Rizqy Amelia Zein, PhD student at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München,
Volodymyr Solovian, PhD in Philosophy, Head of Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group at Ukraine Crisis Media Center
Introduction
As tensions continue to rise in the Gaza Strip, Russia appears to be capitalizing on the news cycle to strengthen its influence amid the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas. Initially, Russia sought to position itself as a mediator in the conflict. To this end, Russian officials have largely refrained from openly criticizing Hamas, and instead, focused on pursuing diplomatic efforts to assert itself as a “great power” in the global landscape. Additionally, Russia appears to be taking advantage of the Israel-Hamas war to divert international attention from its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. The Israel-Hamas war allows Russia to simultaneously enshrine its interests in Ukraine, shape its public image, and expand its influence across different regions, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and other non-Western countries (or the so-called “Global South”) that have traditionally been pro-Palestinian.
While Russia’s bilateral relations with Israel have fluctuated over time, their relationship has been generally cordial with the Soviet Union, the former entity of the Russian Federation, being the first country to formally recognize the State of Israel in 1948. However, their friendship soon began to crumble as Russia proceeded to invade Ukraine in 2022 when Russian officials, including Putin himself, made anti-Semitic remarks about Volodymyr Zelenskyy, inciting anger among Israeli officials.
As Russia faces severe sanctions imposed by Western countries as a repercussion of its military occupation of Ukraine, it is becoming increasingly dependent on its allies in the MENA and Asian region, such as Iran, China, and Syria, for military, political, and economic support. It is therefore not surprising that Russia is recently tilting its stance closer to Palestine, even going as far as hosting Hamas leaders for “a political talk” in Moscow. Ready to sacrifice its once friendly alliance with Israel, Russia is seeking to fully instrumentalize the Israel-Hamas war, which is perceived as a useful tool for establishing an alliance with the “Global South” countries. To this end, Russia is trying to weaken the influence of Western countries in these regions by spreading its propaganda and disinformation about the war in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, in other parts of the world, Russia seeks to destabilize Western countries, including the United States, where the Israeli-Hamas war has become an increasingly divisive domestic issue. The Israeli-Hamas war also serves as an ideal vehicle to undermine the legitimacy of international collective efforts to put an end to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this report, we present our findings on pro-Russian narratives related to the Israel-Hamas war targeting Indonesian audiences based on our data extracted from YouTube.
As the world’s second-largest Muslim-majority country, Indonesia and its historical and long-standing support for Palestine makes it a strategic audience for pro-Russian narratives, especially those related to the Israel-Hamas war and the war in Ukraine. On the one hand, the pro-Palestinian stance resonates deeply with most Indonesians, and, to meet the popular demand, Indonesian foreign policy has been largely pro-Palestinian, albeit with many backdoor deals with Israel. On the other hand, pro-Russian narratives about the war in Ukraine are highly prevalent in Indonesian traditional and social media and have gained significant traction in the country. The Israel-Hamas war provides Russia with an opportunity to highlight the “double standards of the West,” which further reinforces the anti-Western sentiments already pervasive among Indonesian Islamists in particular.
Focusing this report on the Indonesian social media landscape, and particularly YouTube, allows us to assess the prevalence of pro-Russian narratives and how they benefit Russia in managing its global image in Indonesia, as a country with predominantly Muslim populations, as well as in preserving its interests in Ukraine. More generally, exploring how pro-Russian narratives are present and take shape in Indonesia’s social media landscape can provide an interesting example for examining how Russia’s information warfare manifests itself in the “Global South” countries.
Methodology
To identify pro-Russian narratives related to the Israel-Hamas war, we scraped YouTube data on April 22, 2024, using Octoparse. We used the keywords “Rusia” and “Palestina,” which yielded 2,951 entries. We then applied two exclusion criteria to reduce the data: 1) excluding videos posted more than six months prior to data collection, indicating that the videos were made before the Israel-Hamas war, and 2) excluding videos with fewer than 100,000 total views. This allowed us to narrow our analysis to popular videos posted after the Hamas attack and Israeli responses to the attack.
After applying the exclusion criteria, we removed duplicate entries, resulting in 647 videos whose content we assessed in the next step to determine whether the videos conveyed relevant pro-Russian narratives. Duplicate entries were then checked to confirm they pointed to the same video posted by the same channel, justifying removal. Upon further review, the scraper made multiple entries of the same videos because these videos had different promotional parameters in their link, suggesting that the removal of these duplicate entries was warranted.
