{"id":352111,"date":"2025-10-29T00:44:06","date_gmt":"2025-10-28T22:44:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/uacrisis.org\/antyukrayinski-mesedzhi-v-cheskij-vyborchij-kampaniyi-2025"},"modified":"2026-01-19T23:32:45","modified_gmt":"2026-01-19T21:32:45","slug":"antyukrayinski-mesedzhi-v-cheskij-vyborchij-kampaniyi-2025","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/uacrisis.org\/en\/antyukrayinski-mesedzhi-v-cheskij-vyborchij-kampaniyi-2025","title":{"rendered":"Anti-Ukrainian Narratives in the 2025 Czech Election Campaign"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic, held on 3\u20134 October 2025, significantly changed the country\u2019s political landscape. The ANO 2011 movement (\u201cAction of Dissatisfied Citizens 2011\u201d), led by former Prime Minister Andrej Babi\u0161, won the elections, outperforming the ruling coalition. The election results paved the way for the formation of a new parliamentary majority led by ANO, with the participation of Tomio Okamura\u2019s Freedom and Direct Democracy party (SPD) and Motorist\u00e9 sob\u011b (AUTO). Observers noted the distinctly populist nature of the election campaign. Key themes promoted by opposition parties included dissatisfaction with inflation, rising energy prices, migration issues, and criticism of the EU\u2019s environmental policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Coalition negotiations are currently ongoing. From Ukraine\u2019s perspective, the most significant concern is the potential role of SPD, as the party consistently holds skeptical positions toward Ukraine and frequently echoes pro-Russian narratives. SPD is often described as a populist, radical, and authoritarian party, although it presents itself as national-conservative. The party opposes the EU\u2019s migration policy, calls for a referendum on the Czech Republic\u2019s withdrawal from the EU and NATO, supports cooperation with the Russian Federation, and advocates ending assistance to Ukraine, including revoking refugee status for Ukrainian citizens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to available information, the previous coalition agreement provides SPD gaining control over three government ministries. SPD is expected to take over the Ministries of Defence, Agriculture, and Transport, as well as nominate its candidate for the position of Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given the inclusion of right-wing populists from SPD in the governing coalition, the level of social protection for Ukrainians in the Czech Republic may decrease under pressure from ANO\u2019s coalition partners. It is worth mentioning that Ukrainians constitute the largest group of foreign nationals in the Czech Republic-over 581,000 people, accounting for 53% of all foreigners in the country. As of mid-2025, more than 378,000 individuals have been registered under the temporary protection programme, which grants Ukrainian refugees access to public health insurance, education, and the labour market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The new government programme is also expected to include cuts to funding related to support for Ukraine. As a result, Prague\u2019s role in the artillery ammunition coalition has come into question. According to Prime Minister Petr Fiala, from the beginning of Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion until the end of October 2025, the Czech Republic provided Ukraine with more than 3.7 million artillery shells through various financial mechanisms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic also highlighted a broader trend in the rhetoric of European far-right and far-left politicians: a shared criticism of national governments\u2019 policies of supporting Ukraine. In the Czech electoral campaign, the movement \u201cSta\u010dilo!\u201d (\u201cEnough!\u201d) became the main transmitter of pro-Russian narratives regarding Ukraine and the EU. However, the party\u2019s anti-Ukrainian messaging did not help it pass the electoral threshold.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, skepticism toward Ukraine-related policies resonates with a segment of the Czech electorate. According to a STEM survey conducted in June 2025, nearly 50% of respondents believed that military assistance to Ukraine was \u201ctoo extensive.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Source: STEM survey<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The same survey also showed that one third of Czechs place responsibility for the Russian\u2013Ukrainian war on Kyiv and the West. A total of 29% of respondents fully or partially agreed with the claim that Ukrainian statehood is \u201cartificial\u201d in nature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Source: STEM survey<\/a><\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Elections is a particularly vulnerable period in the information domain, characterized by an accelerated news cycle and an increased volume of media content related to socially and politically significant issues. In this context, the Hybrid Warfare Analysis Group examined anti-Ukrainian narratives disseminated during the 2025 election campaign in the Czech information space. The study focuses on the campaign messaging of the SPD party and the \u201cSta\u010dilo!