George Simion, the leader of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), emerged as the winner of the first round of Romania’s presidential elections. His decisive result reflects a consistent trend toward the rising influence of right-wing populism in Romanian politics.
Simion is known for his skepticism about providing aid to Ukraine. However, as recently as last autumn, Romania could have elected a figure whose political agenda posed an even greater threat to Romania’s relations with Ukraine and the EU – namely, Simion’s former party colleague, Călin Georgescu.
Following the annulment of the November presidential election and Georgescu’s disqualification from running again, his name largely disappeared from Ukrainian media coverage. However, Simion, now the frontrunner, has openly spoken about politically “rehabilitating” Georgescu and has floated the idea of appointing him as prime minister. So the question arises: will a potential victory for nationalist Simion lead to a political comeback for the far-right populist and admirer of Putin’s Russia, Georgescu?
The Spoiler Candidate
The unexpected first-round victory of independent candidate Călin Georgescu on November 24, 2024, was a catalyst for the surge in popularity of Romania’s radical right. Initially a little-known figure, Georgescu gained attention through manipulative rhetoric and the use of conspiracy theories. Backed by nearly 23% of voters, his performance was a shock to political analysts and dealt a serious blow to the ruling Social Democrats (PSD) and national-liberals (PNL), whose candidates fell behind the populist outsider.
However, the darker side of Georgescu’s success soon became clear. Romanian authorities revealed intelligence indicating that his campaign had violated election laws, with serious suspicions of foreign interference, specifically Russian.
On December 6, 2024, Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled the first-round results. Georgescu was later charged by the General Prosecutor’s Office with inciting actions against the constitutional order and with creating or supporting a fascist organization. On March 9, the Central Electoral Bureau officially rejected his candidacy, a decision upheld days later by the Constitutional Court.
Despite the charges, Georgescu retained strong support among anti-establishment voters. At the time of his disqualification, his polling numbers were climbing and had reached nearly 40%
Flirting with MAGA
Framing himself as a political “victim,” Georgescu sought to capitalize on his image internationally. His efforts coincided with the Trump administration’s use of the Romanian election scandal to criticize the EU.
At the Munich Security Conference in February 2025, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance stated that “Romania simply annulled its election results based on vague intelligence suspicions and intense pressure from European neighbors.” He went on to argue that if such a democracy can be destabilized by foreign advertising campaigns costing a few hundred thousand dollars, then it wasn’t particularly strong to begin with.
In March, Georgescu appeared on the U.S.-based podcast The Freeman Report, where he declared that Romania is a “slave of the European Union” and called for a referendum on leaving both the EU and NATO. Soon after, he gave an interview to controversial commentator Tucker Carlson, where he promoted conspiracy theories—including the notion that Romania is merely a pawn in Brussels’ alleged plan to provoke war with Russia.
He went further, accusing the presidents of France and Moldova, as well as former U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, of planning to turn NATO into an offensive alliance and launch World War III from Romanian territory. According to Georgescu, the goal of Romanian right-wing forces is to “make Romania great again,” echoing the MAGA slogan.
Example: a screenshot from the SolovyovLive
Notably, the Russians eagerly circulated Georgescu’s revelations. Several pro-Kremlin Telegram channels published the full text of the interview in Russian.
Ukraine in Georgescu’s Crosshairs
Although Georgescu claims to oppose “globalism,” his populist rhetoric undermines public support for Ukraine in Romania. He most frequently repeats the narrative that further military aid to Ukraine risks escalating into a NATO-Russia war.
His anti-Ukrainian discourse peaked during an interview with RomaniaTV.net, in which he called Ukraine a “fictional state,” arguing its real name should be the “Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.” He went on to question Ukraine’s territorial integrity, asserting that Romania should reclaim several historical regions currently within Ukraine’s borders: Northern Bukovina, Budjak, and Northern Maramureș. He also proposed that Hungary “take” Transcarpathia and Poland – Lviv Oblast. The rest of Ukraine, he dismissively called “Little Russia.”
Such rhetoric, long confined to the margins of Romanian politics, gained mainstream traction due to Georgescu’s brief front-runner status – and was eagerly amplified by Kremlin media.
During his campaign, Georgescu also promoted economic sovereignty and reducing import dependence, which resonated with Romanian farmers who protested Ukrainian grain imports in late 2023 and early 2024. His populist messaging reignited opposition to the transit of Ukrainian agricultural products.
The Right Votes Together
For a time, Georgescu avoided endorsing Simion, betting instead on mass protests. But the protests quickly lost momentum.
According to Iulian Chifu, President of the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center, “Voters looking for an outsider candidate grew disillusioned with Georgescu after the arrests of individuals linked to his shadow campaign financing. At that point, he suffered a major media defeat. Now, right-wing candidates have stepped back from their extremist rhetoric.”
As voters shifted their support to Simion – ideologically similar but more viable – Georgescu had little choice but to endorse his former ally.
The two men even appeared together at a polling station. Simion remarked, “I voted for Călin Georgescu” (though his name was not on the ballot – V.S.), and stated that their shared goal is to “restore constitutional order.” Simion later promised to appoint Georgescu as prime minister if elected and to hold a referendum to reinstate the annulled results of the 2024 first round.
Appointing Georgescu to a high-ranking government position would clearly polarize the political landscape in Romania and strain relations with Western allies and Ukraine. However, such a scenario remains unlikely. Even in the event of early parliamentary elections, Simion’s party AUR is unlikely to secure enough seats to form a government on its own. Georgescu’s nomination would require support from other parties. Yet his controversial reputation, ongoing investigations by the Prosecutor’s Office, and pro-Russian views make him a highly toxic candidate for such a role.
A Fragile Alliance
Georgescu’s premiership would polarize Romanian politics and strain ties with Ukraine and the West. However, this scenario remains unlikely. Even in the event of early parliamentary elections, AUR is not expected to gain enough seats to form a government alone. Georgescu’s appointment would require coalition support—something improbable given his toxic reputation, ongoing investigations, and pro-Russian image.
Simion’s alliance with Georgescu appears to be a pragmatic move to retain support from Georgescu’s base ahead of the runoff. Their political partnership may continue in the short term, driven by shared interest in calling snap elections at the peak of right-wing popularity.
Yet if Simion wins, the alliance is unlikely to last. Georgescu has no party of his own, and creating one would put him in direct competition with AUR. Moreover, as president, Simion would be forced to compromise with domestic actors and EU partners. In such a context, keeping the controversial Georgescu close would limit his flexibility and create unnecessary tensions within the administration.
Misty prospects of a political comeback for Călin Georgescu are, undoubtedly, a positive outcome for Romania’s pro-European forces. Yet his sudden rise remains a troubling indicator of the vulnerability of EU democracies to information warfare. The Georgescu case highlights how a calculated fusion of Russian propaganda and far-right populism, amplified through social media, can rapidly destabilize democratic regimes—even in countries aligned with the West.
This material draws on the findings of the analytical report ‘Ukraine’s European Integration and Elections in EU Member States: The Informational Dimension’
Volodymyr Solovian