At the end of 2025, Russian political media were stirred by rumors about the possible resignation of long-serving Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Throughout November, Lavrov was absent from a number of key events, fueling speculation that he had fallen \u201cout of favour\u201d with Vladimir Putin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On 5 November, the minister did not attend a meeting of Russia\u2019s Security Council, making him the only permanent member to be absent. Lavrov also missed Putin\u2019s meeting with the President of Kazakhstan on 12 November and, for the first time, did not lead the Russian delegation at the G20 summit in South Africa (22-23 November), where he was replaced by economic adviser Maxim Oreshkin. Instead of Lavrov, Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk was dispatched to the ASEAN summit in Malaysia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The culmination of the rumors surrounding the head of Russian diplomacy was the absence of Russian Foreign Ministry representatives from informal peace-related talks held in Moscow on 1-2 December with the participation of American representatives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the same time, Western media published reports suggesting the Kremlin was dissatisfied with <\/strong>Sergey Lavrov\u2019<\/strong>s performance. The Financial Times, citing sources, reported that a planned summit in Budapest between Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump (October 2026) was allegedly derailed due to Lavrov\u2019s \u201ctough and inflexible\u201d stance during telephone talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Lavrov was said to have presented a list of unacceptable conditions regarding Ukraine, which angered the Americans and prompted them to cancel the meeting. The FT quoted a person familiar with the matter as saying: \u201cLavrov is clearly tired and believes he has more important things to do than engage with the United States, despite Putin\u2019s desire for the meeting.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rumors were further fueled by the Russian Telegram sphere. The channel Nezygar (approximately 400,000 subscribers) circulated claims that after the unsuccessful call with Marco Rubio, Vladimir Putin had a \u201cserious conversation\u201d with Sergey Lavrov, expressing his dissatisfaction. According to Nezygar\u2019s sources, Lavrov conducted that conversation \u201cin an extremely tense manner, refusing to engage in discussion with the Secretary of State,\u201d possibly adhering too literally to the Kremlin\u2019s hardline instructions. In the channel\u2019s account, the publication in the Financial Times was seen by Foreign Ministry-linked sources as a kind of Western \u201coperation\u201d that dealt a painful blow to the minister\u2019s pride. \u201cThe truth is that Lavrov is indeed tired, and the number of his detractors inside the Kremlin has grown,\u201d Nezygar quoted an informant as saying. The same sources claimed: \u201cIt is obvious that he has lost Putin\u2019s favor and now appears to be the weak link.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Against the backdrop of these discussions, Dmitry Peskov was repeatedly forced to issue denials. On 7 November, he stated that reports about the minister falling out of favor \u201cdid not correspond to reality.\u201d On 21 November, Putin even demonstratively gave the floor to Lavrov as the main speaker at a Security Council meeting, emphasizing his importance. And on 28 November, commenting on the rumors, the president dismissed them sharply: \u201cThis is nonsense. No one has fallen out of favor.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite the official denials, the situation exposed a split within the foreign policy establishment. As the outlet Bloknot noted, Lavrov\u2019s Foreign Ministry favors a hardline confrontation with the West, while veteran diplomat and Putin adviser Yury Ushakov is more inclined toward dialogue. During the events described, it was Ushakov (together with Dmitriev) who actively urged Putin to seek a compromise with Trump, whereas Lavrov and his deputy Sergei Ryabkov maintained a more uncompromising line. It was telling that when Ryabkov publicly spoke sharply about the \u201cunconstructive\u201d nature of contacts with the new U.S. administration, Ushakov publicly rebuked him, thereby signaling support for a course toward de-escalation. This confrontation between \u201chawks\u201d and \u201cpragmatists\u201d within the Kremlin\u2019s foreign policy inner circle reached its peak at the end of 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Although Lavrov has retained his post for now (likely to avoid creating an impression of panic ahead of the March 2026 presidential election), his authority has been shaken. There is speculation that if peace agreements with the United States prove successful, the role of Lavrov and the Foreign Ministry will be further marginalized, and Lavrov himself may be moved into an honorary retirement. Possible scenarios mentioned include his appointment as Speaker of the Federation Council, while the post of foreign minister could go to Sergey Naryshkin or Yuri Ushakov.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia\u2019s Soft Power: Reshaping Its “Image”<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In the sphere of \u201csoft power\u201d and ideology, 2025 also saw personnel changes reflecting a shift in the Kremlin\u2019s policy priorities. The most striking example was the appointment of Igor Chaika (son of former Russian Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika) as deputy head of Rossotrudnichestvo in March of last year. Rossotrudnichestvo is a federal agency responsible for work with compatriots abroad, cultural diplomacy, and humanitarian projects – essentially Russia\u2019s equivalent of USAID. Since 2020, it has been headed by Yevgeny Primakov, the grandson of former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Until recently, the younger Primakov had sought to cultivate a relatively soft image for the agency, emphasizing educational programs and cultural initiatives. However, Chaika\u2019s appointment signaled that the Kremlin intends to strengthen the more aggressive component of the so-called \u201chumanitarian front.