After manually reviewing the captions, descriptions, and content of 647 videos, we included only 83 videos for further analysis. The remaining videos were discarded because they were irrelevant (n = 32), highlighted the Israel-Hamas war but did not reflect pro-Russian narratives (n = 157), or were not presented in Bahasa Indonesia (n = 375).
Eligible videos were further reviewed and categorized based on their content, which allowed us to identify five pro-Russian narratives in the context of the Israel-Hamas war. The steps of data reduction and video selection are illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Results
Our research found 83 videos highlighting pro-Russian narratives in the context of the Israel-Hamas war, with total views ranging from 104,000 to 10 million. Tribun Network is the main actor, with 68 out of 83 (81.92%) pro-Russian videos posted by YouTube channels affiliated with Tribun (i.e., Tribunnews, Tribun Pontianak, Tribun Medan Official, Tribun Timur, Tribun Jateng, TribunJatim Official, Tribun Jogja, and Harian Surya). Tribun Network often cites TASS and the Russian Embassy in Indonesia as its sources but mostly recycles videos from other unknown sources, likely Telegram channels.
According to a thorough investigation conducted by Narasi, Tribun Timur, a news channel affiliated with Tribun Network, has produced a large number of pro-Russian videos since the beginning of the war and has benefited financially from the users’ engagement. However, according to our data, Tribun Timur’s dominance in Indonesia’s pro-Russian narrative discourse seems to have been taken over by its headquarters, as the Tribunnews channel published 59 videos (71.08%) out of 83 pro-Russian videos, compared to only two videos (2.4%) posted by Tribun Timur.
These narratives are mostly organic, with little evidence of foreign influence. However, we found comments written in Cyrillic in five videos (6.02%), which could be preliminary evidence of foreign pro-Russian actors reinforcing these narratives.
We present the findings by describing the content, and number of interactions (total views), followed by a brief analysis of the content. Each pro-Russian narrative is complemented by further analysis generously provided by experts from the Ukraine Crisis Media Center (UCMC).
Pro-Russian Narratives on YouTube Targeting Indonesian Audiences
Narrative #1: General and vague portrayal of Russia as being on the side of the Palestinians.
The first narrative we found reflected in seven out of 83 videos (7.22%) is a vague portrayal of Russia as a supporter of Palestine without giving any further explanation or context as to why this is the case. The four videos with the most views (10 million, 10 million, 8.6 million, and 3.3 million views, respectively) are YouTube Shorts that are less than 60 seconds in length and were most likely reposted from TikTok and created by amateur local content creators with limited video editing skills.
Since the duration of these YouTube Shorts is limited to less than 60 seconds, the narrative is fairly straightforward and shallow, such as categorizing various countries that support Israel (mostly Western countries) or Palestine (e.g., Russia, Indonesia, China, Iran, etc.). Two videos made by a game content creator are presented as an animated story, depicting Israel as “bullies” attacking and threatening “the victim” (i.e., Palestine) with firearms, and then “two guardians” (e.g., Indonesia and Russia) come to protect “the victim” from the “bullies”. Despite the poor quality of these videos, they have generated an extraordinary amount of engagement. We also found some comments written in Cyrillic in the video with the most views, suggesting that there may be an attempt by unknown foreign actors to amplify the narrative.
Three videos with a slightly lower number of views (2.7 million, 1.7 million, and 409,000 views respectively) are regular YouTube videos, two of which are posted by Indonesian mainstream media (i.e., tvOneNews and Tribunnews). A video posted by tvOneNews features an interview with a prominent, pro-Russian international law expert, Prof. Hikmahanto Juwana of Universitas Jenderal Ahmad Yani, on the role the Indonesian government should play in stopping the Israel-Hamas war.
On the one hand, the expert suggests in the interview that the Indonesian president should work closely with the Russian and Chinese presidents to threaten the United States if it doesn’t do something to stop the Israeli military aggression in Gaza. On the other hand, the same expert previously expressed with strong conviction that the Indonesian government should remain neutral in responding to the war in Ukraine and deprecated the Ukrainian ambassador to Indonesia for being “too aggressive” in criticizing Indonesia’s foreign policy on the war in Ukraine, denoting his pro-Russian stance.
