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<\/figure><\/li><\/ul><\/figure>\n\n\n\nIn order to summarize the findings, a number of key trends were identified.. First and foremost, the attempt to use social media, and primarily TikTok, to spread pro-Russian narratives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cThis trend, even in the Ukrainian context, should be reflected not only in the work of analytical groups and civil society organizations, but, I believe, should also resonate with government authorities in order to raise media literacy and avoid the risks that Russia will create for us specifically through the use of TikTok bloggers,\u201d said the HWAG team leader Volodymyr Solovian on this matter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
He is convinced that since Russia does not restrict itself to any moral or ethical norms in campaigns organized using artificial intelligence, Ukrainians should not limit themselves to certain ethical frameworks either, provided these information operations are directed against Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
According to Fedir Shandor, Ukraine\u2019s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Hungary, despite the influence of TikTok or any new social media platforms, voters should not be underestimated. In Hungary, people are simply tired of the fact that for any problem\u2014whether it\u2019s municipal issues, bad roads, or poor quality of education or healthcare\u2014Orb\u00e1n\u2019s party has claimed that Ukraine is to blame for everything.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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\u201cToday, the media and political establishment, and the Hungarian electorate as a whole, are shocked by how the Fidesz party has completely disappeared from the scene. And other parties waging anti-Ukrainian propaganda should reflect on this<\/em>. This means these tactics are not working<\/em>,\u201d the diplomat concluded.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Vadym Halaychuk, First Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Ukraine\u2019s Integration into the European Union and Member of the Ukrainian Parliament, noted that the Russians are quick learners, constantly changing their tactics and strategy. Therefore, we must actively monitor the decisions that will be made in the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cIt\u2019s very good that there are studies like this that allow us to stay focused, stay alert, and understand how the Russians operate. We have extensive experience in Ukraine; this is being addressed by both government agencies and many civil society organizations, even commercial entities, which conduct high-quality monitoring that helps us understand these active Russian influence operations and develop recommendations for countering them,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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How did it happen that in Moldova, where a third of the population is pro-Russian and hundreds of millions of dollars were poured in from Russia, the Russians lost? Mihai Vacariu, an associate professor at the Faculty of Journalism and Communication Sciences at the University of Bucharest, cited one of the reasons. He believes this happened because President Maia Sandu built a highly effective system to counter Russian propaganda, and Europe should follow the example of such determination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A key difference in the 2024\u20132025 campaigns was that Russia shifted\u2014or more precisely, transformed\u2014from classic propaganda campaigns to a system of hybrid aggression, where various processes and tools are synchronized. This view was expressed by Lidiia Smola, a professor at the Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute and a political analyst.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cRussian intelligence agencies radically differentiate the tools they use depending on the strength of the target country\u2019s state institutions and its level of economic development. In other words, the same tools were not used in every country. And the main feature lay in this flexibility. In the upcoming elections, Ukraine must remember that Russia exploited the real internal problems of each country during all these election campaigns. It did not create new conflicts, but rather monitored social conflicts, identified problem areas, and amplified them<\/em>.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
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Tiina Ilsen, Chair of the Board of the International Practitioners\u2019 Partnership Network (PractNet), arrived in Kyiv to share Estonia\u2019s experience with countries that wish to stay on a European course. Before speaking on behalf of the Estonians, she bowed to the Ukrainians and thanked them for what they are doing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cYou stand with us, and we will do whatever is needed for our Ukrainian friends,<\/em>\u201d the guest assured the audience.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Tiina Ilsen commented on the election outcomes discussed in the study and acknowledged that external manipulation has become a common practice, as various forces see windows of opportunity in different elections and seek to influence countries according to their own needs or desires. This is what happened in Sakartvelo, where voter intimidation tactics were used to seize power\u2014a weapon the Kremlin always pulls out when it needs to influence another country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And that is one situation. A completely different one has emerged in Moldova, where the young democracy has learned the lessons of other countries and prepared to defend itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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\u201cThey said: \u2018We know nothing, and we need to learn more.