\n
Research Brief:\u00a0<\/strong>\u201cRussian annexation of Crimean Peninsula: reasons and outcomes\u201d<\/p>\n More than a year has passed since Russian \u2018polite people,\u2019 or \u2018green men\u2019 appeared in Crimea and following an unrecognized referendum, Crimean peninsula\u2019s annexation occurred. Nevertheless, Crimea still remains in the focus of the international community as the situation keeps developing and even gains new momentum. World political analysts claim that there are no economic advantages of the decision to annex the Ukrainian territory, contrarily it creates various difficulties for Russian authorities due to economic sanctions and increased hostility of Western countries. This paper seeks to explain the reasons for such a decision and discuss its aftermath.<\/p>\n But is there something specific about Crimea? Or is its annexation just a part of a common new paradigm? Trenin argues that \u201cIt was precisely Crimea, \u2026, that was the one area most Russians felt strongly about[1]<\/a>.\u201d However, Galeotti and Bowen stress that annexation of Crimea \u201cby any rational calculation, did not make sense[2]<\/a>.\u201d Thus other motivations could play in favour, such as symbolical meaning, since peninsula could be viewed as a key sphere of influence within the concept of a\u2019Russian world.\u2019 Or Crimea\u2019s annexation could just be a part of a \u2018reset\u2019 in relations between Russia and the West \u2013 in a demonstration of power. There are various official explanations of reasons by Kremlin propaganda, such as official demand to protect Russian-speaking people made by then President Yanukuvych, but they obviously don\u2019t reveal true motivations. Below I propose four possible answers-scenarios of why Russia made the decision to annex peninsula:<\/p>\n The first proposed and the simplest answer to this question is that Russia did it because it could. Chief editor of the German newspaper Die Zeit<\/em>, Josef Joffe called Putin master tactician and strategist, he claimed that \u201cPutin is just using opportunities as they become available[3]<\/a>,\u201d and also that \u201che carefully, coolly and cynically calculated all the risks, he sees little risk, he realizes that he has not met a serious confrontation from the West[4]<\/a>.\u201d Contrarily, Nikolay Zlobin, President of Centre on Global Interests (USA) during a meeting with EURUS students in November 2015, he claimed that Putin doesn\u2019t have any long-term strategy \u201cPutin runs form corner to corner and on each he reevaluates the risk and possibilities and then makes decisions,\u201d but he is a very good tactician. Zlobin also mentioned the fact that currently Obama is president of the United States and plays an important role, since he maintains \u201crelative softness in relation to Russia[5]<\/a>.\u201d Taking into consideration the weakness of the Ukrainian state due to practical absence of government and a president, and shock after murders of civil unarmed protesters on the streets, Russia could counted on the confusion and delayed response from the Ukrainian side to its actions in Crimea. Therefore, Russia wasn\u2019t bounded neither by a strong Western response, nor by Ukrainian actions, leaving Putin to seize the opportunity. Nevertheless, it seems that this decision creates more problems than new possibilities, but this will be discussed in details further.<\/p>\n Another scenario is that Russia strategically demands presence of its military fleet in the Black Sea in order to be able to protect itself from surrounding NATO counties. Since the regime in Kyiv has changed and Ukrainians express strong pro-European positions, Russia is afraid that NATO would place its bases on the territory of Ukraine and Crimea in particular. This point is directly linked with previously discussed Russia\u2019s perception of its right to have regional and global interests and protect their key spheres of influence. In the documentary dedicated to the first anniversary of the return of the Crimea in the bosom of Mother-Russia, Putin himself and other interviewed officials repeatedly stress that Russia has to fulfill its \u201cduty and protect Crimean people from NATO units and United States Navy[6]<\/a>.\u201d And Putin officially claimed Russian military presence only a year after annexation in above mentioned documentary. However, during the ongoing Crimean campaign high Russian authorities denied its participation. For example, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu \u201ccalled provocation media photos of Russian military equipment in Crimea. When asked by journalists whether Russian troops present in the Crimea, the Minister again replied: \u201cNo, absolutely[7]<\/a>.