\u201d movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Right-wing parties<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the end of March 2025, four right-wing political forces in the Czech Republic – SPD, PRO, Svobodn\u00ed, and Trikolora – announced the formation of a pre-election coalition under the leadership of SPD. The leaders of PRO, Svobodn\u00ed, and Trikolora were included on SPD\u2019s electoral list and, as a result of the vote, entered the newly elected Czech parliament.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The coalition presented itself as a \u201cgenuine alternative\u201d to the incumbent government. One of the key issues uniting these parties was their assessment of policy toward Ukraine –  particularly with regard to support for Ukraine in its war against Russia and the presence of Ukrainian refugees in the Czech Republic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The overall tone of SPD\u2019s rhetoric toward the Ukrainian state and support for Ukraine is distinctly negative. SPD leader Tomio Okamura and other party representatives openly criticize the Ukrainian authorities, portray Ukraine as a weak and unreliable ally, and oppose any substantial assistance to Kyiv.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Okamura regularly describes the current Ukrainian government as \u201ccorrupt, undemocratic, and semi-fascist.\u201d Since the beginning of the war, SPD publications have consistently promoted the narrative that Ukraine is an \u201cunserious partner\u201d plagued by nationalism and corruption. For example, in March 2025, Okamura stated that Ukraine \u201chas nothing in common with democracy.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The SPD leader has publicly expressed \u201cunderstanding\u201d for Russia\u2019s demand to \u201cdenazify\u201d Ukraine, referring to the fact that \u201cstreets in Ukraine are named after Stepan Bandera,\u201d which he described as unacceptable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The party consistently opposes Ukraine\u2019s Euro-Atlantic integration. Even before forming a coalition with other right-wing populist forces, SPD stated that \u201cUkraine\u2019s accession to NATO is unacceptable to us.\u201d In the past, Okamura openly argued that \u201cRussia should join NATO first,\u201d and only then could Ukraine\u2019s membership be discussed. According to SPD\u2019s narrative, Ukraine\u2019s accession to NATO would allegedly drag the Czech Republic into a \u201cforeign civil war.\u201d Similarly, SPD members express skepticism toward Ukraine\u2019s accession to the EU, emphasizing alleged economic and security risks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

SPD sharply criticizes the Czech government for its military and financial support for Kyiv. Okamura has repeatedly claimed that continued arms deliveries \u201conly prolong the conflict,\u201d which Ukraine allegedly \u201ccannot win by military means.\u201d SPD\u2019s position is to push for immediate peace negotiations, even at the cost of territorial concessions by Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

SPD systematically appeals to public dissatisfaction with the number of Ukrainian refugees. Okamura claims that the mass arrival of Ukrainians has \u201cworsened the housing situation and increased queues in hospitals.\u201d He insists on a \u201creview of all residence permits issued to Ukrainians in the Czech Republic.\u201d According to SPD, only Ukrainians who \u201cwork in positions unattractive to Czechs\u201d (low-paid or physically demanding jobs) should be allowed to stay.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A particularly illustrative statement was made by Okamura in September 2025:
\u201cWe are Czech politicians and we stand on the side of Czech citizens, so this is not out of hatred, but we must bring order to the presence of Ukrainians.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

SPD\u2019s rhetoric toward Ukraine, which had been hostile even prior to the coalition, remained consistently negative and became increasingly radicalized toward the autumn of 2025. While in the spring the emphasis was placed on the argument that the Czech Republic \u201cshould not exhaust itself by helping Ukraine\u201d and must \u201ccare primarily for Czechs,\u201d during the summer Okamura significantly intensified his information campaign.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Against the backdrop of news about Donald Trump\u2019s peace initiatives, the SPD leader effectively began to voice key Russian propaganda talking points, claiming that \u201cRussia is winning this war and the West must agree to Moscow\u2019s terms,\u201d including territorial concessions and the \u201cdenazification\u201d of Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Examples of SPD campaign materials. An example of SPD campaign material. The poster is accompanied by the following comment on social media: \u201cWe reject Ukraine\u2019s accession to the EU and NATO! SPD and our allies oppose Ukraine\u2019s membership in both NATO and the EU because it is a corrupt regime, and this would drag us into a conflict against Russia. Moreover, Ukraine\u2019s EU membership would mean that we would have to contribute to massive subsidies that Ukraine would receive upon accession\u2026 We advocate ending support for Ukraine and Ukrainians and revising residence permits for Ukrainians.\u201d<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n
