Călin Georgescu, a far-right politician and candidate in the Romanian presidential election, called Ukraine an “invented state,” the real name of which supposedly should be the “Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.” The politician did not stop at that and proceeded to question Ukraine’s territorial integrity. According to Georgescu, Romania is interested in regaining control over several historical regions that belong to Ukraine – Northern Bukovina, Budjak, and Northern Maramures. In addition to that, he suggested that Transcarpathia be given to Hungary and Lviv Oblast – to Poland. The rest of Ukraine, he dismissively called “little Russia.”
Heorhii Tykhyi, Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, expressed outrage at such statements. “His attempts to present himself as an ‘independent’ politician look absurd, seeing that the rhetoric he used is identical to Russian propaganda, showcasing his complete dependence on his masters in Moscow,” – he stated. It is true that Russian propagandists and the Kremlin’s minions, who are also “authority figures,” love to divide “Ukrainian pie” among neighboring countries. The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation holds the media leadership within this story. For example, its director, Sergey Naryshkin, presented a similar conspiracy at the end of November 2024. The Kremlin’s main “secret service man” stated that Romania has an interest in controlling the Black Sea coast.
Georgescu became infamous after the scandal that occurred when the results of the first round of the Romanian presidential elections (November 2024) were canceled. The populist candidate received an unexpectedly high number of votes in the first round. According to Romania’s special services, which the country’s Constitutional Court agreed with, Georgescu’s result was secured by orchestrating an artificial increase in the number of views on the candidate’s TikTok page.
Notably, the investigation of Georgescu’s pre-election machinations showed proof of Russia having “invested” in the populist candidate’s success.
In recent years, the Kremlin tried to “play” the card of Northern Bukovina with the help of Diana Sosoaca, another infamous far-right politician and a Member of the European Parliament. In 2023, “Putin’s friend” became infamous for trying to introduce a bill that requested “the annexation of the historical territories of Romania, namely Northern Bukovina, Herța, Bucea (Cahul, Bolgrad and Ismail), historical Maramureș and Snake Island.” The territories listed belong to Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. Additionally, Sosoaca regularly made claims of the “oppression” that the Romanian diaspora allegedly suffers from in Ukraine. The Supreme Court of Romania removed the pro-Russian candidate from the presidential race. Therefore, the role of the pro-Russian political agenda’s headliner was “inherited” by Georgescu.
It is worth noting that Georgescu’s “new borders” rhetoric and verbal attacks on Ukrainian territories are not a novelty in Romania’s political discourse. Rather, it is an attempt to reignite old misunderstandings between Bucharest and Kyiv.
Northern Bukovina was one of the first international relations challenges that Ukraine faced after the declaration of independence. The first Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Anatoliy Zlenko, in his memoirs, mentioned that the “first diplomatic demarche” that occurred during his tenure happened due to the unwillingness of some of the Romanian Parliament Members to accept Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The territorial disputes between Kyiv and Bucharest were finally settled in 2009 when the International Court of Justice of the UN announced its decision on the delimitation of the maritime borders of the exclusive economic zone and the division of the continental shelf in the Black Sea. Since then, conversations about dividing Ukrainian territories were mostly brought up by the marginal parts of Romanian politics.
After the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of Russian aggression against Ukraine, Romania consistently supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Bucharest is the provider of several security initiatives aimed at ensuring NATO’s presence in the Black Sea area. For example, the construction of the largest NATO base in Europe began in Romania. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Romania has become an important logistical hub for military shipments and Ukrainian goods exports. During the Russian blockade of the Ukrainian ports in 2022-2023, almost a third of the total export of grain from Ukraine passed through the Romanian port of Constanța.
The preservation of the public consensus on supporting Ukraine is also notable. According to survey data (GLOBSEC Trends 2024), 55% of the respondents consider Russia the main culprit of the war. INSCOP data shows that only 5,9% of Romanians trust the Kremlin, 11 times less than the level of trust for the UN.
Still, Moscow’s stubborn attempts to incite conflicts between Romanians and Ukrainians persist. Susana Dragomir, a political expert and strategic communication expert, indicates: “Romania is a key player in supporting Ukraine, providing trade corridors and strategic cooperation. For Russia, disrupting Romania weakens this support and gives them greater access to strategic areas like the Danube corridor.”
Therefore, Moscow is preparing for the last round in the fight to destabilize the political situation in Romania. It will happen in May when the Romanian people will choose their president. For the Kremlin, the best-case scenario would be Georgescu’s victory. To receive the parliament’s support, the populist president would probably try and focus on breaking up the pro-European coalition, which includes social democrats (PSD), liberals (PNL), the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), and delegates of national minorities. As a result, a reformatting of the government and/or early parliamentary elections would happen, and Eurosceptic political forces may gain control over the legislative branch. Russian propaganda will try to support this scenario through media support for far-right political forces. At the same time, the political crisis will create favorable conditions to spread anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western narratives in the Romanian information space.
For the Kremlin being able to influence the Romanian president is important due to the scope of the latter’s powers. The Romanian president’s mandate includes overseeing foreign policy. Therefore, Georgescu’s coming to power could negatively impact Ukraine’s support dynamics.
Within the next couple of months, Moscow aims to strengthen the voices of its minions in the Romanian media space to renew the media attack on the topic of the export of Ukrainian agricultural products. Implementing a ban on Ukrainian grain transit is among Georgescu’s pre-election campaign promises, which is why it is unlikely that the politician will refuse the temptation to earn political points from protests against the transit/import of Ukrainian grain.
Thus, we should expect Russian hybrid aggression aimed at discrediting Ukraine to intensify in the Romanian information space. Traditionally, local far-right and Eurosceptic political forces are taking on the role of Moscow’s allies. Georgescu’s coming to power as their representative could radically redraw the domestic political map of Romania as well as break one of the most important external military-economic partnerships for Ukraine.
Viktoriia Odusanvo, Volodymyr Solovian
