Volodymyr Solovian, Viktoria Odusanvo
In late November, Romania held its first round of presidential elections. Calin Georgescu, a far-right politician whose campaign was primarily conducted on TikTok, won first place with nearly 23% of the vote as an independent candidate. Most observers were taken aback by the outcome, as Calin Georgescu had a reputation as a little-known politician who sociologists had not predicted would advance to the second round.
How did TikTok algorithms provide “electoral doping” to a candidate? Can pro-European forces counter the growing threat to trust in the electoral process? These are just two of the questions examined by the Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group in their analysis of Romania’s contentious presidential election.
The TikTok candidate
Georgescu has a degree in agriculture and has previously worked for the Ministry of Environment and in diplomatic positions. In 2020 and 2021, the populist nationalist party Alliance for the Union of Romanians put him forward as prime minister.
Georgescu’s rhetoric is openly pro-Russia. The politician often expresses his desire to end military aid to Ukraine and the export of Ukrainian grain through Romania. Instead, he describes Russian dictator Vladimir Putin as “a man who loves his country.” Georgescu has also criticised NATO and the EU, denying the need for climate change vaccinations.
Protests broke out across Romania in response to Bohdan Basescu’s unexpected success. The opponents’ main leitmotif is that the potential rise to power of a populist politician endangers the country’s democratic development and effective interaction with EU institutions.
As time passed and investigations opened, it turned out that the suspicions were justified…
On December 4, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis made public reports from the Romanian Information Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, and Special Communications Service. According to the data, Georgescu’s campaign received support from TikTok bot farms. Thus, two weeks before election day, approximately 25,000 accounts “joined” in promoting Georgescu’s political campaign. It was also discovered that within a month, one of the accounts transferred $381,000.00 to other accounts supporting Georgescu. The bot accounts were coordinated through the Telegram messenger. Cyberattacks were also used to support bot farms.
There were also attempts to influence the vote-counting process. According to the information in the declassified documents, close to 85,000 attacks were launched on election-related websites and IT companies.
The Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service noted that Russia is responsible for sabotage and interference in the electoral process. “Romania is a target for Russian hybrid attacks, including cyber attacks, information leaks and acts of sabotage,” according to one of the papers. Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu promised that an official investigation would reveal all the details of Russia’s “interference,” which, he claimed, resulted in a “clear distortion of the results” of the first round. By the way, most observers believe Ciolacu was the greatest loser in the election, as despite sociologists’ sophisticated predictions, he finished second to the Liberal Conservatives’ representative, Elena Lascona.
In response to the published information, on December 6, the Constitutional Court annulled the election results, justifying the decision by reports of violations during the campaign by the special services.
Political crisis with a virtual revolutionary flavour
The first round’s results were a shock to Romania’s pro-European political camp. The Social Democratic Party (PSD), the National Liberal Party (PNL), the Union for the Salvation of Romania (USR), and the Hungarian minority party, the Democratic Union of Hungarians of Romania (UDMR), have started talks to form a coalition. As a reminder, four pro-European political forces won 303 of 466 parliamentary seats in the December 1 elections. However, the Romanian Salvation Union quickly withdrew from coalition talks. The agreement most likely failed due to the circumstances surrounding the presidential elections. The representative of this particular party, Lasconi, entered the cancelled second round, and in the new conditions remains the main competitor of the current Prime Minister Ciolac.
Eventually, the negotiations produced a three-party majority. Cholaku retained his position as head of government. As a result, pro-Russian forces can still count on the presidency as their only prize. According to current reports, the first round will take place in the spring of 2025.
The disruption of the electoral process exacerbates the crisis, as the inability to elect a new head of state has resulted in a political and legal conflict. Iohannis, who has led Romania since 2014, refused to step down, citing the country’s constitution, which states that the president serves until his successor is sworn in.
At the same time, in mid-December, calls for protests on December 21 and 22 demanding the resignation of the “usurper” Iohannis spread on social media, primarily TikTok. Opposition technologists are actively exploiting the historical coincidence of Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu’s assassination on December 25, 1989.
In connection with the above facts, the Romanian Ministry of Internal Affairs opened approximately 40 criminal cases on the fact of “incitement to violence”
In unison with Moscow
In response to the cancellation of the results, Basescu increased his anti-Western rhetoric. On the Realitatea TV channel, the candidate linked the current government’s actions to “attempts” by the current US presidential administration to “use Bucharest as a tool to prolong the war in Ukraine, trying to drag Romania into the war.”
It is noteworthy that Georgescu’s rhetoric is consistent with the Kremlin’s position. Russia has adopted the standard strategy of denying its own interference and blaming it on a third party. Even Russian dictator Vladimir Putin commented on the election cancellation. However, in the media, the Russian Foreign Ministry has been the most active in “working out” this track. For example, Alexander Grushko, Deputy Head of Russian Diplomacy, used the political crisis surrounding Romania’s elections to reiterate the mantra of destroying the “canons and postulates” of the West. “This is a line that aims to suppress the will of any people and any political figures who begin to be guided by national interests in their actions,” the diplomat-propagandist summarized.
The winner of the cancelled election’s participation in the re-run is currently under investigation due to possible fraud during his campaign. However, given Georgescu’s media activity, he does not intend to abandon his presidential ambitions. Furthermore, according to a CURS poll conducted in early December, more than 57% of voters preferred the pro-Russian candidate over Lascona in a hypothetical second round.
EU investigations continue
Following the revelations about TikTok’s manipulations, Romania’s National Broadcasting Council requested that the European Commission conduct an investigation. The agency’s deputy head, Valentin Alexandru ǘucan, has accused TikTok of “manipulating public opinion through improper use of the platform.” According to the official, the European Digital Services Act (DSA) requires large platforms like TikTok to assess systemic risks associated with the operation of services, particularly the potential impact on democratic processes.
The EU Commission has already opened an official investigation into whether TikTok violated the Act. “Following serious indications that foreign actors interfered in the Romanian presidential election using TikTok, we are now thoroughly investigating whether TikTok violated the Digital Services Act by failing to take measures to address such risks,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in a statement.
According to the European Commission, the TikTok platform may have been complicit in Russian interference in the Romanian elections by purposefully manipulating the algorithm and rules for moderating paid political content on the platform. For example, Kelin Georgescu’s profile, which served as the main channel for his political campaign, was not designated as a “political candidate” profile. As a result, Georgescu’s videos had a wider reach and were not constrained by the same rules as other candidates.
It should be noted that the platform rejects accusations of intentionally assisting Moscow’s plan and assures the European Commission that it has provided all necessary evidence. In an official statement issued on November 28, TikTok assured that the platform has found no evidence of a “covert influence operation” involving the Romanian presidential election, nor has it confirmed foreign interference.
The United Europe’s political architecture is based on democratic expression of will. As a result, an attack on the legitimacy of the electoral process undermines the governing vertical’s credibility at both the national and EU levels. Thus, Romania’s scandalous presidential election demonstrated the full extent of the threat that social media poses to the electoral institution.
To summarise, unscrupulous actors in international relations are actively mastering methods for influencing European voters’ electoral behaviour. In these circumstances, effective counteraction is possible by exerting greater control over the algorithms of social media platforms such as TikTok (affiliated with China) and Telegram (Russia). Simultaneously, social media restrictions can pay off if EU governments work together to increase media literacy, particularly by explaining car thieves’ hybrid information practices.