\u201d If Russia was protecting people from military threats, why didn\u2019t they officially admit it? Moreover, Russia\u2019s military presence in the Black Sea was secured by Kharkiv agreements and signed in April 2010 by Yanukovych, which prolonged the fleet\u2019s stay on Ukrainian territory until 2042[8]<\/a>. And furthermore, some experts even express doubts as to whether Russia needs the Black Sea Fleet in general. \u201cGenerally speaking the Russian Black Sea naval fleet is very expensive and practically a useless attribute of imperial Russian statehood, and nothing more.[9]<\/a>\u201d Experts further extend his point by asking: \u201cWho is going to fight Russia in the Black Sea, after the capture of the Crimea? With Turkey, Georgia, Bulgaria, Romania?… In the case of a Russian attack on Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey will have to confront all the military potential of NATO countries and their allies. In the event of such a war, the Russian Black Sea Fleet will be destroyed \u2018in an instance,\u2019 without coming into direct contact with the combat fleets of the NATO countries[10]<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n Some observers claim annexation of Crimea a leverage of implementation of Russia\u2019s interests in Ukraine. In another words, after occurrence of Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, Moscow invented a new method to prevent Kyiv from moving towards West. This reason is also connected to the idea of a \u2018Russian World,\u2019 described in a previous section. I could agree with the existence of intentions to moderate the Ukrainian path of development, but the invasion in Eastern Ukraine serves this aim. Firstly, since Russia embodied Crimea as its federal district, Crimea doesn\u2019t have any administrative decision power in Ukraine. Also, the population of Crimea traditionally express anti-Western political attitudes, and influenced national decisions anyway. Contrarily, \u201cDonetsk and Luhansk Peoples Republics\u201d according to Minsk agreement[11]<\/a> have to remain in Ukraine with ability to influence or veto some decisions of Kyiv. Secondly, by Crimea annexation actually created an opportunity for Ukraine to influence Western position toward Russia, and moreover to put pressure on Russia itself, since Crimea is highly dependent on a supply from Ukraine in groceries and energy fields.. Moreover, as a side effect, by excluding Crimea from Ukraine, Russia reduced the pressure on the Ukrainian economy, since Crimea was a subsidized region, which pulled a lot of resources from Ukraine. For the same reasons version that Russia wanted to punish Kyiv for Maydan occurrence with Crimea annexation, as some analysts suggested[12]<\/a> doesn\u2019t work.<\/p>\n And the last scenario represents the Crimean campaign as a boost for ratings in Putin\u2019s support among the population. Social scientists agree that the legitimacy of Putin\u2019s political regime is to a large extent dependent on Vladimir Putin\u2019s personal popularity and support. Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy stress that from the moment Putin appeared in Russian politics he was in a \u201cpermanent media campaign.[13]<\/a>\u201d Well known Russian financier Slava Rabinovich claims that \u201cPutin annexed the Crimea, started the war in the east of Ukraine, and in general, began this monstrous criminal adventure with Ukraine for only one reason: to preserve his criminal power at any costs, in the period of impending economic collapse[14]<\/a>.\u201d He also explained that \u201cin January 2014, just before the Olympics, even (even!!!) on a wave of “patriotism” of the upcoming “exemplary” Olympics, Putin’s approval ratings plummeted. Moreover, his approval ratings then reached such a level that it has never had: only 40% of Russians were satisfied with his actions as president[15]<\/a>.\u201d Other analysis confirms this view and further develops it: \u201cthus, Putin is now in perfect position to maintain his position in power. The economic situation is catastrophic, but broad masses of people do not pay any attention to it, except in the context of the \u2018damned West strangles us\u2019\u2026. \u201dThe rubble has fallen? So look at the hryvnia! The standard of living is reduced? So in Ukraine there is complete poverty! We have corrupted people in power? So Ukrainians have not just been corrupted, but they are even fascists. And so on and so forth. The main thing for the rating \u2013 not to reduce the degree of hysteria[16]<\/a>.