Written by Viktoriia Odusanvo
In early September, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a report on its two-year observation mission at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). In the preface, the Agency’s Director General, Rafael Grossi, referred to the plant as ‘occupied’. However, the report then distances itself from the ‘political discussion’. The authors of the document avoid the issue of responsibility for the party that, by occupying the nuclear power plant, has established a dangerous precedent in terms of international law and global peaceful nuclear security.
UCMC’s Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group reviewed the IAEA report and discovered contradictions. We believe the authors made a “compromise with conscience” by remaining silent on Russia’s destructive role.
Schrödinger’s Principles
According to the report, the first violation of the five firm principles occurred in April 2024, when a drone attack was launched on the station. This was the first recorded violation since the principles were implemented in May 2023.
The Five Principles are part of the ZNPP protection strategy proposed by the IAEA on May 30, 2023. The agency’s initiative stated the following:
- Any attacks from or on ZNPP’s territory are unacceptable, especially those aimed at reactors, spent fuel storage facilities, other critical infrastructure, and personnel;
- It is illegal to use ZNPP as a heavy weapons depot or military base;
- The plant’s power supply should not be put at risk;
- All structures, systems, and elements required for the plant’s safe and reliable operation must be protected from attacks;
- No actions should be taken to undermine the aforementioned principles.
The phrase ‘the first recorded violation’ is particularly noteworthy. In fact, since the occupation of ZNPP, Russia has consistently violated international nuclear law. The occupation administration’s policy has been unaffected by IAEA regulations.
For example, in April of this year, Russian shelling damaged an external power line that connected the temporarily occupied ZNPP to the Ukrainian power grid.
Russian military equipment and soldiers from the Russian Armed Forces are also permanently stationed on the nuclear power plant grounds. The presence of Russian army soldiers and military equipment on ZNPP territory is an especially blatant example of disregard for the IAEA’s five principles. According to current reports, representatives from the monitoring mission have repeatedly heard sounds indicating that the Russians were launching missiles near the nuclear power plant.
Given this, the report’s de facto disregard for numerous facts demonstrating Moscow’s violations of the five principles, including those occurring between May 2023 and April 2024, is incomprehensible. In this case, the IAEA is either fantasizing or purposefully concealing a number of systemic safety concerns surrounding ZNPP.
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi during a visit to ZNPP, June 23
Selective monitoring
According to the report, “after the occupation of ZNPP, the automatic transmission of data from local radiation monitoring stations located within 30 kilometers of the plant was interrupted.” As a result, Ukrainian officials were unable to continue contributing data to the agency’s International Radiation Monitoring Information System (IRMIS). In response, IAEA personnel stationed at the site ensured that offline transmissions of radiation monitoring data to IRMIS from off-site stations were available.
The IAEA report seeks to persuade readers that the reliability of external monitoring of the situation at ZNPP has been ‘resolved’. In fact, the Agency’s ability to monitor the radiation background at the Russian-occupied ZNPP is questionable. The Russian authorities continue to deny IAEA representatives access to portions of the nuclear power plant’s territory and premises. The Agency’s experts do not have access to the reactor halls of power plants 1, 2, and 6. Furthermore, the Russians periodically close portions of the turbine halls of all power plants, preventing IAEA experts from entering.
The IAEA’s inability to keep the situation under control is supported by numerous crises at ZNPP that occurred during the Russian occupation. According to Petro Kotin, the head of Energoatom, the ZNPP equipment is nearing critical condition. The situation is complicated by the Russians’ refusal to repair the plant and their repeated violations of nuclear and technical safety requirements.
Grandmaster of peacekeeping
Quote from the report: ‘During the two years of his permanent presence, the Director General supported numerous diplomatic efforts to support the nuclear safety of ZNPP, including exchanges, meetings, and consultations with high-level officials from Ukraine and the Russian Federation and their nuclear regulatory bodies. Throughout these meetings and consultations, the Director General has stressed the importance of strict oversight of the implementation of the Five Principles and Seven Pillars to protect ZNPP and prevent a nuclear accident.’
The shuttle missions between Kyiv and Moscow give the impression that the situation is under control and add points to the IAEA leadership on the global stage. However, are these efforts effective?
The Agency explains its position by striving for ‘balance’ and trying ‘not to mix political and security issues with the technical factors of the IAEA’s work’.
However, the IAEA’s diplomatic work can hardly be called bilateral and equal. The meetings of IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi with representatives of the Russian authorities on the future of the ZNPP have a number of consequences. Among them is the creation of a ‘picture’ in which the presence of the occupation authorities on the territory of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant is the new normal.
