The first round of Poland’s presidential elections took place on May 18, 2025.
The results confirmed the continued dominance of Poland’s two main political forces – the liberal-democratic Civic Platform (PO) and the conservative Law and Justice (PiS). However, the current electoral campaign also clearly demonstrated a growing trend – the rising popularity of the far-right.
The Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group has thus examined key aspects of the campaign led by “Confederation” candidate Sławomir Mentzen, particularly in the context of Ukraine, and explored the party’s role in shaping the image of Ukraine and Ukrainians in Poland’s information space.
The anti-Ukrainian trio below the waterline
The runoff round will feature Rafał Trzaskowski (ruling coalition led by the Civic Platform (PO)) and Karol Nawrocki (opposition Law and Justice (PiS)). The ultranationalist “Confederation” candidate Sławomir Mentzen secured almost 14.8%, while the far-right radical MEP Grzegorz Braun received 6.3%.
In recent years, Poland’s political climate has been characterized by polarization and widespread voter fatigue due to the prolonged dominance of the two main camps: PO and PiS.
Against this backdrop, far-right forces continue to gain electoral momentum.
38-year-old Mentzen represents a young generation of Polish right-wing politicians and is one of the figureheads of the parliamentary party “Confederation,” which seeks to establish itself long-term as the third force in Polish politics.
It is worth recalling that Confederation representatives regularly exploit anti-Ukrainian narratives in their campaigns. In 2023, Confederation organized protests under the slogan “This is not our war,” also durng autumn 2023 – early 2024, its regional representatives coordinated protests by Polish transport workers on the border with Ukraine. According to Łukasz Adamski, Deputy Director of the Juliusz Mieroszewski Centre for Dialogue, “Confederation supporters, unlike PiS, which focuses on historical memory, pay more attention to the economic aspects of relations with Ukraine, including issues related to European integration.”
Notably, one month before election day, Mentzen’s ratings nearly matched those of Nawrocki. However, the young politician lost electoral momentum despite an intensive country-wide tour and aggressive social media campaigning. Ultimately, opposition voters wavering between the nationalist Confederation and the conservative PiS chose the more moderate Nawrocki, considering him to have a better chance of succeeding in the second round.
Nawrocki has already appealed to other right-wing candidates for support. Yet, unlike parliamentary elections, which can result in coalition-building and sharing of ministerial positions, a potential PiS president would have limited “consolation prizes” to offer Confederation representatives. Moreover, openly supporting a competitor on the right-wing electoral flank could be perceived by Mentzen’s voters as a sign of weakness in the young and ambitious politician.
The relative success of Braun, even more radical than Mentzen, was largely based on provocative performances, such as burning the EU flag or extinguishing candles on a Hanukkah menorah in the Polish Sejm. Nevertheless, Braun’s result is quite situational. Due to his scandalous reputation and openly pro-Russian views, the radical politician has little chance of expanding beyond a marginal niche, as indicated by the low ratings of his party, the Confederation of the Polish Crown, which he heads.
Among far-right candidates, Sejm deputy Marek Jakubiak received the least support (0.77%). In one campaign interview, Jakubiak stated that although supporting Ukraine in 2022 was justified, today “Ukraine poses a danger to Poland.” According to Jakubiak, the threats from Ukraine include millions of Ukrainians “flooding” Poland, exploiting “the big hearts” of Poles, and a potential invasion by “demoralized Ukrainian soldiers demobilized by war.”
An “adequate” candidate for Russian propaganda
Support for Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees was a dominant theme in Mentzen’s campaign. In recent days alone, the Confederation candidate made statements such as:
- “Billions of zlotys are spent on payments and benefits for Ukrainians, while Poles struggle with insufficient funds for healthcare and social programs.”
- “Ukrainians in Poland have excessively broad rights.”
- “I will not agree to sending Polish troops to Ukraine or admitting Ukraine to NATO. We cannot enter this war; we do not want to be dragged into it; we do not want Polish soldiers to die there.”
Mentzen also demanded revoking the Order of the White Eagle -Poland’s highest state award – from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, awarded in April 2023.
Mentzen’s “raid” into Lviv on the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion drew significant media attention in Ukraine. This time, the Confederation representative focused on historical aspects of Polish-Ukrainian relations. In several videos, Mentzen stated Ukraine should “stop the cult of Stepan Bandera” and falsely accused Ukraine of directing funds allocated for war-damaged infrastructure in Lviv toward rebuilding the museum of Roman Shukhevych, “responsible for the Volhynia massacre.”
Such rhetoric was condemned even by some Polish politicians. Sejm deputy Roman Giertych noted that Mentzen “became the hero of all Russian media,” describing him as a “useful Kremlin idiot” who “destroys the fragile thread of understanding between Poles and Ukrainians.”
(Photo: slawomirmentzen / Instagram / video screenshot)
Indeed, in recent months, Mentzen received significant attention from Kremlin propaganda. Even radical Z-channels on Telegram labeled him “an adequate candidate for the presidency of Poland.”
At the same time, after the provocative Lviv trip in late February, Mentzen largely refrained from further escalating historical memory issues, instead focusing on economic and security aspects. He criticized Donald Tusk’s government policy regarding Ukrainian refugees, ignoring Ukrainians’ significant economic contributions to Poland. Between 2022-2025, Ukrainians registered 77,700 new businesses (9% of total new enterprises), paying approximately PLN 15.1 billion (approx. USD 3.9 billion) in taxes to the Polish budget in 2024, according to Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK).
Mentzen also manipulated the idea of deploying Polish troops in Ukraine – an entirely theoretical scenario discussed among European capitals but far from practical implementation.
In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Mentzen offers limited support for Ukraine. He calls Russia a threat and Putin a criminal, though his stance appears more aligned with Poland’s societal consensus on Russia rather than indicative of genuine constructive intent toward Kyiv.
Thus, Poland’s 2025 presidential elections confirmed the continued dominance of the two main political forces. Nevertheless, a noticeable trend has emerged—the growing strength of far-right sentiments, demonstrated by the substantial support received by “Confederation” candidate Sławomir Mentzen. His campaign attracted attention in Ukraine due to several provocative statements, particularly around historical themes, creating additional risks for Polish-Ukrainian relations. At the same time, such rhetoric made Mentzen a convenient target for Russian propaganda.
However, the most significant effect of Mentzen’s campaign, along with those of other far-right candidates, was its distortion of Polish perceptions regarding Ukrainians’ roles in local society and the economy.
Overall, candidates with openly anti-Ukrainian agendas (Mentzen, Braun, Jakubiak) collectively garnered support from over 22% of voters in the first round. Hence, regardless of who ultimately wins, the future president will inevitably have to consider the general trend of the electorate shifting rightward, driven by a growing demand for Euroscepticism and conservatism.
Volodymyr Solovian