Written by Volodymyr Solovian, Viktoriia Odusanvo
The 6th of August was the start of AFU’s operation in the Russian Federation’s Kursk region. The war transcending into internationally acknowledged Russian territories caught even Russian propagandists off guard.
During the first day, while the Kremlin was operating in “radio-silent” mode and Russian generals struggled to determine Ukraine’s true objectives, the Kremlin’s Telegram propaganda machine started to glitch.
Most channels followed the “general line” blindly, choosing to lessen the scope of events. Meanwhile, a group of “independent” Z-channels seized the chance to showcase their own “expertise” and “objectivity” as opposed to the Russian Ministry of Defence’s ridiculous media strategy of silence.
Obviously, a surge of “dissenting opinions” concerning AFU’s operation in the Kursk region is not a sign of objectivity but a reaction that focuses on narrow corporate interest. The difference between the opinions of pro-war bloggers who dared to criticize the military command can be explained by the fact that behind most Z-channels there are specific groups of influence from within the Russian Intelligence Service’ environment or clans from the Russian military command structure.
An example of “cooperation” between the so-called independent Telegram channels and Russian high-ranking politicians or military can be observed in a recent investigation, conducted by “Telebachennya Toronto”. As per the OSINT-ers data, the Deputy Commander of the 11th Army Corps, Alexey Polyakov used to discredit his commanders regularly and leaked information to the famous Russian blogger “Older than Edda” (more than 300,000 subscribers).
The precedent created by Kursk, as well as Prigozhin’s rebellion in June 2023, demonstrated how, when a situation is potentially dangerous for the Kremlin, power groups start an uncompromising struggle to be closer to Putin. Telegram wars are a vital attribute of this process, their purpose being to shift responsibility to an intraspecies competitor.
Telegram channels nominated the Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, as the main culprit in failing to organize the country’s border defences. The battles in the Kursk region also became a convenient reason to assign the blame on several generals, with Alexander Lapin, commander of the newly created Leningrad Military District, being among them (units of this division are operating in the Kursk region).
The role of the vanguard in the attack against Russian army generals is usually played by the Z-channels, which were, even before, a part of Prigozhin’s media. The information pool of the (most likely) liquidated leader of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s PMC Wagner was wiped out by the Kremlin over a year ago. Still, several channels from Wagner’s orbit did not stop functioning and continued to stir up radical moods among Russians. Moreover, the situation with the AFU’s operation in the Kursk region demonstrated how, in the case of a military and political destabilization of Putin’s regime, the level of criticism can grow rapidly even among the loyal channels.
The freedom of thought notes on the “hurray-patriotical” flangs of Russian propaganda are not a new occurrence. Up until now, the Kremlin was able to control the dosage of publically demonstrated dissatisfaction from the radical Z-imperialists. The most inconvenient critics usually end up in jail (as per the Strelkov-Ghirkin case example) or “excluded” by organized bullying campaigns from the Russian government’s court heralds.
However, Ukraine’s unexpected advance specifically might prompt the Kremlin to launch a Telegram cleansing and increase the level of control and moderation of Z-channels. The reason, in our opinion, is not hidden in the attack against Putin’s commanders. The informational “bleeding” of the generals might work in Putin’s favor, as he, being a part of the KGB once, never truly trusted the military. Demonstratively, the information that discredits Gerasimov (assertedly, the military commander ignored the reconnaissance data about the deployment of Ukrainian divisions that were involved in the Kursk offensive) was first published by the channels controlled by the Russian Intelligence Services VChK-GPU and “Rybar”.
Opposed to this, the open criticism from the radical segment of Telegram targeting the “official” propaganda—federal media, commenters of political talk shows, and the “court” Telegram channels, which remain loyal to the government in any situation—became an unpleasant signal for the Kremlin technologists.
The Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group presents some examples of the “friendly fire” narrative from radical actors on Russian Telegram channels towards the Russian propaganda positions:
Telegram channel “Philologist in the Ambush”, (54,000 subscribers):
“…we are witnessing another attack of a schizophrenic anticrisis. As the actual crisis can’t be hidden, the shocked masses must immediately be shown something nice and calming. As in, look, the wise rulers keep the situation under control, the mighty reserves are coming to the region, and we will defeat everyone now”.
Telegram channel “Veteran’s notes”, (357,000):
“The regular army of the Ukrainian nazis amounting to several full-fledged mechanized brigades using NATO’s equipment invaded RF’s territory and they [federal media] still talk about “combatants”. And we are surprised about why it happened”.