\u201d Furthermore, sociological surveys conducted in Russia prove the correctness of stated assumption[17]<\/a>.<\/p>\n Aftermath<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n April 2016 will mark two years of the annexation of Crimea peninsula by the Russian Federation. In the documentary dedicated to the first anniversary of the return of the Crimea, Putin called Crimean occupation \u201cthe largest successful bloodless military campaign.[18]<\/a>\u201d But what has this campaign actually brought in the aftermath? From the symbolical perspective, as was said \u201cCrimea-ours\u201d (\u041a\u0440\u044b\u043c-\u043d\u0430\u0448<\/em>) provoked an uplifting of patriotic sentiments among Russians, and boosted Putin\u2019s rating. Three hundred people was awarded with a medal \u2018for the return of the Crimea[19]<\/a>,\u2019 and a special documentary was dedicated to the first anniversary. But even speaking about this abovementioned film, which the \u201cobjective was to show the world the Russian version of events that occurred in February – March 2014 in Ukraine, in particular the processes that accompanied the reunification of the Crimea with Russia,[20]<\/a>\u201d it\u2019s really hard to say that it reach its goal. One commentator mentioned that \u201cI see the film only as an element of foreign policy strategy of Russia, and even in this case it is not clear why it was necessary to walk such a complicated way. In terms of internal promotion, the film both doesn\u2019t brings benefits, but also brings risks. The film has repeated message that Russia was forced to attach the Crimea in order to prevent in Crimea development of situation similar to conflict in the Donbas. The film was still in the air, when the questions of Donbas residents and sympathizers form Russians appeared in the internet \u2013 \u2018Are they not human beings? Don\u2019t they need to defend?\u2019 \u2013 until it became clear that it is technically impossible to attach Donbas similarly to the Crimea[21]<\/a>.\u201d So even symbolically, the film failed to reach its aim.<\/p>\n From the political perspective, \u201cresolution, which does not recognize the secession of Crimea from Ukraine, was supported by 100 countries\u201d in the UN General Assembly. Moreover, only Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe voted against. Furthermore, occupation lead to decline of Russia\u2019s prestige on the international arena, Russia lost its status of reliable partner, and it was excluded from the G8.[22]<\/a> Russia\u2019s involvement in the conflict in Syria doesn\u2019t greatly improve the situation, and recent the accident with Turkey airspaces violation produced even higher tensions. Moreover, Russia lost even its old associates, such as Belorussia and Kazakhstan.<\/p>\n From an economic perspective, the West imposed various sanctions against Russia and it\u2019s authorities, both personal and sector,[23]<\/a> and despite hard efforts of Russian diplomats, recently prolonged it for another half a year.[24]<\/a> Sanctions make tangible impacts on the Russian economy, but even if not taken into consideration, financing of the peninsula itself is a heavy burden for the Russian budget. According to murdered politician Boris Nemtsov calculations, Crimea costs 4 billion dollars per year for Russia\u2019s budget.[25]<\/a> And according to Galeotti and Bowen \u201cRussia has already pledged $1.5 billion to support Crimea[26]<\/a>,\u201d apart from regular social spending. And now, problems causes by current products[27]<\/a> and energy blockade[28]<\/a> initiated by Ukrainian- Crimean Tatar activists have to be added into account. They not only request additional costs to stabilize the situation in peninsula, but also to spoil the positive image of Russian officials among the entire country.<\/p>\n Summarizing,<\/em><\/strong> after the collapse of Soviet Union Russia was mistreated by Western countries by imposed Cold War prejudice, need to obey strict rules of reforms created by West through IMF and other institution, role of a \u2018junior partner.\u2019 And Russia\u2019s primary goal was to return its status of a Great power and ability to play in international arena by its own rules. Some scholars say this was the personal ambition and vision of Vladimir Putin, others consider Russia\u2019s foreign actions as just a reflection of the mood of the population. However, Russia\u2019s new Foreign Policy and Military Doctrine reflects Russia\u2019s right to have regional and global interests and protect their key spheres of influence, which to some extent could be defined by a concept of a \u2018Russian World.