\u2019 That\u2019s when the changes began. We began preparing in 2022 and continued in 2023, studying how to build state strategic communications, how to foster resilience, how to make people proud of their self-sufficiency, and what it means to feel secure in one\u2019s own country. And this is methodological work\u2014strategic communications and their capacity within government institutions, the security sector, civil society, and the media. When it comes to cooperation, it\u2019s about creating the sense that it\u2019s not the government versus civil society, but that everyone shares a common responsibility to make the country a place where people want to live. And this isn\u2019t a matter of one person being at fault for another. It\u2019s a collective effort by all parts of society. And it doesn\u2019t happen overnight; it takes work. And that\u2019s what Moldovans have been doing,\u201d emphasized the Chair of the Board of the International Practitioners\u2019 Partnership Network.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
According to her, if people do not understand the core values of their society, it becomes extremely difficult to combat hostile information. Successful resilience against disinformation requires the resilience of the entire society. Government institutions alone are not enough. In addition to values, people need positive prospects for the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cSuccess comes from consistent initiatives. When the government becomes reactive, it opens the information space to sophisticated operations. So, no matter what the Russians do with their narratives, they cannot offer a safe and prosperous future to any of us<\/em>,\u201d emphasized Tiina Ilsen.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
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At the conclusion of the discussion, Volodymyr Solovian identified the key points Ukraine should focus on to protect itself from Russian influence in the upcoming elections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Influencing elections is not a separate campaign, he believes. It is merely one aspect of Russia\u2019s long-term information influence. Therefore, interventions during the elections themselves should be viewed as a period of greatest informational vulnerability, but at the same time, these campaigns must be analyzed in terms of Russia\u2019s long-term influences and strategies. Their overall goal generally aligns with the Kremlin\u2019s geopolitical ambitions regarding a specific country. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The rise to power of pro-Russian opposition forces is not necessarily Russia\u2019s goal. It may seem that the Kremlin primarily focuses on victory and regime change; consequently, if this strategy fails, the Kremlin is considered to have suffered a defeat. However, in reality, the Kremlin\u2019s intentions might be to affect the policies of the incumbent government, as by stirring up society with certain fears, the Kremlin can influence state policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cI\u2019d like to say a few words about social media. For Ukraine, the most pressing threat is TikTok. While in 2019 Telegram was the main platform for the infiltration of Russian narratives, now it\u2019s TikTok. We\u2019re seeing a network of pseudo-bloggers emerging. Some of them operate from European Union countries. Unfortunately, Austria is currently the largest of such hubs. And precisely because Ukraine does not even have physical access to the tools needed to block these channels, we do not have access to TikTok\u2019s information dissemination algorithms. This poses threats in the context of upcoming elections in Ukraine. As for the use of artificial intelligence, Ukraine must act in kind. We cannot afford the luxury of limiting ourselves to certain ethical norms regarding the Russians when it comes to the application of artificial intelligence<\/em>,\u201d noted the head of the Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group of the Ukraine Crisis Media Center.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
The fear of war, which the Russians have been actively manipulating lately, will no longer work in Ukraine\u2019s elections. Other trigger points will be sought\u2014public dissatisfaction with the consequences of the war and mobilization. Additionally, once active hostilities end, the demand for social justice will increase. This will create a foundation on which certain radical projects may emerge\u2014projects that may not necessarily be directly pro-Russian but will attack the pro-European course or attempt to promote an agenda that risks affecting the dynamics and prospects of Ukraine\u2019s European integration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The discussion also featured Pavel Havl\u00ed\u010dek, a research fellow at the Association for International Affairs (Czech Republic); Valeriu Pa\u0219a, a political expert and head of the Watch Dog community (Moldova); Tinatin Khidasheli (Georgia), head of Civic IDEA and former Minister of Defense of Georgia; Arnold Bleyan (Armenia), head of the Armenian Center for Democracy and Security Affairs; and Dementii Bilyi, political scientist and head of the Kherson Regional Organization of the Committee of Voters of Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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