“One of the most harmful categories of fakes are the fakes that overly exaggerate our success or even contain fiction, fantasies about such success, and also those that “draw” an opponent defeat without any proof when, in reality, it wasn’t defeated yet”.
Vladyslav Shurygin, military “expert”:
“The enemy is on our territory for two weeks. But we still did not hear whose fault it is that it happened. […] The country should at least see a truthful map of what it has lost up until now. We are starting to seriously lose an information war. […] The Internet is full of information, which our citizens get “hooked on”. And they refuse our information”.
Telegram channel “The Thirteenth” (309,560):
“It’s so tiring; some losers are sitting there talking about some terrorists, about the outside influence, calling someone, asking for someone’s opinions or permissions, blatantly lying. […] Let’s be honest, this is military impotence”
Another reason for the Kremlin to be concerned is an open criticism by Russian “rightwings” towards Kadyrovites (Chechens loyal to the Chechen leader, Kadyrov). Other than the Russian Ministry of Defence and federal media, the Akhmat Special Forces unit and its commander and, additionally, the Deputy Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Russian Army Apti Alaudinov, were “attacked” by the Z-military bloggers. The annoyance directed towards the actions of Chechen units was caused by Alaudinov’s bravado in claiming countless successes of the “Akhmat” in the Kursk region, which were far from the truth. The “tales” about how the “Akhmat” could not stop the breaching of the border due to “missing” the AFU forces also did not add popularity to the Kadyrovites’ leader. In the Z-blogging sphere, Kadyrov’s favorite gained a derogatory name “Lapti Aladina” (the wordplay created by paraphrasing his name, roughly translated as “Aladdin’s bast shoes”).
Telegram channel “The Thirteenth” (309,560):
“Today Apti Aronovich Alaudinov declared that srochniks [elnisted men] should go to war. […] If you want to take other people’s children and send them to the front lines, let’s start with Chechnya. Let’s start this show in Chechnya, let’s have srochniks [enlisted men] from Chechnya. And if not, let’s not talk about it. Because it’s easy to decide when it’s other people’s children”.
Telegram channel “Alex Parker Returns” (230,000):
“After “Lapti Aladina” [“Aladdin’s bark shoes”] became the deputy chief of the military-political department of the Ministry of Defense a new trend started in the army. Both draftees and contractors are being pushed to change religion and convert to Islam”.
Allegedly, in the Kursk region, several banners where Apti Alaudinov “quotes” the wisdom of the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu had appeared. As the main justification for Kadyrovites’ failures in stopping the Ukrainian offensive in the initial days was the argument that the “Akhmat” had “walked straight past” the AFU, these banners look rather humourous.
Debunking the image of the “invincible” Kadyrovites plays into the hands of the Kremlin, in a way, as it lowers the weight of Kadyrov himself. Still, Putin cannot allow the favorite child of Chechnya’s master, the “Akhmat” unit, to be turned into a laughingstock and a scapegoat in the everyday Russian’ people’s eyes. It could lead to a hostility increase between the regions in Russia, which the center is involving significant financial and ideological resources to contain.
Throughout September, the Kremlin managed to, to some extent, channel the discontent about the course of the war (mostly about losing control over a part of the Kursk region of the RF) thanks to the success of the occupation contingent in the Pokrovsk direction. However, after the frontline in the Donbas region stabilizes, it will become harder for the Russian government to explain why the AFU is present in the “canonically” Russian territories.
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Since the beginning of the AFU’s operation in the Kursk region, the Russian media space resembles the cannibalism of spiders trapped in a jar, attacking one another to gain the upper hand in the media space. At first glance, military bloggers’ statements seem like a demonstration of truthfulness and a desire to “gift” their audiences with correct information. However, the purpose of such “analytics” by the Z-channels is not just to gain the audience’s support but to fight for their governmental benefactor’s interests.
This is why it is important for the Kremlin to ensure full control over the networks of propaganda Telegram channels before the Russian Army’s advancement in Ukraine starts to slow down. Therefore, soon we might expect a new stage in “tightening the screws” in the Russian Telegram segment. The Kremlin’s current task is to clear the messenger of any signs of infighting between different clans and influential groups of the Russian power vertical.
Putin’s strategists see Telegram as a tool that should uninterruptedly act as a means for mass hypnosis of their population and external information operations. Unsuncioned displays of distrust towards superiors are inadmissible.