\u2019 But only to some extent, since this paper proved that this concept mostly used for domestic justification and as a propaganda tool, the true reason for Crimea\u2019s annexation was the need to secure Putin\u2019s popularity among the Russian population against the background of an impending economic crisis, since it is essential component of regime legitimacy. The outcomes of Crimean occupation are mostly negative: economic decline, losing of the world community\u2019s respect (which is so important for Russian mentality) and status of reliable partner. The only gains are in symbolical field: risen level of patriotism and boosted rating of President Putin. Therefore, the primary goal was accomplished, but it seems like Putin\u2019s team are much better in tactics than strategy, since it hasn\u2019t foreseen or calculated side consequences, such as long-lasting sanctions, real cost of keeping Crimea population and infrastructure, and furthermore \u2013 response from Ukrainian civil society and Crimea Tatars resistance. More importantly, it seems like Putin\u2019s biggest ambition is a \u2018Russian World\u2019 is both strategically and tactically accomplishable, since Putin miscalculated – by gaining Crimea he lost all of Ukraine.<\/p>\n Conducted by: Varvara Shmygalova<\/strong><\/p>\n List of Cited Bibliography:<\/strong><\/p>\n [1]<\/a> Trenin, p. 410<\/p>\n [2]<\/a> Galeotti, Mark, and Andrew S. Bowen. 2014. Putin’s empire of the mind.\u00a0Foreign Policy <\/em>(206): 16, p. 17<\/p>\n [3]<\/a> \u201c\u041f\u0443\u0442\u0438\u043d \u043d\u0435 \u0441\u0443\u043c\u0430\u0441\u0448\u0435\u0434\u0448\u0438\u0439, \u043e\u043d \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0438 \u0432\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438\u201d, \u0420\u0430\u0434\u0438\u043e \u041f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0448\u0430<\/em>, September 09, 2015 http:\/\/www.radiopolsha.pl\/6\/249\/Artykul\/220502#sthash.7uencMbM.dpuf<\/a><\/p>\n [4]<\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> \u041d\u0438\u043a\u043e\u043b\u0430\u0439 \u0417\u043b\u043e\u0431\u0438\u043d, \u201c\u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0437\u043b\u043e, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0441\u0435\u0439\u0447\u0430\u0441 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0437\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442 \u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e \u041e\u0431\u0430\u043c\u0430\u201d, \u041d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u0413\u0430\u0437\u0435\u0442\u0430 <\/em>March 20, 2014 http:\/\/www.novayagazeta.ru\/politics\/62806.html<\/a><\/p>\n [6]<\/a> \u0414\u043e\u043a\u0443\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0444\u0438\u043b\u044c\u043c \u0410\u043d\u0434\u0440\u0435\u044f \u041a\u043e\u043d\u0434\u0440\u0430\u0448\u043e\u0432\u0430, \u201c\u041a\u0440\u044b\u043c. \u041f\u0443\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430 \u0420\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0443.\u201d https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=t42-71RpRgI<\/a><\/p>\n [7]<\/a> \u201c\u0428\u043e\u0439\u0433\u0443 \u043e \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0435 \u0432 \u041a\u0440\u044b\u043c\u0443: \u2018\u0447\u0443\u0448\u044c \u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043e\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f\u2019\u201d, \u0420\u0443\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0434\u0430 \u0412\u0412\u0421 March 05, 2014 http:\/\/www.bbc.com\/russian\/russia\/2014\/03\/140305_crimea_troops_shoigu<\/a><\/p>\n [8]<\/a> \u201c\u0414\u043e\u0433\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0440 \u042f\u043d\u0443\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0438\u0447\u0430 \u0438 \u041c\u0435\u0434\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0432\u0430 \u043e \u0431\u0430\u0437\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u0444\u043b\u043e\u0442\u0430 \u0434\u043e 2042 \u0433\u043e\u0434\u0430. \u0422\u0435\u043a\u0441\u0442 \u0434\u043e\u043a\u0443\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430\u201d, \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0434\u0430, March 22, 2015 http:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/rus\/articles\/2010\/04\/22\/4956018\/<\/a><\/p>\n [9]<\/a> \u0412\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0438\u043c\u0438\u0440 \u041d\u0435\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0441\u043e\u0432, \u201c\u0417\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043c \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u0427\u0435\u0440\u043d\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0412\u043e\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e-\u041c\u043e\u0440\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u043b\u043e\u0442,\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0430\u043d\u0438\u043d?