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The priority for the new agency is the post-Soviet countries (the so-called \u00abnear abroad\u00bb). It is worth noting that back in 2020, a reform of Rossotrudnichestvo was initiated: the central office was replenished with a department for international development and humanitarian programmes, and the strategy shifted its focus to projects in the field of education and social development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The biggest challenge that the announced changes will be aimed at aligning with is the need to increase the efficiency of the institution in the face of a shortage of funds. To understand the scale, Rossotrudnichestvo’s budget is about 5.5 billion rubles a year, with only about 25% of these funds going directly to project activities (the rest goes to maintaining centres, staff, maintaining monuments, supplying books abroad, etc.) For comparison, USAID’s budget exceeded $50 billion before the recent cuts. So, in the context of the growing budget deficit due to the war against Ukraine, the Kremlin is trying to \u00aboptimize\u00bb the structure of state institutions of hybrid influence abroad. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the interpretation of Russian ideologues, \u00abincreasing the effectiveness\u00bb of Russia’s soft power institutions should mean intensifying work with the expert community and opinion leaders. Through them, the Russians are trying to influence broad international audiences. According to Primakov, Russian propagandists also plan to develop the format of \u00abnon-profit organisations without borders\u00bb. The idea is to help Russian NGOs network with foreign organisations and send Russians abroad to implement \u00absocially useful projects\u00bb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Primakov also assures that the Russian development agency will focus on practical results rather than quantitative indicators. He refused to evaluate the effectiveness of Russian Houses by the number of events held: it is more important to know who these events involved, what socio-political effect was achieved and how to measure it. Each office of Rossotrudnichestvo now has to defend its work plan in terms of the expected audience and impact, as well as justify its cost-effectiveness, as the Russian budget is tight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The announcement of the creation of the Russian USAID sparked a lively debate among politicians and commentators in Russia. Most pro-government voices supported the initiative, albeit with different connotations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The idea was expectedly welcomed by representatives of the political establishment. Many commentators presented the news as Russia’s logical response to USAID’s longstanding activities. In the Russian information space, USAID is often portrayed as a \u00abdivision of the US intelligence services\u00bb. The negative image of the agency is used to justify the need for its own analogue – that if the US has been \u00abdeceiving the world\u00bb and promoting its interests through international aid for decades, Russia needs to have a similar mechanism. It is noteworthy that the idea of a \u00absymmetrical response\u00bb can be traced in the speeches of Russian officials and commentators. For example, propagandist Oleg Tsarev (a former member of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine who defected to Russia) supported the creation of the Russian USAID as a relevant step and discussed it in the context of strengthening Russia’s soft power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The moral and ideological superiority of the Russian approach is also emphasised. For example, Sergei Markov, a well-known political scientist from the pro-Kremlin camp, noted that the West offers the world such values as freedom, democracy, and technological development, while Russia should clearly articulate what it will offer. In his view, the idea of Russia as a carrier of \u00abconservative traditional values\u00bb has potential, but has not yet been finalised.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russian observers, who distance themselves from the Kremlin, have mixed views on the initiative. On the one hand, they note its significance in the context of Russia’s soft power policy. On the other hand, there are serious warnings about how the plan will be implemented. For example, the Telegram channel \u00abHrani\u00bb, commenting on Primakov’s statement, called it an \u00abimportant turn\u00bb in the construction of Russia’s soft power, but warned that the fact that a new structure has been created does not guarantee effectiveness, and that the results will depend on the personnel model of the new institution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Indeed, the previous experience of Russian humanitarian projects in the post-Soviet space is not very encouraging. \u00abHrani\u00bb notes that the expansion of the powers of existing agencies more often led to an imitation of vigorous activity than to real impact. In other words, the activities were carried out \u00abfor the sake of it\u00bb – for an internal report.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The initiative to create a Russian equivalent of USAID demonstrates Moscow’s awareness of the importance of soft power in the international arena. After years of passive cultural diplomacy, Russia is trying to build a more proactive and structured policy through international development projects. Russian propagandists and officials generally welcome the emergence of this new tool. However, along with enthusiasm, there is also a dose of scepticism. Critics point out that without a change in approach – without openness to non-state partners, a clear value message and a self-critical view – Russia’s soft power risks remaining a showcase for domestic use, without gaining real sympathy abroad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/uacrisis.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/image-14.png\")
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