In reality, Russia and Israel became extremely close under the office of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who directly called himself a friend of Vladimir Putin. Before Russia invaded Ukraine, Netanyahu met with the Russian president more often than any other world leader. During his second premiership (2009-2021), Netanyahu visited Russia almost 20 times to meet with Vladimir Putin. In 2019, Netanyahu’s election campaign included billboards showing the Israeli prime minister shaking hands with the Russian president.
Putin often used Netanyahu’s favor to create the image of a “fighter” against anti-Semitism. For example, in January 2020, the Russian president participated in the World Holocaust Forum, which took place at the Yad Vashem memorial in Jerusalem. About 40 state leaders took part; however, Netanyahu paid the most attention to Putin’s visit, despite criticism from the opposition and Western countries.
It is worth noting that, despite attempts to assume the role of “protector” of the Palestinian people, Russia continues to conduct active trade with Israel. Given that the Bank of Israel estimated that war-related costs for 2023 to 2025 could amount to $55.6bn, US aid does not cover Tel Aviv’s costs for the operation in the Gaza Strip. The US Congress approved aid to Israel in the amount of 26.4 billion dollars for 2024, of which $9.2 billion was for humanitarian aid and more than $4 billion for air defense needs. That means the Israeli government will be forced to direct revenue from foreign trade for army needs. Against this background, Türkiye has stopped all trade with Israel, while Russia maintains close economic ties with Israel.
While Russia appears to publicly oppose Israel’s military occupation of Gaza, in reality, Israel and Russia have maintained cordial economic relations. Notably, Israel is one of the few states in the so-called “Western world” that has yet to join anti-Russian sanctions following its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia ranks eighth in terms of the volume of Israeli imports, with $2.05 billion in 2023.
Thus, Moscow’s diplomatic demarches practically do not affect economic and political relations between Russia and Israel. Both countries prioritize pragmatism in bilateral ties. For example, Israel blocks the supply of weapons to Ukraine, which was developed by Israeli manufacturers jointly with Europeans. In exchange, Russia turns a blind eye to Israeli strikes on Iranian facilities in the region.
Therefore, even though the Kremlin pays obeisance to Palestinians in its rhetoric, through trade, Russia de facto sponsors Israel’s ability to conduct an operation in the Gaza Strip.
Narrative #2: Excessive praise of Putin for his support for the Palestinians.
The second narrative we found in ten videos (15.87%) is excessive praise of Putin for his supposedly “insurmountable support” for the Palestinians. The total views of these videos range from 110,000 to 1.7 million. The titles of these videos are often capitalized with superlative word choices to convey a sensational message. The narrative in these videos is framed to give the impression that Putin is a hero protecting civilians in Gaza. Three videos are made by a popular channel with 10 million subscribers, “Islam Populer”, which specializes in making videos about Islam. However, their content is a mix of unofficial interpretations of Islam, pro-Russian narratives, and conspiracy theories.
One of their most popular videos (1.7 million views) features Putin’s “heroic image” in protecting and assisting the Palestinians with humanitarian aid (i.e., “Putin Pasang Badan Lindungi Palestina!” which directly translates as “Putin puts his body on the line to protect Palestinians!”), emphasizes Putin’s commitment to sending military and humanitarian aid to Palestine. The video is merely a rough cut of various videos edited together with no credible sources cited to support this claim. There are also some Cyrillic comments found in this video, suggesting that there may be a deliberate attempt to amplify the narrative by unknown foreign actors (Figure 3).
Seven videos are posted by mainstream media channels (e.g. Tribunnews, viva.co.id, and Kompas.com). The narrative presented in these videos overlaps substantially with that of “Islam Populer”, although they are more professionally produced. The titles are also capitalized and the content consists of superlatives to exaggerate Russia’s “unwavering” commitment to support Palestine. A Tribunnews video highlights Putin’s statement made at a BRICS meeting saying that protecting the Palestinians is Russia’s “sacred duty” but does not cite any sources to back up this claim.
Putin’s statement here was taken out of context, because his original statement, which was made on 23 November 2023 at a government meeting (not at a BRICS meeting as the Tribunnews video suggested), is as follows: “This is a very important humanitarian, noble mission. We need to help people who are suffering from current events. And we see what is happening there. Therefore, it is our sacred duty to help especially our citizens”.