The imbalance of the situation, in turn, causes confusion and tension among Ukrainian experts. In particular, the Head of the Board of the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Valeriy Chaly, commenting on the Agency’s strategy, expresses concerns about the possible consequences of such ‘diplomacy’ in the future. Among them are fears of possible pressure on Kyiv in the interests of the Kremlin by the IAEA, which will be used as a tool for manipulating nuclear safety. ‘I would not be surprised if he (Rafael Grossi – UCMC) is working for his re-election and a hefty salary as a UN official with such dubious activities,’ the diplomat said.
‘In practice, the IAEA’s ‘balance’ opens a dangerous path to legitimising the presence of the Russian army and Rosatom at ZNPP. The fact that the IAEA somehow ‘adds weight’ to the leadership of Rosatom after Russia has violated international conventions, of which the IAEA is the depositary, makes the situation ironic.
Russian missiles evade the IAEA report
The IAEA’s mission is to ensure nuclear safety around the world. However, the Agency frequently chooses to ignore the terrorist nature of Russia’s aggression, particularly the shelling of energy facilities that are part of the generation and distribution infrastructure for electricity produced at the unoccupied Ukrainian NPPs (Rivne, Khmelnytsky, and South Ukrainian).
The last massive Russian attack on Ukrainian power generation systems occurred on August 26, 2024. As a result, Ukraine’s energy infrastructure was severely damaged (specifically, transformer stations that transmit current generated at NPPs to the grid). Some power units at the Rivne and South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plants were temporarily turned off. In this regard, the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to International Organizations in Vienna informed the IAEA that Russia’s strikes on Ukraine’s energy sector endanger the operation of nuclear facilities.
Volodymyr Omelchenko, an energy expert, believes the attack on August 26 was intended to target nuclear power. Mykhailo Gonchar, an expert on international energy and security relations, believes that Russia’s deliberate targeting of Ukrainian nuclear power plants is part of a larger strategy to destabilize Ukraine’s energy industry.
However, the report’s authors did not pay attention to these facts…
Agency under the umbrella of Russian propaganda
The Russian Federation’s attempts to harm nuclear power generation in Ukraine raises concerns about the IAEA leadership’s activities. Following the massive shelling of Ukraine’s energy sector, which also affected transformer stations and nuclear power plant substations, Raphael Grossi visited the Russian nuclear power plant in Kursk, despite the lack of evidence that it was not the target of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ Kursk operation. Furthermore, the ‘threat’ at the Kursk NPP may be interpreted as an exaggeration by Russian propagandists and another attempt to discredit Ukraine.
Valeriy Chaly questions the necessity of the IAEA Director General’s visit to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, arguing that even if the situation corresponds to Russian propagandists’ statements, the NPP units can be shut down, lowering the level of danger. Taking these facts into account, the expert suggests that Grossi’s visit to the nuclear power plant was more of a public relations campaign than an assessment of the nuclear hazard.
In light of Russia’s occupation of ZNPP and attacks on Ukrainian nuclear power facilities, statements about the threat of a nuclear disaster at Ukraine’s Kursk NPP are especially hypocritical.
In this case, the IAEA’s ‘diplomacy’ again aided Russian propaganda. The visit of Rafael Grossi, as well as the Agency’s ‘neutrality’, enabled the Russian media to create a narrative in which the IAEA condemned Ukraine’s actions. Alexei Likhachev, Director General of Rosatom, further ‘twisted’ reality and used this narrative to legitimize Russia’s occupation of ZNPP, claiming that Rosatom had allegedly agreed with the IAEA on a ‘immediate response in both Zaporizhzhia and Kursk’.
The IAEA report emphasizes the importance of ‘all parties’ adhering to the agreements. In this case, we believe it is inappropriate to distribute responsibility equally between the aggressor, who violates international law, and the victim of aggression.
Despite the Agency’s loud statements about its work, the level of danger at ZNPP remains high, and the Russian army’s actions to destabilize the plant are systematic. Unfortunately, the report summarizing the two years of the IAEA observation mission at ZNPP contains no indications of a shift in the distancing strategy. As a result, the IAEA will continue to refuse to acknowledge Russia’s responsibility for violating Ukraine’s nuclear safety.
At the same time, Russian propaganda will continue to actively exploit the IAEA’s desire to stay out of the ‘political debate’ by distorting the Agency’s efforts to discredit Ukraine.