\u201d \u0425\u0430\u0439\u0412\u0435\u0439<\/em>, April 27, 2015 http:\/\/h.ua\/story\/401395\/<\/a><\/p>\n [10]<\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n [11]<\/a> \u201c\u041a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u043b\u0435\u043a\u0441 \u043c\u0435\u0440 \u043f\u043e \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e \u041c\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0441\u043e\u0433\u043b\u0430\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0439\u201d, President of Russia official website<\/em>, February 12, 2015 http:\/\/kremlin.ru\/supplement\/4804<\/p>\n [12]<\/a> \u201c\u0417\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043c \u041f\u0443\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0443 \u043d\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d \u041a\u0440\u044b\u043c – The National Interest\u201d, \u041a\u043e\u0440\u0440\u0435\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043d\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442.net, April 12, 2014 http:\/\/korrespondent.net\/world\/worldabus\/3318431-zachem-putynu-nuzhen-krym-The-National-Interest<\/a><\/p>\n [13]<\/a> Fiona Hill, Clifford Gaddy, \u201cPutin: Operative in Kremlin\u201d, Brooking FOCUS Book<\/em>, 2012.<\/p>\n [14]<\/a> \u201c\u0420\u0430\u0431\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0438\u0447 \u0440\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0430\u043b, \u0437\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043c \u041f\u0443\u0442\u0438\u043d \u0430\u043d\u043d\u0435\u043a\u0441\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b \u041a\u0440\u044b\u043c \u0438 \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0430\u043b \u0432\u043e\u0439\u043d\u0443 \u0432 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0438\u043d\u0435\u201d \u0425\u0432\u0438\u043b\u044f<\/em>, July 09, 2015 http:\/\/hvylya.net\/news\/digest\/rabinovich-rasskazal-zachem-putin-anneksiroval-kryim-i-razvyazal-voynu-v-ukraine.html<\/a><\/p>\n [15]<\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n [16]<\/a> \u201c\u0417\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043c \u041f\u0443\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0443 \u041a\u0440\u044b\u043c \u0438 \u0432\u043e\u0439\u043d\u0430 \u0432 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0438\u043d\u0435?\u201d, \u0410\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u0440\u0442\u0430\u043b <\/em>\u201c\u0410\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0438\u043c\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0440\u0443\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u043d\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u043c\u201d<\/em>, April 24, 2015 http:\/\/right-dexter.com\/analytika\/rossiya\/zachem-putinu-krym\/#.Vlo7Gt-rRAY<\/a><\/p>\n [17]<\/a> \u201c\u0412\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0438\u043c\u0438\u0440 \u041f\u0443\u0442\u0438\u043d: \u0434\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0435, \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0438, \u043e\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\u201d \u041b\u0435\u0432\u0430\u0434\u0430-\u0426\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0440, <\/em>April 27, 2015. http:\/\/www.levada.ru\/27-03-2015\/vladimir-putin-doverie-otsenki-otnoshenie<\/a><\/p>\n [18]<\/a> \u0414\u043e\u043a\u0443\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0444\u0438\u043b\u044c\u043c \u0410\u043d\u0434\u0440\u0435\u044f \u041a\u043e\u043d\u0434\u0440\u0430\u0448\u043e\u0432\u0430, \u201c\u041a\u0440\u044b\u043c. \u041f\u0443\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430 \u0420\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0443.