The video of the government meeting shows that Putin first announced the number of Russian citizens in Gaza who have appealed to the Russian authorities for evacuation (approximately 900 people, according to Putin). Next, Putin asked the relevant minister how this problem could be solved. Only following the report made by the Minister of Emergency Situations, did Putin make a statement about “sacred duty”. That is, “the sacred duty” here refers to protecting or evacuating Russian citizens, and not to all Palestinians.
Since this narrative conveys morally loaded claims, such as portraying Putin and Russia as the “good cops” fighting the “morally corrupt” Israel, it is not surprising that it evokes emotional responses from the audience. For example, a user commented “We the Indonesian Muslims are deeply grateful for Russia, especially Mr. Putin, who cares about the situation faced by the Gazans. Uraaaaa…” on a video posted by Tribunnews, which received 206 likes from other users. Another commented, “Why does my heart burst with joy when hearing this news…” on a Tribunnews video showing Russia’s commitment to support Hamas. One user praised Putin for his brilliant war tactics by commenting, “The United States is attacking Russia by making use of Ukraine, but now it’s Russia’s turn to fight back against the United States by using Hezbollah. What a brilliant move…”
Historically (1994-2022), the European Union (18.9%), the United States (14.2%), Saudi Arabia (9.9%), Germany (5.8%), the United Arab Emirates (5.2%), Norway (4.8%), the United Kingdom (4.3%), the World Bank (3.2%), Japan (2.9%), and France (2.7%) were the leaders in the field of humanitarian support for Palestine.
Against this background, Russia’s aid to Palestine before the start of Israel’s operation in Gaza was minimal and did not compare with the support of Western countries. On average, Russia allocated 5 million dollars per year to humanitarian aid programs for Palestine.
Since October 2022, Moscow has increased efforts to publicize its humanitarian initiatives in Gaza however, statistics indicate minimal deliveries. From the beginning of the humanitarian mission, Russia has transferred 480 tons of humanitarian cargo to Gaza, compared to Turkiye which has dispatched 52,000 tons of humanitarian aid.
The EU has to date organized 41 air bridge flights to deliver over 1,800 tonnes of aid to Palestinians via Egypt and is exploring further means of delivering lifesaving supplies. Washington, for its part, is making efforts to curb the radical plans of the Israeli military command. The US military began construction of a sea pier off the coast of the Gaza Strip, which should accelerate the flow of humanitarian aid to the exclave.
Thus, for the Russian Federation, the topic of humanitarian aid is an opportunity for PR. However, real indicators of aid demonstrate that Moscow’s involvement in humanitarian support for the Palestinians is minimal against the background of the efforts of European countries and the United States.
Narrative #3: Russia’s military support for Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iran, Yemen’s Houthi, and Hamas.
The third narrative that we found in our dataset is reporting Russia’s military support for all of the opposing parties involved in the Israel-Gaza war, which is reflected in 39 videos (46.98%). All of these videos are posted by the channels affiliated with the Tribun network, except for one posted by viva.co.id. These videos featuring this narrative have received high to moderate views ranging from 104,000 to 2.7 million.
These videos claim that Russia is sending military aid to support Hamas, Iran, Houthi, and Hezbollah. According to these videos, Russia has claimed to be sending missiles, fighter jets, and the RPG-7 (which is said to destroy Israel’s Merkava tank) to support Hamas, and to be stationing troops near the Gaza border, ready to deploy if the situation does not favor the Palestinians. However, these claims have been largely debunked – there is no credible or verifiable evidence that Russia is providing arms supplies to Hamas.
Some videos show Russia’s commitment to send warships to help Iran attack Israel, while some others, interestingly, highlight the involvement of the Wagner Group in arming Hezbollah. Specifically, the Wagner Group is said to be arming Hezbollah with the SA-22 Pantsir missile system so that they can use it to support Hamas in its fight against Israel. While a declassified U.S. intelligence report confirms the Wagner group’s involvement in arming Hezbollah, it is unclear whether it is directly related to the Israel-Hamas war.
A Tribunnews video (859,000 views) displays an interview with the same pro-Russian international relations expert that we mentioned in narrative #1 regarding his prediction that the Israel-Hamas war could escalate into “World War III”, in which Russia and North Korea would ally to fight against the Western front (e.g., the United States and Israel).
