Relations between Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation, which have for decades been characterised by a pragmatic partnership, have undergone a radical transformation in recent months. The trigger for these changes was the tragedy of 25 December 2024, when an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane en route from Baku to Grozny crashed as a result of a Russian air defence missile. 38 people died, with 26 of them being Azerbaijani citizens.
The Kremlin’s public reaction was demonstratively cynical. The only thing that really interested the Russians in this situation was to shift the responsibility to Kyiv. Therefore, Russian propaganda focused on promoting the version that the main cause of the tragedy was an attack by Ukrainian drones.
At the same time, the refusal of the Russian authorities to take responsibility and apologise in a proper manner became a trigger for a diplomatic crisis between Azerbaijan and Russia.
In the following months, Baku demonstrated a consistent diplomatic response to Moscow’s contemptuous attitude. The republic declared national mourning, suspended flights to a number of Russian regions, recalled some diplomatic personnel from Moscow, and demanded an official acknowledgement of responsibility and compensation. This resulted in President Aliyev’s refusal to take part in the Victory Day parade in Moscow, an unprecedented move that showed the depth of the crisis.
The summer turned out to be an escalation for Russian-Azerbaijani relations. On 27 June, Russian security forces carried out massive raids in Yekaterinburg, detaining more than 50 Azerbaijanis under the pretext of investigating a 2001 murder (!). The operation ended in tragedy – two brothers, Ziyaddin and Huseyn Safarov, were killed during the detention (in fact, they were killed by Russian «law enforcement officers»), and several people were seriously injured.
In response, Azerbaijan strongly condemned Russia’s actions, calling them «demonstrative and deliberate acts of extrajudicial killing and violence». Baku cancelled all cultural events with the participation of Russia, scheduled visits by officials and opened a criminal case over the torture.
The next phase of raising the stakes in the standoff was a special operation against Russian propagandists operating in Azerbaijan. On 30 June, local police raided the office of Sputnik Azerbaijan, arresting editorial director Igor Kartavykh and editor-in-chief Yevgeny Belousov as FSB agents. Another 8 Russians were also detained on suspicion of drug trafficking and cybercrime.
On 2 July, the parties exchanged diplomatic demarches. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry summoned the Russian ambassador, protesting against ‘unfriendly actions’ and ethnic intolerance towards Azerbaijanis during the raids in Yekaterinburg. Baku also accused Moscow of a disinformation campaign and demanded a full investigation into the downing of the Azerbaijan Airlines plane with compensation for the victims. For its part, the Russian Foreign Ministry also protested, accusing Baku of «deliberately dismantling» bilateral relations and unlawful actions against Russian citizens.
The Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group studied the Kremlin’s propaganda rhetoric on Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan amid the crisis in bilateral relations.
In the pursuit of a «third force»: accusing the West and Ukraine of fuelling the conflict
The Russians based this narrative on the claim that the crisis in relations between Moscow and Baku was inspired by «external forces». Thus, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called the telephone conversation between the presidents of Ukraine and Azerbaijan a «provocation». According to him, «Ukraine is doing everything possible to provoke Azerbaijan to continue its emotional acts against Russia… Ukraine will now do everything possible to add fuel to the fire». Also, at a briefing on 3 July 2025, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova described relations between Russia and Azerbaijan as a «strategic alliance» and noted that «there are forces that do not like it».
Pro-Kremlin analysts directly accused the West of provoking the conflict. Political analyst Marat Bashirov argued that the British are «systematically trying to set fire» to Russia’s relations with post-Soviet countries, first with Armenia and now with Azerbaijan. Military commander Dmitry Steshin promoted the thesis of a «second front», stating that after Kyiv, Baku should «catch fire». This narrative was relayed by the Tsargrad TV channel and similar radical media resources in Russia.
Russian commentators often assign the role of a “third force” to both Great Britain and Ukraine, and this choice is not accidental. Kremlin ideologists have been shaping the narrative around London as the most resolute antagonist in the “anti-Russian world behind the scenes.” Likewise, the Kremlin constantly sees a “Ukrainian involvement” in every international failure or scandal involving Russia.
