Written by Matt Wickham, UCMC analyst
The attention given to the recently freed Russian oppositionists as part of a prisoner swap should come as no surprise; the West, in particular, the White House, has long invested in the hope of Russian opposition, although thus far it has seen limited, or next to no success.
Just hours after arriving in Germany, recently released political prisoners from the depths of the Kremlin’s prisons—at least that’s how the speakers described it—Vladimir Kara-Murza, Ilya Yashin, and Andrey Pivovarov were given a platform to speak to the West, telling the world that they may have the answer to a freer, safer, and more democratic Russia.
They baselessly, perhaps naively, claim ordinary Russians aren’t part of “Putin’s Russia,” sharing their absolute convictions on what the Russian people want. This claim, however, would be far more credible if they had been a part of Russian society and had not lived in isolation for the last few years. After all, their limited contact with the outside world, which consists of a few phone calls with family and a small amount of fan mail, casts serious doubt on their “insight” into the true mood of the Russian people.
And so, their comments, particularly those calling for the sanctions to be lifted, as it is “Putin who should suffer, not everyday Russians,” have only confirmed to the Ukrainian people what they’ve always believed: the Russian opposition is a lost hope for achieving just peace in Ukraine.
Yet much doubt remains about what these Russian oppositionists can truly achieve. So then, with little support from the Russian people, almost no political following, and residing beyond the borders of Russia, why is the West putting their money on these three figures?
The Long Game: A New “Russian Opposition”
Abbac Hallyamov, a political scientist, says that oppositionists don’t need to remain in the country to gain influence, particularly now that the internet is transcending borders. He reminds us how many oppositionists achieved a revolution and that if Lenin and Plehahnov could do it, why can’t one or all of these three?: “Lenin was not in Russia for nearly a decade before the revolution, and [Georgi] Plekhanov was gone for about 30 years.”
Hallyamov’s optimism is cautiously shared by Ukrainian politician Oleg Dunda, who notes that Ukraine needs to find a way to work with these oppositionists if they are capable of creating chaos in Russia. The hope, however, is mainly centred around Kara-Murza, who has “amazing contacts in Washington,” tells Dunda. (Let’s not forget, Kara-Murza’s main achievement was the adoption by the US Senate of the “Magnitsky Act” in 2012. The law laid the foundations for the sanctions mechanism in which the Putin regime is now stuck). He warned, however, that these connections could also make Kara-Murza potentially dangerous if he refuses to work with Ukraine: “We need to know who we can work with after the collapse of Russia, as part of Ukraine’s safety. We need to collaborate with people who can create chaos in Russia, and if that’s Kara-Murza, we must support him and explore all options to make it happen.”
Disillusionment With Russian Opposition, is it Justified?
After enduring Russia’s full-scale war for over 2.5 years with little visible dissent from the Russian people—both at home and abroad—Ukrainians are understandably disillusioned with the notion that the so-called Russian opposition could effect meaningful change in Russia. Navalny failed, so why should we expect anything from these, frankly speaking, “nobodies”? This disillusionment is shared by Ukrainian journalist Vitalii Portnikov, who argues that the ideological agenda of the Russian people is actually whatever Putin and his propaganda apparatus dictate, and the beliefs of Russian oppositionists are those of a politician living in a bubble. He told how, while they may claim to understand the desires of the Russian people, the true voice of Russia is represented by Putin, not Vladimir Kara-Murza. Moreover, against the backdrop of recent events in Kursk, his naivety is highlighted by the fact that citizens of Russia’s Kursk region are now calling on Putin for help, admitting how they have supported the ‘Special Military Operation’ and assisted the Russian army from the outset. It sounds pretty straight forwards to me – the Russian people support “Putin’s” war.
But why the immediate indignation from Ukrainian society? Consider the stark contrast between the images of freed Ukrainian POWs and those of the recently freed Russian oppositionists. Ukrainian prisoners return in a dire state—starved, with ribs showing, requiring immediate medical intervention—while the Russian oppositionists appear in near “tip-top” physical health, reporting only very low Vitamin D levels found by doctors in Germany upon their freeing. Then you have Ilya Yashin’s rather delusional comments about surviving politically motivated captivity through mental strength. He claims, “The psychological makeup involves self-reliance and a balanced mental state, allowing one to maintain discipline and organization. None of us faced this issue because we were united by a mission and understood our purpose.” His statements, which imply that mental strength alone can overcome systemic oppression, only further illustrate how detached these oppositionists are from reality.