Another Tribunnews video (128,000 views) features a rather peculiar narrative – Ukraine is said to have betrayed its Western allies by secretly sending firearms to Hamas to support them in their fight against Israel. The video shows a “video statement” by the Hamas representatives, thanking Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Arabic for sending them firearms. This is likely another Russian propaganda aimed at European and North American audiences, but perhaps Tribunnews was rather clumsy or careless in publishing something that does not fit the beliefs of their typical audience. The same Hamas video was also posted by the Russian Embassy in Kenya on Twitter, substantiating our suspicion that the narrative is related to state-affiliated channels. That said, the comments on this specific Tribunnews video are still overwhelmingly pro-Russian.
In the mass media, there is plenty of manipulation around the topic of the participation of PMC Wagner in the training of Hamas or Hezbollah fighters. While we cannot rule out the involvement of individual Wagner instructors, Russia is acutely experiencing a shortage of modern weapons in the war with Ukraine (in particular anti-aircraft systems). Therefore, in the medium term, Russia does not have the capacity to export weapons of its production to other countries.
Russia’s military cooperation with Iran intensified in 2022 when Russia faced a shortage of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Following this, Moscow and Tehran agreed on the Russian purchase and production of 6,000 Iranian Shahed UAVs for 2.5 years. Part of Russia’s payment for Iran’s services is the supply of 24 Su-35 fighter jets to Tehran.
It is worth highlighting the facts of cooperation between the Russian Federation and Israel in the field of the military industry. For example, between 2014 and 2018, Israel supplied a sanctioned Russian defense company with UAV components from various European and American manufacturers.
Thus, Russia does not directly supply arms to Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthi, and Hamas, as this would harm the Kremlin’s relations with Israel. The Russian leadership fears that in the case of a direct transfer of weapons to pro-Iranian forces, Israel will launch airstrikes against Russian military facilities in Syria and provide Ukraine with military technology assistance. So, for the Kremlin, the issue of arms support for pro-Iranian forces is a lever of geopolitical influence and a component of the system of agreements with regional actors. Therefore, Moscow will not jeopardize its own interests and security through the supply of weapons to Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthi, and Hamas.
Narrative #4: Pro-Russian narratives of the Makhachkala incident.
The fourth pro-Russian narrative that appears in our dataset relates to the Makhachkala incident when a violent mob stormed the airport in search of passengers from a flight from Tel Aviv that had landed at the airport in Dagestan’s capital. There is evidence that this incident was initially provoked by organic, anti-Semitic messages and misinformation circulated online via Telegram and Whatsapp, which stemmed from the Israel-Hamas war. However, following up on the incident, Putin made the unsubstantiated accusation that the West and Ukraine were to blame, which is precisely the central narrative conveyed by five videos in our dataset (6.02%) all posted by Tribunnews. Total views of these videos range from 260,000 to 1.3 million.
Some of these videos have provoked hostile, anti-Semitic comments expressing support for the Chechens to avenge the Jews for what they are doing in Gaza. Some users appeared to express their gratitude to Ramzan Kadyrov, the Chechnyan president, for “teaching the Jews a lesson” for the suffering they have caused to Palestinian Muslims. It is important to note that Kadyrov is a central figure who primarily shaped Russia’s Muslim-friendly image in Indonesia.
After a brief assessment of the comments on the five videos reflecting pro-Russian narratives on this topic, we also found an interesting but peculiar feature of the pro-Russian attitude in Indonesia. Pro-Russian supporters seemed to cheer the anti-Semitic violence against Jews, but at the same time condemned the West and Ukraine for “allegedly” provoking the violence. These convoluted beliefs perfectly reflect the typical pro-Russian propaganda, which is often similarly ambiguous and confusing.
One expert’s analysis argues that the incident may reflect the downstream consequences of Russia’s conflicting messages in response to the Israel-Hamas war. On the one hand, Russia is tilting diplomatically closer to Palestine and some MENA countries, and thus, branding itself as being “a protector of Muslim values” by openly challenging Israel and the West. Thus, to forge closer ties with predominantly Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Russia needs to showcase the support of Chechnyan Muslims for the Palestinians.
But on the other hand, Russia is not quite ready to jeopardize its long-standing relationship with Israel. Moreover, Russia avoids escalating the war to their allied countries (e.g., Iran, Syria, Lebanon) at all costs because if that were to happen then it would quickly drain their limited military resources. The violent mob in Dagestan may also serve as a warning to the Russian government that its confusing messages have gone too far, creating future domestic security risks that it will eventually have to deal with.