\"\"
Examples of SPD campaign materials. An example of SPD campaign material. The poster is accompanied by the following comment on social media: \u201cEven in Ukraine\u2019s largest cities, streets are being renamed after the mass murderer and Nazi Bandera, and monuments are erected in his honor. Bandera\u2019s followers brutally murdered 60,000 Poles, Jews, and Czechs. It was the Banderites who greeted each other with the slogan \u2018Glory to Ukraine.\u2019\u201d<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n
\"\"
Examples of SPD campaign materials. An example of SPD campaign material. The poster is accompanied by the following comment on social media: \u201cAccording to SPD and its allies, Ukrainian so-called \u2018refugees\u2019 should return home. We say clearly: not a single crown more for Ukrainians!\u201d<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n
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Examples of SPD campaign materials. An example of SPD campaign material. The poster is accompanied by the following comment on social media: \u201cWe will not be dragged into war and will keep our soldiers at home! According to President Petr Pavel, the Czech Republic should participate with its soldiers in monitoring the future peace in Ukraine.\u201d<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

\u201cLaw, Respect, Expertise\u201d (PRO)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The leader of the PRO party, Jind\u0159ich Reichl, has adopted an even harsher public stance toward Ukraine. Although PRO formally speaks of \u201cpeace\u201d and the \u201cnational interests of the Czech Republic,\u201d in practice its rhetoric often directly mirrors Kremlin messaging. Reichl\u2019s speeches are saturated with accusations against Ukraine and the West, extending to the outright justification of Russia\u2019s actions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the beginning of 2025, Reichl still attempted to disguise his pro-Russian views under slogans of \u201cpeace\u201d and \u201cCzech patriotism.\u201d However, during the summer-particularly following Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency and his statements about the need to quickly \u201creach an agreement\u201d with Putin – the PRO leader effectively \u201cdropped the mask\u201d. By August\u2013September, his rhetoric had become nearly indistinguishable from Russian propaganda: he openly repeated Kremlin narratives and even called for coercive actions against Ukraine. This indicates that between March and September, PRO\u2019s position became markedly more hostile toward Ukraine, abandoning euphemisms altogether. The coalition with SPD appears to have further reinforced this trend.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reichl systematically discredits President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy. For instance, he publicly described Zelenskyy as \u201can emotionally unstable person addicted to cocaine, ready to do anything for his own survival,\u201d while labeling the transfer of advanced weapons to Ukraine as \u201cabsolute madness.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of Reichl\u2019s most radical statements was made in August 2025. The politician claimed that \u201cof the two warring states, we are supporting the one that attacks European energy infrastructure,\u201d referring to the alleged Ukrainian sabotage of the Druzhba oil pipeline, through which Russian energy resources are exported to Hungary and Slovakia. This narrative deliberately distorts cause-and-effect relationships, portraying Ukraine as an aggressor toward neighboring countries while ignoring Russia\u2019s systematic strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The most shocking narrative promoted by PRO is the proposal to direct NATO military force against Ukraine itself. Following the pipeline incident, Reichl stated that, were he in the position of the Hungarian or Slovak governments, he would \u201cdemand that NATO activate Article 5 and strike Ukraine, even militarily.\u201d He described Kyiv\u2019s actions as \u201cbrutal blackmail of Orb\u00e1n and Fico\u201d and emphasized that \u201cblackmailers must be dealt with mercilessly.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Like SPD, the PRO party advocates the immediate cessation of military assistance and financial support for Ukraine by the Czech Republic. Reichl accuses the Czech government of harming the country through its support for Ukraine, claiming it allegedly fuels inflation and budget deficits. PRO calls for focusing on domestic issues, arguing that as far as the war is concerned, \u201clet the United States and Russia negotiate\u2014Czechia should not interfere.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
The leader of the PRO party, Jind\u0159ich Raichl, posted a video on TikTok supporting the Hungarian authorities’ claims about the alleged beating and death of a Hungarian citizen in Transcarpathia during an attempted mobilization. Raichl claims in the video that “the same fate could have befallen a Czech citizen.” In fact, the official Budapest version of events was refuted<\/a> by the Ukrain<\/em>e<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n