\u201d Chaika, who has a reputation as a businessman linked to shadowy schemes, previously headed Rossotrudnichestvo\u2019s Public Council and, according to reports, \u201cmade a name for himself in Moldova\u201d through interference in local affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Notably, Chaika\u2019s appointment came immediately after Moldova and Azerbaijan closed Russian cultural centers on their territories, accusing them of subversive activities. By elevating to a senior post a figure linked to political scandals in Moldova, Moscow issued a demonstrative challenge: in effect, it signaled that there would be no rollback of the \u201cRussian world\u201d agenda – on the contrary, the emphasis would be on even harsher methods. In recent years, Rossotrudnichestvo has increasingly been involved in propaganda efforts supporting the war, including exhibitions about alleged \u201ccrimes of Ukraine\u201d and fundraising campaigns for the Russian army, as seen, for example, at the Russian House in Ankara. The leadership reshuffle therefore forms part of a broader course toward the centralization and radicalization of the \u201chumanitarian\u201d bloc under the control of figures from the president\u2019s inner circle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Personnel Chessboard of Putin\u2019s Administration<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In August of last year Putin reorganized the structure of his administration by creating a Directorate for Strategic Cooperation. According to the plan, the new directorate is tasked with international activities, primarily overseeing cooperation with countries of the former USSR and with African states. In October 2025, the unit within the Russian presidential administration was placed under the direct leadership of Vadim Titov, who had previously served as CEO of the company \u201cRosatom – International Network.\u201d At the same time, First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Sergey Kiriyenko, who is known for overseeing the Kremlin\u2019s domestic political track, was appointed as its curator.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The establishment of the Directorate for Strategic Cooperation was preceded by the dissolution of two older departments within the Presidential Administration – those responsible for cultural and cross-border cooperation – which had previously been overseen by Dmitry Kozak. This points to a redistribution of spheres of influence in favor of Kiriyenko\u2019s team.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another sign of this trend was the creation, within the Presidential Administration, of a Main Administrative Center for Personnel Training. Sergey Kiriyenko launched programs aimed at the \u201cmanagerialization\u201d of the state apparatus in order to \u201ccultivate a new elite\u201d in the spirit of technocratic patriotism. The movement \u201cParental Care,\u201d established in 2022, and the project \u201cNew People\u201d have also continued their activities – all of these initiatives are designed to reinforce the ideology of \u201ctraditional values\u201d and support the pro-Putin majority ahead of the elections. Notably, throughout 2025 the Russian authorities adopted a series of laws entrenching an ultra-conservative ideological course: a total ban on LGBT-related content, the expansion of the \u201cFoundations of Russian Statehood\u201d course in educational curricula, increased control over books and films, and similar measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n The personnel decisions that have been made indicate that, on the one hand, they increase loyalty, as senior Russian officials are well aware of the risks of disobedience. On the other hand, this personnel \u201ccirculation\u201d reveals the regime\u2019s vulnerability. Ahead of the 2026 elections – when a new composition of the State Duma as well as a number of governors are to be elected in the autumn – the Kremlin is relying on the controlled mobilization of the electorate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The personnel reshuffles have confirmed that Russia has no intention of retreating from its aggressive rhetoric. Putin is sending a clear signal to the elites: no one is indispensable – even such pillars of the regime as Shoigu or Lavrov can be sidelined if this is necessary to preserve the system. Lavrov, although he has kept his post, has been put in his place, and Putin\u2019s aide Yuri Ushakov – long known for his hardline stance on Ukraine – has been brought in alongside him for support and oversight. Chaika\u2019s appointment at Rossotrudnichestvo likewise indicates that Moscow is ready to move away from attempts to imitate classic \u201csoft power\u201d practices and toward hybrid forms of aggression in various regions of the world<\/p>\n\n\n\n Overall, the personnel reshuffles of late 2025 and early 2026 indicate that the Kremlin is consolidating its governing apparatus. Putin has placed at key nodes individuals he personally trusts – friends and relatives of close associates – betting on technocratic efficiency at the rear and ideological loyalty on all fronts, from the trenches to the negotiating table. The domestic political course has become even more conservative, and the rhetoric more belligerent (notably, 2026 was ushered in with New Year speeches about a \u201csacred struggle\u201d and massive missile strikes against Ukraine). At the same time, no systemic changes have taken place: the Kremlin continues to show no signs of readiness for ideological relaxation or for a genuine search for sustainable peace.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"![\"\"](\"https:\/\/uacrisis.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/image-6-1024x628.png\")
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