Domestic anti-Semitism was inherent in Soviet society. Tens of thousands of USSR Jews, mainly the intelligentsia, were in the role of “rootless cosmopolitans”, whose civil rights were restricted. Some of the most outstanding figures of culture and science of Jewish origin were tortured by Soviet security agencies. From 1970-80, the Soviet system maintained a number of unwritten restrictions on the admission of Jews to certain professions and high administrative positions, while the KGB also prevented the repatriation of Jews to Israel. Vladimir Putin, who comes from the KGB structure, is well aware of the practice of using anti-Semitism for propagandistic mobilization of the population. It is worth noting that one of Russia’s declared “goals” in the war against Ukraine is so-called “denazification”. Therefore, anti-Israel actions in Russia or public statements undermine the foundations of Kremlin propaganda.
Thus, an ambivalent situation arose. On the one hand, Russian propaganda flirts with the world’s Muslim audiences by spreading anti-Israeli narratives. However, attempts to show solidarity with Muslims at the international level are not extrapolated to the internal Russian socio-political space. According to an opinion poll, as of January 2024, only 41% of Russians sympathized with Palestine, while 17% declared support for Israel, and 20% did not approve of the actions of either side. This demonstrates the lack of consensus among Russians regarding support for the Palestinians. In the conditions of military censorship and total control over the Russian media by the Kremlin, this data testifies that the Kremlin does not consider the conflict in the Middle East as a sufficient motive for the mobilization of the Russian population.
On the contrary, the Kremlin tries to suppress any manifestations of inter-ethnic enmity, since the failure of national politics can lead to destabilization of the Russian regime.
Narrative #5: Emphasizing Russia’s various foreign policies (or officials’ statements) that “allegedly” favor the Palestinians (e.g., Russia’s veto of a pro-Israel UN resolution proposed by the U.S., support for full UN membership for Palestine, seeking UN investigation of Israeli nuclear weapons).
The last narrative we excerpted from pro-Russian videos in our dataset is a miscellaneous policy effort, including official statements, that firmly align Russia with Palestine. 22 videos (26.5%) fall into this category, with moderate total views ranging from 104,000 to 1 million. Twenty videos were published by channels affiliated with Tribun Network, while Kompas.com posted one video, and another was a YouTube Shorts made by a local content creator.
Some videos highlight an official statement questioning the possibility of Israel possessing nuclear weapons, which arose after a controversial Israeli minister’s comment on the suggestion of deploying nuclear weapons to deal with the war in Gaza. Three videos claim that Russia is pushing the United Nations to launch an investigation into the possibility that Israel has nuclear weapons while no credible sources can back up this claim.
Some videos simply emphasize Russia’s condemnation of Israel’s military aggression in Gaza and its attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria, while others supplement this message by stating that Israel, as a colonizer, has no right to self-defense. Some other videos portray Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as being “in a hot mess” after knowing that Russia “allegedly” supports Palestine. Relatedly, two videos highlight Russia’s veto of a UN ceasefire resolution proposed by the United States and Russia’s support for full UN membership for Palestine.
However, in the case of the Palestinian issue, it is devalued, since Tel Aviv does not comply with the resolutions of the UN Security Council, if it considers them to be contrary to the national interests of Israel.
Moreover, Israel has officially announced that it does not intend to comply with the appeal of the UN General Assembly to the International Court of Justice regarding the determination of the status of the occupied territories of Palestine.
At the same time, Russia is an ineffective defender of the interests of the Palestinians in the UN, as it has lost its moral authority due to the systematic violation of the Charter of this organization. Russia is annexing the territories of Ukraine, and its army has killed more than 30 thousand Ukrainian civilians during the invasion since 2022. Under these conditions, Russia has no moral right to point out to Israel the disproportionality of its actions in the Gaza Strip.
Further Analysis: Russia seeks its own benefit
Moscow is utilizing the situation in Palestine to launch an information campaign against the West. Russia is attempting to convince regional audiences that the United States’ dominance in the Middle East has resulted in disastrous consequences, including a war between Israel and Hamas. Thus, the Israel/Hamas War provides Moscow with an opportunity to position itself as an appealing and sympathetic partner to the “Global South”, including countries where anti-Western narratives are prevalent.
