The Russian authorities and state media portrayed Zapad 2025 as defensive maneuvers that were not directed against any other country. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stressed that these exercises were a continuation of military cooperation between two allies and a rehearsal of coordination, without the aim of threatening anyone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the same time, given the international resonance, the Kremlin used Zapad 2025 to intimidate European societies. Russian President Vladimir Putin, visiting the final stage of the exercises at the Mulino training ground in the Nizhny Novgorod region, said that \u00ab100,000 military personnel and about 10,000 pieces of weaponry and military equipment took part in the exercises. These included 333 aircraft: tactical aviation, strategic aviation, and military transport aviation. More than 247 ships were also used: surface ships, submarines, and support vessels\u00bb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, independent analysts and military experts question the scale and military significance of Zapad 2025. According to the Belarusian Ministry of Defense, about 7,000 military personnel were involved on Belarusian territory (of which only 1,000 were Russian troops), which is significantly less than in previous Zapad exercises. According to Western intelligence estimates published in the international media, up to 30,000 military personnel from the aggressor country and its ally Belarus actually took part in the exercises. Therefore, the actual scale of the exercises only confirms that the Russian army is currently not ready to deploy a large force outside the combat zone in Ukraine without undermining its own offensive potential.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Not All Zapads Are the Same<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Zapad 2025 exercise has caused concern among NATO neighbors and Western governments, as previous exercises in this series were used by the Kremlin for logistical preparation and informational camouflage of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Therefore, the event attracted considerable attention from the intelligence services of many countries and the international press. Back in the fall of 2024, when Moscow and Minsk announced the preparations for the maneuvers, Eastern European countries began to prepare for possible risks. After the OSCE’s official announcement in December 2024 about the Zapad 2025 maneuvers, anxiety and rhetoric about the \u00abaggressiveness\u00bb of these maneuvers intensified in the West. In early 2025, Poland announced its own large-scale Iron Defender exercises with NATO allies, which began on September 1, involving about 30,000 troops and 600 pieces of equipment, making them the largest maneuvers in Polish history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Against the backdrop of Zapad 2025, a number of Western countries resorted to specific security measures. Poland called the exercise scenario \u00abquite aggressive from the point of view of military doctrine\u00bb and closed its border with Belarus for an indefinite period on the day the exercises began. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia temporarily restricted civilian aviation access to their airspace and strengthened border controls in their eastern regions. At the same time, NATO deployed an enhanced air patrol mission called Eastern Sentry over the Baltic states and Poland, involving air defense and air force units from several Alliance countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Given the experience of 2021, the current maneuvers are viewed through the prism of the expansion of Russian aggression. For example, Julian R\u00f6pke, a columnist for the German newspaper Bild, suggested that during Zapad 2025, the Russians and Belarusians are practicing the capture of the Suwa\u0142ki Corridor (the territory of Poland between Belarus and the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation).<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, most experts agree that Russia currently lacks the resources to open a new front in the West. As Andriy Kovalenko (Center for Countering Disinformation of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine) noted, the Kremlin’s attempt to intimidate the West has failed\u2014the exercises have turned into more of a media show for domestic audiences. He emphasized that Russia had few allies (small contingents from Mali, Burkina Faso, and a few dozen Indian soldiers; traditional partners such as Armenia and Kazakhstan were absent). Against this backdrop, a number of international analysts described the Belarusian side’s invitation to NATO representatives to observe the exercises (observers from the US, Turkey, and Hungary visited the Belarusian training grounds) as an attempt by Lukashenko to \u00abflirt with the West\u00bb. Ultimately, most observers agree that Russia currently lacks the resources for large-scale operations beyond Ukraine. Another important argument is Beijing’s position: excessive escalation is contrary to the interests of China, for which the security of trade routes with Europe is important.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russian Propagandists Disappointed<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In the Russian segment of Telegram, the reaction to Zapad 2025 was mixed. Pro-government and propaganda channels mostly retransmitted official messages about the success of the exercises and emphasized their supposedly defensive nature. For example, the official channel of the Russian Ministry of Defense published videos of missile launches and aviation operations, emphasizing compliance with international rules and the \u00abplanned\u00bb nature of the actions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, many military correspondents close to the Kremlin were critical of what they saw. For example, the well-known Telegram channel \u00abVoenny Osvedomitel\u00bb called the maneuvers \u00abdetached from the realities of modern warfare\u00bb .The channel’s administrators noted that Russian Tu-22M3 and Su-34 bombers were dropping conventional bombs (without glide and correction modules) from low altitudes, while paratroopers loaded old BMD-2s onto Il-76 transport planes for a mass parachute drop behind enemy lines \u2014 in other words, they were recreating scenarios that seem anachronistic in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the media, the Zapad 2025 exercises were projected as a tool for demonstrating Moscow’s military power. Russia sought to simultaneously reassure its domestic audience and intimidate Western states. However, expert assessments\u2014even from the Russian side\u2014indicate that the actual content of the exercises did not correspond to the propaganda narrative. Moreover, NATO’s response indicates that the Zapad 2025 exercises proved to be an ineffective tool for achieving the Kremlin’s goal of instilling fear among European societies and undermining NATO unity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/uacrisis.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/image-2.png\")
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Tu-22M3 aircraft<\/em><\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n
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