In an interview with Freedom TV, Mykyta Kuzmenko, an analyst at the Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group, explains why Ukraine is increasingly carrying out successful strikes against targets deep inside Russia, why Russian air defense is unable to cover the country\u2019s entire territory, and how this affects Russia\u2019s internal stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Text version:<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Recently, we have seen Ukraine scaling up its long-range strikes. Moreover, these strikes are now targeting not only oil refineries but also enterprises of the Russian defense industry. Is this only a problem of Russian air defense, or are there other reasons?<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n In my view, there are several factors explaining why we are increasingly seeing successful strikes against not only oil infrastructure but also Russia\u2019s military industry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The first reason is the limited capacity of Russia\u2019s air defense system. Its effectiveness, quantity, and distribution remain highly questionable. A significant share of Russian air defense assets is concentrated near the front line and around Moscow. This was especially visible ahead of the May 9 parade, when the Russian authorities tried to provide maximum protection for the capital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, the Russian Federation is not systematically capable of covering facilities in the Urals, the Volga region, or other remote areas. There are many such facilities, they are located across a vast territory, and their full protection would require an extremely large number of expensive air and missile defense systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The second reason is the rapid development of Ukraine\u2019s long-range strike capabilities. Ukraine has significantly increased its ability to hit targets deep inside Russia. This includes drones, missiles, and combined strike systems capable of operating at distances of hundreds and even thousands of kilometers. According to some estimates, certain Ukrainian developments may be able to reach targets at a range of up to 1,500\u20133,000 kilometers. This has become a challenge for Russian air defense for which it was not prepared.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The third factor is the symbolic and psychological effect. Ukrainian strikes are increasingly reaching cities that, in Russian historical memory, were considered deep and unreachable rear areas. During the Second World War, it was precisely to such regions that enterprises, parts of industry, and elements of state administration were evacuated from Moscow and central Russia. These areas were regarded as a kind of \u201cimpregnable fortress\u201d that the enemy could not reach.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now this illusion has been destroyed. Ukrainian strikes are reaching defense-industrial facilities, putting them out of operation, and demonstrating to Russian society that the war is no longer something distant and abstract.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So this is not only about a military effect, but also about a political and psychological one?<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Yes. This directly affects the morale of Russian society. For residents of remote regions, there long existed an illusion of safety. They could perceive the war as something happening far away \u2014 at the front, in Ukraine, in border regions \u2014 but not near them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now this illusion is gradually being destroyed. Russians see explosions, airport closures, and strikes on enterprises that are part of Russia\u2019s military-industrial complex or strategic industry. This means that the war is coming to regions that previously considered themselves protected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this way, the tacit social contract that Putin offered the Russian population after the start of the full-scale war is being eroded. Its essence was simple: the army fights, while most citizens do not feel the consequences of the war in their everyday lives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Today, however, Russians are increasingly seeing the consequences of the war. Although the Russian population remains fairly passive and loyal to the Kremlin, the growing number of strikes on rear-area facilities inside Russia may gradually undermine the sense of stability and security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It seems that Putin\u2019s social contract primarily applies to Moscow, St. Petersburg, and several other major cities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For the Kremlin, Moscow and St. Petersburg have special political significance. They are the political and economic centers of the regime and symbols of Russia\u2019s imperial past. The authorities are interested in ensuring that residents of these cities feel the war unleashed by Putin as little as possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, this means that other regions remain much less protected. Ukrainian strikes regularly reach deep into the territory of the Russian Federation, including the Urals, where important centers of Russia\u2019s military-industrial complex, heavy industry, and oil sector are located.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example, on April 25, the first Ukrainian drone strike on Yekaterinburg was recorded. On the same day, strikes were reported on the Shagol airbase in Chelyabinsk Oblast. The number of attacks on Perm has also increased significantly. Whereas previously only isolated UAV incidents had been recorded there, in 2026 the local authorities were already forced to temporarily close the airport.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukrainian long-range strikes are becoming a systemic factor influencing the military, economic, and domestic political situation in Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia constantly talks about its partners, about support from China, Iran, and North Korea, and about the involvement of foreigners in drone production, including in Yelabuga. If Russia is so strong, why is it unable to protect its strategic enterprises? Is this a shortage of resources, money, or technology?<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Several factors overlap here. First of all, air and missile defense systems are among the most expensive weapons systems. Only certain types of missile weapons or naval platforms may be more expensive. Full coverage of a large territory requires enormous financial, technological, and production resources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition, defense against aerial targets is not simply a matter of having a launcher. To repel an attack, one needs a sufficient number of interceptor missiles, radars, trained crews, and command-and-control systems. To destroy a single aerial target, two or more interceptor missiles are often needed. In other words, if, hypothetically, ten strike assets are incoming, at least twenty missiles may be required for guaranteed interception.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Often, an interceptor missile may cost more than a strike drone. This is why mass long-range strikes create a serious economic problem for Russia: even if some targets are intercepted, the defensive process exhausts financial and industrial resources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Can Russia\u2019s partners help it with air and missile defense systems?<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n In theory, Russia may seek such support, but in practice the circle of potential partners is very limited. Iran currently needs air and missile defense systems itself, so it is unlikely to be a stable source of such assistance. North Korea does not have enough modern technology in this area.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That leaves China, but this raises another question: to what extent is the Chinese leadership ready to share sensitive defense technologies with Russia and take on additional political risks?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, even with partners, Russia cannot quickly resolve the shortage of air and missile defense capabilities. It is forced to make a choice: to protect Moscow, the front line, and selected critically important facilities, or to spread its resources across the entire country. The Kremlin chooses the first option.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Can we say that Ukrainian long-range strikes are already affecting Russia\u2019s economy?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Yes, and this is an important point. It is telling that even Russian analysts have begun to take Ukrainian long-range strikes into account as a factor of economic impact. In particular, according to some estimates, the forecast for Russian GDP growth in 2026 was lowered partly because of the consequences of such strikes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What matters is that these are not only assessments by Western institutions or the Ukrainian side. Even within the Russian expert discussion, Ukrainian long-range strikes are gradually becoming part of the economic agenda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is logical, because strikes on oil refineries, defense-industrial enterprises, industrial facilities, logistics, and airports create not only a military effect. They affect production, transport, insurance, regional economies, budget expenditures, and the overall sense of stability inside Russia.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"