\u201d https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=t42-71RpRgI<\/a><\/p>\n [19]<\/a> “\u041c\u0435\u0434\u0430\u043b\u044c \u0437\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u0437\u0432\u0440\u0430\u0449\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041a\u0440\u044b\u043c\u0430” \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0430 \u041f\u0443\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0430 – 12 \u0444\u0430\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0432\u201d, Facenews<\/em> April 22, 2015 http:\/\/www.facenews.ua\/articles\/2014\/196626\/<\/a><\/p>\n [20]<\/a> \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0441\u043b\u0430\u0432 \u0418\u0449\u0435\u043d\u043a\u043e, \u201c\u0424\u0438\u043b\u044c\u043c \u00ab\u041a\u0440\u044b\u043c. \u041f\u0443\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430 \u0420\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0443\u00bb – \u0441\u0438\u0433\u043d\u0430\u043b \u0432\u043d\u0435\u0448\u043d\u0438\u043c \u043f\u0430\u0440\u0442\u043d\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043c\u201d, \u041f\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044f<\/em>, March 16, 2015 http:\/\/politrussia.com\/news\/rostislav-ishchenko-film-510\/<\/a><\/p>\n [21]<\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n [22]<\/a> \u201c\u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044e \u0438\u0441\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0438\u0437 \u00ab\u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0448\u043e\u0439 \u0432\u043e\u0441\u044c\u043c\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0438\u00bb, \u043d\u0430 \u043e\u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438 \u2013 \u2018\u0434\u0432\u0430\u0434\u0446\u0430\u0442\u043a\u0430\u2019?\u201d, \u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0441\u043e\u043c\u043e\u043b\u0435\u0446, March 26, 2014 http:\/\/www.mk.ru\/politics\/article\/2014\/03\/26\/1003781-rossiyu-isklyuchili-iz-bolshoy-vosmerki-na-ocheredi-quotdvadtsatkaquot.html<\/a><\/p>\n [23]<\/a> \u201cEU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis\u201d, European Union Newsroom<\/em>, http:\/\/europa.eu\/newsroom\/highlights\/special-coverage\/eu_sanctions\/index_en.htm<\/a><\/p>\n [24]<\/a> \u201c\u0421\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0432 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0434\u043b\u044f\u0442 \u0435\u0449\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0433\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u2013 \u0421\u041c\u0418\u201d, \u041a\u043e\u0440\u0440\u0435\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043d\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442.net<\/em>, November 22, 2015 http:\/\/korrespondent.net\/world\/3593287-sanktsyy-protyv-rossyy-prodliat-esche-na-polhoda-smy<\/a><\/p>\n [25]<\/a> Boris Nemtsov personal page, Facebook<\/em>, post from March 9, 2014 https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/boris.nemtsov\/posts\/598283640241240<\/a><\/p>\n [26]<\/a> Galeotti, Mark, and Andrew S. Bowen. 2014. Putin’s empire of the mind.\u00a0Foreign Policy <\/em>(206): 16, p. 17<\/p>\n [27]<\/a> \u201c\u0411\u043b\u043e\u043a\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u041a\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0443. \u041a\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0456 \u0442\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0438 \u0456 \u0430\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0432\u0456\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0432\u0436\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u0447\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u043f\u0456\u0434\u0433\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0443 \u0434\u043e \u0430\u043a\u0446\u0456\u0457\u201d, \u0422\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0432\u0456\u0437\u0456\u0439\u043d\u0430 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d<\/em>, September 20, 2015 http:\/\/tsn.ua\/ukrayina\/blokada-krimu-krimski-tatari-i-aktivisti-vzhe-pochali-pidgotovku-do-akciyi-496942.html<\/a><\/p>\n [28]<\/a> \u0415\u043d\u0435\u0440\u0433\u0435\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043d\u0430 \u0431\u043b\u043e\u043a\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u041a\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0443: \u041e\u043a\u0443\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0442\u0438 \u043f\u0456\u0432\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u043d\u0430\u0441\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044f “\u0433\u043e\u0442\u0443\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0441\u044f \u0434\u043e \u0433\u0456\u0440\u0448\u043e\u0433\u043e”, \u0423\u041d\u0406\u0410\u041d<\/em>, November 23, 2015 http:\/\/www.unian.ua\/society\/1191288-energetichna-blokada-krimu-okupanti-pivostrova-zaklikali-naselennya-gotuvatisya-do-girshogo.html<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"\n
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