The purpose of this narrative is to distract from Russia’s own actions by portraying the conflict as the result of provocations by “external players.” This theory lacks any factual basis. In fact, even the Kremlin has failed to construct a convincing conspiracy, as the escalation of tensions between Baku and Moscow was a direct response to actions taken by Russian security forces in Yekaterinburg.
Ilham Aliyev on July 1, 2025, he expressed «clear support from Ukraine in a situation where Russia is mistreating Azerbaijani citizens»
«Ethnic Mafia»: Justification through Xenophobia
The second narrative aims to legitimize the forceful actions of Russian law enforcement against the Azerbaijani community in the eyes of the Russian population. Pro-government commentators insist that an organized criminal group (the so-called «ethnic mafia») was neutralized in Yekaterinburg, and that the actions of the security forces were legal and had no ethnic basis.
On June 30, State Duma MP Viktor Vodolatsky stated that Russian law enforcement acted within the law. He emphasized that the security forces «did their job, regardless of the criminals’ nationality» and described Baku’s reaction as exaggerated.
Pro-Kremlin military bloggers picked up the image of the «Azerbaijani mafia». Popular blogger Sergey Kolyasnikov (TG channel ZERGULIO, 427,500 subscribers) referred to the dismantled organization as a «mafia that rivals the Italian one in the US». Another blogger, Alexei Zhivov (TG channel ZHIVOV Z, 113,400 subscribers), rhetorically asked: «So, is the leadership of Azerbaijan covering up criminal communities in Russia?»
The claim of an «ethnic mafia» partially relies on the real existence of criminal elements in any diaspora. However, it distorts the nature of the issue and the scale of the reaction. The internal focus of this narrative is driven by an overt (and sometimes even blatant) appeal to the xenophobic beliefs of ordinary Russians, who consider the Russian national element superior to representatives of the national «peripheries» of the empire. Therefore, this episode shows that Z-propaganda not only cultivates hatred toward Ukrainians but also toward members of other nationalities who, at certain points in history, found themselves within the geopolitical ambitions of Moscow.
«Ingratitude» of Azerbaijan and Calls to Reassess Relations
Another notable trend in Russian rhetoric is the demonstrative «offense» at Azerbaijan’s sharp response, portraying Azerbaijan as an «ungrateful partner» who «bites the hand that feeds it». In the pro-Kremlin discourse, it is emphasized that Moscow allegedly has always supported Baku, only to be repaid with «black ingratitude». Against this backdrop, threats and suggestions to «punish» Azerbaijan are being voiced.
The aforementioned MP, Vodolatsky, directly accused Azerbaijan of lacking respect. He stated that Baku showed «ingratitude» toward Russia and contemptuously compared Azerbaijan’s outrage to the behavior of a «dog,» while depicting Russia as an elephant, quoting Krylov’s fable «The Elephant and the Dog» («we live by the principle: the elephant walks, and the dog barks»).
Some radical commentators even speak about the risk of military conflict. For example, TV host Vladimir Solovyov emotionally reacted to the events, mentioning the shared «300-kilometer border» between the two countries.
Accusations of «ingratitude» reflect the imperial mindset of part of the Russian establishment. This thinking is based on the idea that smaller neighbors are «obliged» to show loyalty to Moscow for past favors. In the case of Azerbaijan, Kremlin speakers clearly mean that Russia acted as a mediator in the Karabakh conflicts, supplied arms, and thus, Baku should now be more lenient toward Moscow’s actions. However, in reality, Azerbaijan is a sovereign state that does not see itself as a client of its former metropolis.
These developmetns have once again called into question Russia’s role as a dominant actor in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan’s refusal to accept Moscow’s cynical response to the deaths of its citizens, its resolute diplomatic démarches, and its readiness to endure economic losses for the sake of sovereignty principles mark a new stage in relations between Baku and Moscow. At the same time, a glaring example of the Kremlin’s ideological and political degradation is the demonstration of great-power chauvinism and xenophobia, set against the backdrop of its inability to bring the former «vassal» to heel.
Mykyta Kuzmenko