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Screenshot from Jind\u0159ich Reichl\u2019s TikTok page<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Svobodn\u00ed<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The leader of the Svobodn\u00ed party, Libor Vondr\u00e1\u010dek, emphasizes that he is \u201cnot pro-Russian,\u201d while simultaneously arguing that Czechia should not spend money on Ukraine and should instead focus on its own domestic problems. Unlike SPD or PRO, representatives of Svobodn\u00ed less frequently rely on ideological or historical arguments; instead, they stress the financial dimension of the issue and principles of public governance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In March 2025, immediately after forming an alliance with the significantly more radical SPD and PRO, Vondr\u00e1\u010dek was forced to respond to accusations that Svobodn\u00ed had \u201cgotten into bed with pro-Russian forces.\u201d He justified the alliance by stating that it was \u201cnot pro-Russian\u201d and that the parties were united by shared pragmatic goals, while the issue of Ukraine was allegedly secondary. However, even then he acknowledged that \u201con the issue of Ukraine, we are in complete agreement with our coalition partners.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By autumn 2025, Svobodn\u00ed\u2019s rhetoric had noticeably converged with that of SPD. Although Vondr\u00e1\u010dek refrains from openly offensive statements toward Ukrainians, unlike Okamura or Reichl, he increasingly repeats their talking points almost verbatim. For example, in August, speaking at a supporters\u2019 convention, he claimed that \u201c70% of Czechs want peace as soon as possible, even at the cost of Ukrainian territory,\u201d citing opinion polls. This argument about the \u201cwill of the people\u201d had been actively used by Okamura and was subsequently adopted by Svobodn\u00ed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It should be noted that several moderate members of Svobodn\u00ed left the party due to the alliance with SPD, although party leaders do not publicly address these departures. In the information space, the party demonstrates unity with the coalition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The party\u2019s core message is the need to scale back state support for Ukraine. Vondr\u00e1\u010dek stated explicitly: \u201cWe should not send money to Ukraine, because we want low taxes and a \u2018lean\u2019 (cost-efficient) state.\u201d According to him, no state has a \u201cmoral obligation\u201d to assist another country, even if it has been subjected to aggression: \u201cA state has no morality – it serves its own citizens.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Svobodn\u00ed effectively propose an isolationist stance for Czechia. They argue that since Ukraine is not a NATO member, the war \u201cdoes not concern our defense commitments,\u201d and Prague should not devote significant resources to supporting Ukraine. Any foreign assistance, according to the party, should be provided solely through voluntary donations by citizens rather than from the state budget.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the coalition\u2019s programmatic documents, at Svobodn\u00ed\u2019s insistence, a demand was included to abolish the temporary protection regime for Ukrainian refugees. Instead, Ukrainians would be allowed to remain in the country only under standard asylum procedures. The party justifies this by claiming that there are allegedly \u201cno longer obstacles to the safe return\u201d of many refugees and that, therefore, a special regime is unnecessary. Although this position mirrors that of SPD and PRO, Svobodn\u00ed frame it in legal and economic terms, arguing that \u201cthe European policy of temporary protection no longer corresponds to reality.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Traditionally Eurosceptic, the party also opposes EU enlargement to the East. In interviews and podcasts, Vondr\u00e1\u010dek has stated bluntly: \u201cWe do not want Ukraine in the EU.\u201d Regarding NATO, he echoes the coalition\u2019s partners: in March 2025, the coalition announced a joint position that it would veto Ukraine\u2019s accession to NATO if it had the opportunity while in power. Svobodn\u00ed leader Libor Vondr\u00e1\u010dek also positively assessed, on TikTok, a vote by an SPD representative in the European Parliament against a resolution in support of Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The leader of the Svobodn\u00ed party, Libor Vondracek, positively assessed the vote of the SPD representative in the European Parliament against the resolution in support of Ukraine on TikTok <\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Trikolora<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Trikolora party, led by Zuzana Majerov\u00e1, holds positions close to those of SPD and PRO but places particular emphasis on criticism of the United States and the EU in the context of the war. Trikolora actively disseminates these messages through the social media accounts of its leader and party spokespersons, including party ideologue Zden\u011bk Koudelka.