The second round of Romania’s presidential election will take place on May 18.
The winner of the first round, George Simion, leader of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) secured nearly 41% of the vote. His opponent in the runoff will be the mayor of Bucharest, Nicușor Dan.
On the eve of the vote, the Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group analyzed the main features of the current campaign and the potential risks posed to Ukraine if Simion, known for his skepticism regarding support for Kyiv, emerges victorious.
The outcome hangs in the balance
As recently as late February, the leading figure among Romania’s right-wing camp was Călin Georgescu, who ran as an independent candidate. Georgescu achieved a surprise victory in the first round, but the Constitutional Court of Romania annulled the results over suspicions of foreign interference. He was subsequently barred from running in the new elections due to violations of campaign finance rules and other legal breaches.
Following Georgescu’s disqualification, Simion assumed the role of the sole candidate representing right-wing forces.
Political commentators now consider Simion the frontrunner. He managed to consolidate Georgescu’s electorate, as well as a substantial portion of the diaspora vote (60.5%). During the height of the campaign, Simion also received an endorsement from Anamaria Gavrilă, leader of the Youth Party (POT), which cleared the electoral threshold in last December’s parliamentary elections – an alliance that further bolstered Simion’s support.
Source: stirilekanald.ro
In the second round, Simion is counting on votes from supporters of fourth-place finalist and former Prime Minister Victor Ponta. He may also gain some backing from Romania’s Hungarian minority (6% of the population). Despite Simion’s long-strained relationship with this community, Hungarian President Viktor Orbán has thrown his support behind the AUR candidate.
In this context, the key question is whether Dan was able, in a short time, to convince the supporters of other candidates that he is the one capable of preventing the country from falling into the grip of right-wing populism while also breaking with the trail of government corruption.
According to the latest poll by AtlasIntel, both candidates are neck and neck heading into the second round, with 48.2% each. However, the poll does not account for diaspora votes or the “shy voter” factor—Simion’s supporters are less likely to openly state their preferences.
Given the tight race, even small shifts in voter behavior could prove decisive. The suspense will likely persist until the final hour of voting, and Simion’s perceived favoritism is far from certain.
A hero to the far-right
Simion’s campaign strategy reflects the aesthetics of the MAGA movement. He describes his political platform as “Trumpist,” advocating for a reduced bureaucracy and increased defense spending. It is no surprise that commentators have dubbed him the “Romanian Trump.”
The emulation of Trump is not unique to Simion – his former ally Georgescu also expressed admiration for the former U.S. president during his own campaign.
However, Simion’s strategy goes beyond rhetorical imitation. His team has sought direct engagement with the White House. On April 18, 2025, a $1.5 million contract between AUR and American lobbying firm was registered with the U.S. Department of Justice. The contract aimed to arrange meetings with politicians and promote Simion in U.S. media.
Following public exposure of the contract in late April, suspicions arose that the lobbying efforts may have been financed using state subsidies – a violation of Romania’s political party financing laws. AUR denied the existence of the contract, and the American firm involved stated it had not taken effect. Ultimately, this investigation is unlikely to have serious consequences, particularly given AUR’s ties to the Trump camp.
Trumpism among European far-right circles appears largely opportunistic. Trump’s foreign policy is grounded in isolationism, with his attention drawn to autocracies offering economically favorable deals to the U.S. In that context, Romania and its neighbors barely register on Trump’s geopolitical radar. Consequently, figures like Simion and Georgescu are not ideological allies of Trump’s team but rather tools used to pressure Brussels and certain European capitals as part of the negotiations on a trade agreement between the U.S. and the EU.
President non grata
Simion’s position on Ukraine is ambivalent. While he condemns Russian aggression, he also opposes military aid to Kyiv.
On the positive side, Simion is more politically flexible than Georgescu, who was a frontrunner in the race a short time ago.
Nonetheless, even a cursory look at Simion’s campaign reveals that he continues to exploit anti-war narratives, thereby undermining public support for Ukraine.
Simion and other AUR members have repeatedly criticized sanctions against Russia and aid to Ukraine, insisting that “this is not our war” and th at Romania should prioritize its own interests. In February 2025, AUR MPs voted against legislation authorizing the downing of Russian drones violating Romanian airspace. Simion also recently proposed that Ukraine compensate Romania for the military assistance it has received, including the Patriot missile system – mirroring the stance of the current U.S. administration.
In addition, Simion has touched on the rights of the Romanian minority in Ukraine during his campaign.
Thus, Simíon adheres to the traditional agenda of Romanian nationalists, invoking alleged discrimination against ethnic Romanians, while closely mirrors Trump’s rhetoric. As a result, his stance toward Ukraine remains rather inconsistent and largely contingent on the position of the U.S. administration.
From Ukraine’s side, uncertainty remains regarding a travel ban on Simion, reportedly in effect since 2023. The ban is believed to stem from suspicions of possible collaboration with Russian intelligence services – a claim publicly made by former Moldovan Defense Minister Anatol Șalaru. Therefore, if Simion wins the presidency, Ukrainian diplomacy will have to start rebuilding bilateral relations from the lowest point.
Simion’s presidency may also strain ties between Bucharest and Chișinău – potentially destabilizing the broader region.
Simion has vowed to create a Department for the Republic of Moldova under the presidency, which he plans to eventually transform into a Ministry of Reunification modeled after South Korea’s unification policies. His unionist stance could damage the standing of pro-European forces in Moldova ahead of the September parliamentary elections. As a result, Ukraine risks losing a key security and EU integration partner in the region.
Simion’s presidential bid marks a turning point in Romania’s political landscape.
Despite publicly condemning Russian aggression, Simion’s continued use of anti-war rhetoric undermines public support for Ukraine. His potential victory would likely complicate Romania–Ukraine relations.
However, if Romania maintains a pro-European majority in parliament and government, there will still be room to mitigate tensions. Moreover, Simion is unlikely to openly confront Kyiv if the U.S. administration refrains from criticizing Ukraine’s leadership.
Finally, in assessing the security risks for Ukraine, one must also consider the potential destabilization of Moldova if Simion wins.
Volodymyr Solovian