATO into an offensive alliance and launch World War III from Romanian territory. According to Georgescu, the goal of Romanian right-wing forces is to \u201cmake Romania great again,\u201d echoing the MAGA slogan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Notably, the Russians eagerly circulated Georgescu\u2019s revelations. Several pro-Kremlin Telegram channels published the full text of the interview in Russian.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine in Georgescu\u2019s Crosshairs<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Although Georgescu claims to oppose \u201cglobalism,\u201d his populist rhetoric undermines public support for Ukraine in Romania. He most frequently repeats the narrative that further military aid to Ukraine risks escalating into a NATO-Russia war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n His anti-Ukrainian discourse peaked during an interview with RomaniaTV.net, in which he called Ukraine a \u201cfictional state,\u201d arguing its real name should be the \u201cUkrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.\u201d He went on to question Ukraine\u2019s territorial integrity, asserting that Romania should reclaim several historical regions currently within Ukraine\u2019s borders: Northern Bukovina, Budjak, and Northern Maramure\u0219. He also proposed that Hungary \u201ctake\u201d Transcarpathia and Poland – Lviv Oblast. The rest of Ukraine, he dismissively called \u201cLittle Russia.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Such rhetoric, long confined to the margins of Romanian politics, gained mainstream traction due to Georgescu\u2019s brief front-runner status – and was eagerly amplified by Kremlin media.<\/p>\n\n\n\n During his campaign, Georgescu also promoted economic sovereignty and reducing import dependence, which resonated with Romanian farmers who protested Ukrainian grain imports in late 2023 and early 2024. His populist messaging reignited opposition to the transit of Ukrainian agricultural products.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Right Votes Together<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n For a time, Georgescu avoided endorsing Simion, betting instead on mass protests. But the protests quickly lost momentum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According<\/a> to Iulian Chifu, President of the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center, \u201cVoters looking for an outsider candidate grew disillusioned with Georgescu after the arrests of individuals linked to his shadow campaign financing. At that point, he suffered a major media defeat. Now, right-wing candidates have stepped back from their extremist rhetoric.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n As voters shifted their support to Simion – ideologically similar but more viable – Georgescu had little choice but to endorse his former ally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The two men even appeared together at a polling station. Simion remarked, \u201cI voted for C\u0103lin Georgescu\u201d (though his name was not on the ballot – V.S.), and stated that their shared goal is to \u201crestore constitutional order.\u201d Simion later promised to appoint Georgescu as prime minister if elected and to hold a referendum to reinstate the annulled results of the 2024 first round.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Appointing Georgescu to a high-ranking government position would clearly polarize the political landscape in Romania and strain relations with Western allies and Ukraine. However, such a scenario remains unlikely. Even in the event of early parliamentary elections, Simion\u2019s party AUR is unlikely to secure enough seats to form a government on its own. Georgescu\u2019s nomination would require support from other parties. Yet his controversial reputation, ongoing investigations by the Prosecutor\u2019s Office, and pro-Russian views make him a highly toxic candidate for such a role.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A Fragile Alliance<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Georgescu’s premiership would polarize Romanian politics and strain ties with Ukraine and the West. However, this scenario remains unlikely. Even in the event of early parliamentary elections, AUR is not expected to gain enough seats to form a government alone. Georgescu\u2019s appointment would require coalition support\u2014something improbable given his toxic reputation, ongoing investigations, and pro-Russian image.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Simion\u2019s alliance with Georgescu appears to be a pragmatic move to retain support from Georgescu\u2019s base ahead of the runoff. Their political partnership may continue in the short term, driven by shared interest in calling snap elections at the peak of right-wing popularity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet if Simion wins, the alliance is unlikely to last. Georgescu has no party of his own, and creating one would put him in direct competition with AUR. Moreover, as president, Simion would be forced to compromise with domestic actors and EU partners. In such a context, keeping the controversial Georgescu close would limit his flexibility and create unnecessary tensions within the administration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Misty prospects of a political comeback for C\u0103lin Georgescu are, undoubtedly, a positive outcome for Romania\u2019s pro-European forces. Yet his sudden rise remains a troubling indicator of the vulnerability of EU democracies to information warfare. The Georgescu case highlights how a calculated fusion of Russian propaganda and far-right populism, amplified through social media, can rapidly destabilize democratic regimes\u2014even in countries aligned with the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n This material draws on the findings of the analytical report <\/a>‘Ukraine\u2019s European Integration and Elections in EU Member States: The Informational Dimension’<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/uacrisis.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image.png\")
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