Viktoriia Odusanvo
On October 26, Georgia held its parliamentary election, with the central intrigue surrounding the contest between the ruling Georgian Dream (GD), a party that has been in power for 12 years, and the pro-European opposition. The outcome will shape the country’s foreign policy path and prospects for European integration, as the two parties aim to take distinctly different directions.
Choosing between the European Union and the Kremlin
Despite Russia’s hybrid aggression, eventually leading to the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, Georgia managed to secure the status of a candidate for EU membership in December 2023. Yet now, Georgia’s path to the EU has been put on ice after the ruling political force, the Georgian Dream, follows a path that leads straight to the Kremlin. Brussels’s original discontent emerged after the “Transparency of Foreign Influence” law passed by the government-controlled parliament. According to this law, organizations that receive over 20% of their finances from abroad must be registered by governmental institutions (a carbon copy of the Russian Federation’s “Foreign Agents” law). This concern was only cemented further when the Georgian Dream Party put forward plans to give the church the status of a special institution within the country and laws that could limit the rights of the LGBTQ+ community. Moreover, Georgia’s ruling party has threatened to deprive opposition members of their mandates.
The Georgian government’s recent course of policy has caused serious concern in Brussels. European leaders are questioning Georgia’s ability to join the EU if the Georgian Dream Party continues its destructive course. Before the election, heads of foreign policy departments of the EU’s 13 countries (Germany, France, Poland, Belgium, Danemark, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, and the Czech Republic) published a statement, indicating Georgia’s EU future being cut short if the government doesn’t change its’ course.
The GD’s “shadow owner”—oligarch and ex-prime minister of Georgia Bidzina Ivanishvili—began accusing Western politicians of trying to engage Georgia in the Russian-Ukrainian war to open a “second frontline” since this year’s spring. Using the media network he controls, he started to systematically implement what can only be described as a fear-mongering campaign about the “Global War Party,” that is, by using Western support, they want to pull Georgia into a war against Russia. A very distinct campaign built on fear borrowed straight from the Kremlin’s playbook.
Supplying the non-sanctioned goods of dual purpose is practical proof of the Georgian government being Putin’s regime subjects.
Tbilisi first started distancing itself from the Euro-Atlantic vector when it imposed the cutback of the defense cooperation, an initiative helped by the West. In July 2024, 30 million euros from the EU in support of Georgia’s defense were reported to be frozen. Later, the US announced that the Noble Partner joint military exercises were postponed until further notice. And thus, indicatively, for the first time since 2008, there was no mention of Georgia’s intention to join NATO in the Washington Summit of the Alliance declaration in July 2024.
As the Georgian government moved to consolidate its internal power by adopting anti-Western rhetoric and quietly undermining sanctions against Russia, this October’s election has brought the country to a pivotal crossroads, confronting it with a dilemma that offers no path of return. The opposition’s potential victory was considered to be one of the few available options to preserve the country’s course for European integration and protecting the progress the Georgian people have achieved in recent years. Most of the opposition parties signed the Georgian Charter, which obliges them to cancel all laws that hinder Georgia’s European integration. And thus, Moscow would have increased it’s hybrid warfare pressure if the government had changed. With this not coming to fruition, a continued GD Party ruling would lead to a further deepening Georgia’s division and a radicalization of protests. The price for preserving the “non-attack mode” with Moscow and the energy, trade, and economic dividends, that being neighbors with Russia provides is keeping distance from the West.
The unconvincing victory
After processing 100% of the ballots, Georgia’s Central Election Commission (CEC) announced that the Georgian Dream received 53.9% of the votes, receiving the majority needed for the quorum (76 positions). The four opposition forces Coalition for Change, Unity—National Movement, Strong Georgia, and Gakharia—For Georgia also overcame the election threshold. According to the official calculations, the Pro-Russian government’s opponents received 37% of the votes, yet in big cities—Tbilisi, Rustavi, Kutaisi, and Batumi—as well as polling stations from the Georgian Diaspora abroad, the GD lost.
However, the trust for the Georgian CEC was ruined by several factors:
The violation of the election process, which could have impacted the results significantly. “My Vote”, Georgian observer mission, has stated that over 900 cases of voting process violations from 196 presents were recorded by the organization. This includes throw-ins, repeated votes, blackouts at the polling stations, physical threats on the members of the opposition commission members, and other technologies of “influencing” the results (such as buying votes and renting voters personal information) were reported.
International observers from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) stated that Georgia’s elections were overshadowed by pressure and intimidation against the voters. “We continue to express deep concerns about the democratic backsliding in Georgia. The conduct of yesterday’s election is unfortunately evidence to that effect”, – stated Antonio López-Istúriz White, Head of the EP delegation.
Doubts regarding the objectivity of the official data are also founded by the significant mismatch between the final tally and the exit polls. The difference between the official results and the two questionnaires, which were carried out at the opposition’s request, was more than 10 points. By the 28th of October, all four opposition forces announced a refusal to accept the election results, announcing mass protests.
Salome Zurabishvili, the President of Georgia, stated. “I do not accept this election. This election cannot be acknowledged. It would be the same as accepting Russia entering here, Georgia being subject to Russia.” According to the president, the people of Georgia have become victim of a Russian “special operation”.
Moscow’s appetites are growing
The current year brought significant warming in the relationships between Moscow and Tbilisi. Despite Georgian Prime Minister Kobakhidze ensuring that there are no plans to renew diplomatic relationships with Moscow after the victory in the election held on the 26th of October, this circumstance does not interfere with the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare operations against Georgia.
A traditional motif for Russia’s support of the GD is “geopolitical image”. A loyal Georgian government is an important asset in the Russian geopolitical gambit in the South Caucasus, where the alliance between Turkey and Azerbaijan strengthened significantly after the Second Karabakh War, and Iran is actively demonstrating ambition, that goes against the Kremlin’s interests (for example, the question of the Zangezur Corridor).
When assessing how this could affect the Russia’s future military strategy, the Kremlin’s interest in the current Georgian government’s victory is caused by the intention to create a naval base in Abkhazia by 2025 without “unnecessary noise” (the Russian purpose is to “hide” the Chernomorskiy flot (Black Sea Fleet) ships from the attacks of Ukrainian sea drones). The GD’s silent agreement in the face of another blatant act of Russian aggression against the territorial integrity of Abkhazia complicates Ukraine’s international legal response aspect significantly.
In the light of informational confrontation with the West, “cementing” the Ivanishvili party’s power is also beneficial for Moscow. The arguments Russian propagandists used before the election were focused on discrediting the idea of building a democracy in Georgia and its potential to join the EU. Therefore, Russian propaganda converts the loss of the “pro-European” opposition into a narrative about “the weakness and bankruptcy” of the idea of Europe in the “post-Soviet space”.
At the same time, falsifications that undermine the legitimacy of the election play out in Kremlin’s favor. Western leaders’ criticism of the GD and opposition protests would only strengthen Tbilisi’s drifting towards the Russian “shores”.
The election has not brought Georgia safety in its relationships with Moscow, which the Georgian Dream tried to “sell” to its voters as Russia plans to increase its presence in the region of the South Caucasus. Therefore, the Kremlin sees the ruling political force “freezing” the European course as Tbilisi’s weakness. Stopping European integration is not the price a vassal can pay for relative peace at their borders, it’s a prelude to Moscow restoring control over the lost “imperial legacy”.