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As early as the beginning of 2025 – prior to the formal creation of the coalition – the party unequivocally supported the notion of \u201cUkrainian neutrality\u201d and blamed the West for the conflict. After uniting with SPD and PRO, these views gained a broader platform. The most notable change was an increase in public visibility: Majerov\u00e1 began appearing more frequently in televised debates, where she sharply criticized government policy toward refugees. For example, on the TV show \u201cCo \u010cech, to politik!\u201d she clashed with the pro-Ukrainian mayor Pavel Novotn\u00fd, insisting that the admission of Ukrainian children disadvantaged Czech children. Overall, Trikolora continues to consistently promote anti-Ukrainian messaging, acting in close alignment with SPD.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Trikolora openly repeats the Kremlin\u2019s claim that the West provoked the war. At the beginning of 2025, Koudelka published an essay that was subsequently shared by Majerov\u00e1 on Facebook. The text argued that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cUkraine could have been a buffer state between NATO and Russia, where neither side would dominate it. It could have been neutral and prosperous. Instead, the West – by supporting the Kyiv coup of 2014 and promising Ukraine NATO membership – placed Ukraine on a thorny path toward military suffering.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Like its coalition partners, Trikolora insists that arms deliveries to Ukraine must be stopped immediately and that negotiations should begin. However, the party often frames its position in humanitarian terms, arguing that \u201cthe continuation of the war only multiplies the number of victims.\u201d Trikolora frequently cites opinion polls – specifically the same claim that 70% of Czechs support a rapid peace even at the cost of Ukrainian territory – to argue that a majority of Czech citizens are allegedly willing to \u201csacrifice\u201d part of Ukraine in exchange for peace.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Trikolora\u2019s rhetoric toward Ukrainians who have found refuge in the Czech Republic is reduced to the message that \u201cthey create problems for Czechs and should return home.\u201d Zuzana Majerov\u00e1 has repeatedly claimed that the presence of Ukrainians overburdens the education system and social services. For example, she stated: \u201cOur children cannot get into kindergartens because of [the presence of] Ukrainians.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In June 2025, Majerov\u00e1 openly supported SPD\u2019s demand to deport most Ukrainian refugees, writing: \u201cAccording to SPD\u2019s position, Ukrainian refugees should return home\u2026\u201d She added that government arms deliveries only prolong the conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In publications by party spokespersons, themes such as NATO\u2019s bombing of Yugoslavia or Western colonial conquests are frequently invoked to divert attention from Russia\u2019s contemporary aggression. In the aforementioned essay, Koudelka emphasized that the \u201cAmerican attack on Yugoslavia destroyed the post\u2013Cold War peace\u201d and argued that the United States sought to \u201cmonopolize the right to conduct military strikes,\u201d but that Russia thwarted these plans in 2022. These narratives are intended to undermine the moral legitimacy of supporting Ukraine by suggesting that the West is \u201cnot without sin\u201d and therefore has no right to lecture others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
Screenshot of a comment by Zuzana Majerov\u00e1 on Trikolora\u2019s official Facebook page. Direct quote: \u201cWe must do everything to ensure that a significant share of Ukrainians return home rather than prepare to receive new ones. After all, if there is peace in Ukraine, there will be no reason to provide Ukrainians with asylum, let alone to support them. And we have long clearly stated that we insist on reviewing the status of all Ukrainians who have been in Czechia since 2022.\u201d<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

STA\u010cILO!<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the opposite ideological flank of the Czech political spectrum, the most visible political force at present is STA\u010cILO! (\u201cEnough!\u201d) – a broad coalition of left-wing political parties. The left-wing alliance was led by Kate\u0159ina Kone\u010dn\u00e1, leader of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KS\u010cM), who became the key transmitter of the movement\u2019s campaign messaging in Czech media and social networks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

