The celebrations in Beijing marking the anniversary of the end of the Second World War, attended by the leaders of Russia and North Korea, were described in the international press as a “parade of dictators.” Media outlets paid particular attention to the “overheard” conversation between Xi Jinping and Putin about longevity. The head of the Hybrid Warfare Analitical Group of the UCMC, Volodymyr Solovian, spoke on Channel 5 about authoritarian leaders’ intention to remain in power as long as possible with support of modern biotechnologies. The interview also cover topics of the Kremlin’s transformation into China’s junior partner and the West’s ability to respond to the challenge of the alliance of autocracies.
During the celebrations in Beijing, a microphone accidentally recorded a conversation between Xi and Putin about longevity. Is Putin’s interest in biotechnology the result of his desire to prolong his rule?
The desire to extend one’s physical presence at the top of power is typical for aging dictators. Putin is no exception – he has long shown an interest in biotechnologies allegedly capable of prolonging life. Rumors have circulated for years that one of Putin’s daughters oversees the field of cryonics and life-extension research within Russian medicine. In reality, the idea of medically prolonging life is just one of the pseudoscientific theories that the dictator’s entourage feeds into his conspiracy-saturated mind. The goal of Putin’s minions is obvious—to enrich themselves on state contracts related to pseudoscientific research. However, Putin himself may sincerely believe that modern biotechnologies will delay his departure from power and allow him to see the realization of his imperial plans.
In the case of the Chinese leadership, we see a similar behavioral model. Xi Jinping effectively destroyed the established tradition of regularly changing leadership every eight years. This system was introduced by the architect of modern China, Deng Xiaoping, in order to prevent the prolonged concentration of power in one person’s hands. However, in 2018 Xi Jinping abandoned this rule and today remains effectively the “indefinite” ruler of China. Most sinologists agree that he will remain in power for the next four-year term as long as his physical resources allow. We also see active purges in the upper ranks of the Communist Party of China and military leadership, which indicates Xi Jinping’s desire to concentrate even more levers of control in his own hands. Since the times of Mao Zedong, no Chinese leader has amassed such a large volume of power around himself. Thus, the continuation of his own physical existence at the head of the state becomes an extremely important resource for Xi Jinping in maintaining control over the party apparatus.
How dangerous is the union of aging autocrats, considering the nuclear weapons factor?
I do not think they are ready to use nuclear weapons. Such a scenario is possible only if their regimes face a real threat of destruction. For now, there are no such preconditions. On the contrary, the military parade on September 3 in Beijing demonstrates that China is interested in technological dominance in the field of unmanned technologies. The Russia-Ukraine war has shown that both sides depend on electronic components manufactured in China. Russia today is critically dependent on supplies of finished drones and components from Chinese enterprises. In the case of Ukraine – even the supplies that come from Western partners often contain Chinese parts, since many components are produced in the PRC.
What significance does Putin’s participation in the “parade of dictators” hold for Moscow?
Putin’s main goal is to demonstrate the unity of Moscow and Beijing. We see that Russia has finally made a strategic choice. Having rejected all the “carrots” that Trump offered Putin, the Kremlin chose the role of China’s junior partner. The agreements announced following Putin’s visit to China on the construction of the “Power of Siberia-2” gas pipeline clearly confirm this. The project will take decades to implement, which means Russia’s long-term dependence on China. Notably, under the preliminary conditions set by the Chinese side, Gazprom will supply natural gas at domestic Russian prices. In other words, Moscow will effectively hand over its resources to China at cost in exchange for support in current and future imperial adventures.
How do the United States, particularly Donald Trump, react to such developments? Can we expect a restoration of transatlantic unity?
In my opinion, Trump in this case does not take the factor of transatlantic unity into account. The key question is whether the American president perceived Putin’s visit to China as a personal insult and a blow to his authority in the eyes of his own electorate. The current situation has shown the futility of hopes among some of Trump’s entourage that Russia could be “wrenched” from China’s embrace through economic incentives. On the other hand, alternative options for response are not attractive in Trump’s eyes. Sanctions pressure and lowering prices on Russian oil exports is a long-term strategy that is essentially a continuation of the previous administration’s policy. Thus, Trump will have to admit that he is forced to move in the same direction as Joseph Biden. Given the context of the approaching U.S. congressional election campaign, the White House cannot choose this scenario, since it would mean acknowledging the failure of Trump’s team’s strategy on the Russia-Ukraine track.
And what about Europe? Can it play a more decisive role?
Western Europe is gradually waking up. Central Europe and the Scandinavian countries are well aware of the threat from Russia. But there are still many problems in decision-making mechanisms: the consensus principle in the EU and NATO allows one country to block a common policy and slows down the response to challenges generated by the Kremlin. Yet in war, as is well known, time itself is the main resource. Therefore, we now see the search for alternative formats – the so-called “coalitions of the willing,” which are ready to act regardless of pro-Russian governments in certain EU countries. At the same time, we see informational failures: among European societies, there remains a low level of awareness that Russia’s war against Ukraine is not a local conflict on the periphery of the continent but an attempt by Moscow to destroy the pan-European security system. Over the past three years, Russian missiles and drones have repeatedly entered NATO territory, but the response has so far remained unjustifiably cautious. This creates in the Kremlin a sense of impunity. Russia acts entirely predictably: gradually raising the stakes, step by step, testing where the line lies after which the West will finally give a proportionate response.