Moreover, the lack of acknowledgement or support for Ukraine during this conference has only deepened cynicism within Ukrainian society regarding the potential for meaningful change from these figures. However, it would be unjust to place the blame solely on the Russian opposition for this. Journalists should have addressed this issue directly but failed to do so. We must remember that these figures were given a platform not to advance Ukraine’s agenda but rather to serve theirs and much of the West’s interests. And let’s be realistic: the only “Russian oppositionist” who might genuinely support Ukraine in the way Ukrainians desire and deserve would be someone living in Ukraine and awaiting Ukrainian citizenship.
All of this, not even mentioning the call for the West to lift Russian sanctions because they supposedly harm everyday Russians, clearly explains Ukraine’s disillusionment with the potential of this opposition and Ukrainian society’s annoyance with the West’s never-ending desire for Russian opposition to Putin, then a military victory for Ukraine.
So, Who is the Winner Here?
Although politics, especially in terms of the Russo-Ukrainian war, is often viewed through a win-lose lens—in which one side’s gain is interpreted as the other’s loss—this exchange may really be a mutual victory.
Firstly, it is a significant political victory for the US, specifically the Biden administration. As the presidential elections approach, demonstrating the ability to secure the release of American citizens detained abroad is (for the American people) a powerful testament to the administration’s (Democrats’) diplomacy and ability to negotiate with Russia—a term we hear more and more being thrown about here in Ukraine… A coincidence?
What’s more, Trump, who previously asserted that only he could strike a deal with Putin, has criticised the swap as a poor agreement while oddly praising Putin for his success. This exchange appears to be a political win for both the Democrats and Putin. For the Democrats, it is likely to bolster their position, which, in turn, for the Kremlin is preferable. Putin has already told that a Biden, and thus democratic leadership, is more predictable than a Trump presidency. And thus, a Democrat win aligns with Russia’s long-term strategy as it could help the Kremlin plan its propaganda and hybrid warfare efforts more effectively. And so, win-win.
So What Did Putin Gain?
Putin’s decision to finalise the swap now, rather than wait just a few more months until after the US elections, also indicates a degree of urgency and perhaps a very subtle panic. The Russian opposition’s call for lifting sanctions in their very first press conference may signal one of Putin’s demands, perhaps threats, directly to them – call for sanction removal. This reflects the strain on the Russian economy and the Kremlin’s subtle desperation for change as the war looks to continue into another year.
Moreover, this exchange is used by Putin as a much-needed boost in loyalty from his security forces. In doing so, Putin effectively tells his operatives to perform their duties no matter the risk, and if they get caught, the motherland never, ever abandons its people. “Мы своих нe бросаем” is a Russian propaganda track that has seen heavy investment over the years. Yet, the truth is that Russia does abandon its people; those who are not forgotten are only those who are strategically important to the stability of Putin’s dictatorship. However, “Мы своих не бросаем тех, кто полезен диктатуре Путина” (“we don’t throw those beneficial to the Putin dictatorship”) doesn’t have the same ring to it.
Lastly, Hallyamov explains how, by successfully orchestrating this exchange, Putin projects an image of strength and control, reassuring his domestic audience that Russia is still a powerful player on the global stage capable of negotiating. Also, with Putin personally greeting the swapped individuals on the red carpet shows how he wanted to use this as his PR win. However, Hallyamov tells that this is one of the downfalls of the Russian regime, particularly Putin, he doesn’t know when to stop too all for the sake of public approval.
The West’s persistent optimism about finding a successor to “Putin’s Russia” may be rooted in a deeply entrenched, yet flawed, perspective shaped by historical and literary analyses of Russia.
Furthermore, the West’s reluctance to challenge the existing global order and political institutions reinforces a dangerously softened view of Russians and Russia. By clinging to outdated assumptions and avoiding disruptive changes, the West maintains a “Cold War” status quo that fails to address the complexities of contemporary Russian politics and undermines effective policy responses. Consequently, the idea of a political opposition that could reform Russia is favoured over recognizing the potential need for a more profound and unsettling shift that could ultimately secure a Ukrainian win and thus security in Europe.