STA\u010cILO! built its election campaign around issues of social protection for \u201cordinary people.\u201d Party spokespersons regularly emphasized the \u201cproblems of ordinary Czechs,\u201d in particular the shortage of doctors, medicines, and social services. At the same time, according to STA\u010cILO!\u2019s interpretation, one of the main causes of this situation lies in the expenditures of Petr Fiala\u2019s government on strengthening the Czech defence sector and on supporting Ukraine. It is therefore unsurprising that calls to immediately halt arms supplies to Ukraine were regularly voiced at the party\u2019s election rallies, videos of which were widely disseminated on social media in short-form formats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
The leader of STA\u010cILO!, Kate\u0159ina Kone\u010dn\u00e1, has accused the President of Ukraine of personal corruption on TikTok, without providing any evidence to substantiate these claims<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Notably, during public events held as part of the election campaign, STA\u010cILO! representatives largely avoided focusing on Russian aggression as the cause of the war. Instead, they shifted responsibility onto the West, promoting narratives about an allegedly aggressive NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Also characteristic of the rhetoric of Europe\u2019s far-left political forces, STA\u010cILO! spokespersons made statements \u201cexposing\u201d alleged cases of \u201cneo-Nazism in Ukraine\u201d and criticized Kyiv\u2019s official interpretation of World War II history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, unlike right-wing parties, Czech communists devoted significantly less attention to migration during the election campaign. The issue of Ukrainian refugees in Czechia was instead framed through the lens of prioritizing the interests and rights of Czech citizens. These messages were integrated into STA\u010cILO!\u2019s broader information strategy, which combined socially oriented slogans with interpretations of government policy that closely mirrored Russian propaganda narratives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, on the issue of Ukraine, the positions of left-wing and right-wing political forces in Czechia reveal numerous points of convergence. One notable example of this \u201cmisalliance\u201d between STA\u010cILO! and SPD is their shared stance on removing Ukrainian symbols from official Czech institutions-symbols that had been displayed since 2022 as a sign of solidarity with Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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STA\u010cILO! spokesperson Roman Roun stated: \u201cI would not hang the flags of foreign states on government buildings.\u201d<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n
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STA\u010cILO! spokesperson Roman Roun stated: \u201cI would not hang the flags of foreign states on government buildings.\u201d<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Summarizing the findings, the authors of the study identify the following trends in Czech politics highlighted by the 2025 election campaign:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Risks to continued support for Ukraine.<\/strong>
A future coalition led by ANO, potentially involving SPD, implies a revision of Prague\u2019s policy toward Ukraine. A reduction in financial and military assistance is expected, alongside a reassessment of support programs for Ukrainian refugees and a gradual decrease in Czech participation in European security initiatives related to Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Convergence of radical right and left rhetoric on Ukraine.<\/strong>
A defining feature of the elections was the rapprochement between the extreme flanks of the Czech political spectrum – SPD and STA\u010cILO! – on issues related to Russian aggression and support for Ukraine. This convergence indicates the transformation of anti-Ukrainian rhetoric into a broader anti-Western, anti-elite, and pro-Russian narrative that increasingly influences public opinion and the political agenda in Czechia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Strengthening of Ukraine-skeptical tendencies in Czech political discourse.<\/strong>
The elections demonstrated a drift of Czech politics toward populism, Euroscepticism, and pragmatic isolationism. Both far-right and far-left forces used anti-Ukrainian rhetoric as a tool of electoral mobilization, combining it with criticism of the government\u2019s policies on support for Ukraine and assistance to Ukrainian refugees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Volodymyr Solovian, Mykyta Kuzmenko<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic, held on 3\u20134 October 2025, significantly changed the country\u2019s political landscape. The ANO 2011 movement (\u201cAction of Dissatisfied Citizens 2011\u201d), led by former Prime Minister Andrej Babi\u0161, won the elections, outperforming the ruling coalition. The election results paved the way for the formation of […] More<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":36,"featured_media":352112,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[700,699],"tags":[],"section":[726],"form":[31936],"yoast_head":"\nAnti-Ukrainian Narratives in the 2025 Czech Election Campaign | UACRISIS.ORG<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic, held on 3\u20134 October 2025, significantly changed the country\u2019s political landscape. 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