Russia has for years portrayed itself as a mediator in the Middle East. But the primary reason for Moscow’s interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is to divert attention from the Kremlin’s drawn-out war in Ukraine. Therefore, it could be implied that protracted destructive conflict in the Middle East corresponds to Moscow’s geopolitical interests due to the following reasons:
Firstly, the war in the Middle East diverts Western and American military resources, which are consequently insufficient to support Ukraine effectively. For example, in October 2023 the US provided Israel with tens of thousands of artillery shells that had been destined for Ukraine. Secondly, Israel’s military operation splintered the Western community at the interstate level (e.g., lack of consensus in the EU) and within societies (e.g., the Democratic Party is confronting internal divisions over the Israel-Hamas war, and student protests in the US). Third, US pro-Israel policies undermine the legitimacy of Western arguments for Ukraine in the “Global South”, particularly in the Middle East. Attempts to demonstrate the barbaric nature of the invasion of Ukraine, with a focus on the moral component, do not cause much empathy in Arab countries against the background of destruction and human death in Gaza.
Finally, through information support for the Palestinians, Moscow is regaining sympathy in the Arab world, which was partially lost due to the Russian bombing of Aleppo (2015-16), which cost the lives of hundreds of Syrian civilians. Thus, Russia expands the Arabic-language segment of its propaganda. For example, in December 2023 the RT Arabic television channel opened a regional office in Algeria and launched the “Bridges to the East” program about relations between Russia and the Arab world. Also RT Arabic launched an advertising campaign in the United Arab Emirates: on digital platforms, radio, and billboards.
Pro-Russian narratives that portray Russia as being on the side of Palestinians largely overlap with its image as “a defender of Islamic values,” which prevails in some countries with predominantly Muslim populations. However, it is important to note that the Russian government has allowed systematic discrimination that limits the ability of Muslims to practice their faith. For example, veiled Muslim women have reported being denied employment, banned from entering educational institutions, and physically and verbally harassed due to their appearance.
In the past, the Russian government had implemented several Islamophobic policies, including a ban on the Hajj pilgrimage and a ban on religious education in schools, which applied largely to the Muslim population in the North Caucasus. During its military occupation of Ukraine, Crimean Tatar Muslims have been repeatedly subjected to human rights violations. Mosques are under heavy surveillance, Muslims are imprisoned on fraudulent charges, and worse, around 5,000 Crimean Tatars have been forced to leave their homes since Russia’s full-scale invasion began. Therefore, Russia’s sudden fondness for Islam should be countered and exposed, emphasizing that its public image of being “Muslim-friendly” is nothing more than a strategic campaign, with an ulterior motive of protecting its interests.
Conclusions
Our analysis reveals a consistent portrayal across five themes of pro-Russian narratives we found on YouTube that emphasize Russia’s alignment with Palestine and its appeal to Muslim-majority audiences in Indonesia. These narratives effectively align with the pre-existing general support for Palestine in Indonesia. Therefore, the narratives not only tap into causes that resonate with most Indonesians but also bolster Russia’s image as a supporter of Muslim causes globally. This is a defining characteristic of Russian propaganda, which is highly adaptable to local contexts. Russia often actively exploits pre-existing, morally charged beliefs on important social and political issues that are prevalent in a particular country or region. Through the use of social media platforms, such narratives not only reach a wide audience but may also warp public perceptions and potentially foreign policy stances.
The infiltration of such narratives into the Indonesian social media landscape has concerning implications. Some narratives evoke hostile anti-Semitic comments, as reflected in the videos of the Makhachkala incident, and thus could potentially lead to security risks, reflecting the dangerous side of such narratives. We urge that this situation requires careful monitoring and response strategies to mitigate the risks associated with this type of highly divisive content.
To effectively counter these narratives, it is important to provide factual information from reliable and verifiable sources and include diverse perspectives to ensure balanced and nuanced information. To this end, one could also present perspectives from trusted Ukrainian media alongside claims from Russia’s state-affiliated channels, allowing comparison between both claims. As stated in the previous section, Russia’s apparent disinterest in a ceasefire or peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Hamas war would greatly jeopardize its interests in Ukraine, therefore, it is crucial to highlight the true nature of Russia’s stance on the Israeli-Hamas war in all efforts to counter these narratives.
Improving Indonesians’ media literacy should also be a priority, as it helps audiences critically evaluate the reliability of certain news channels and understand the dynamics of Russia’s state-sponsored propaganda. Reminding Indonesians of the importance of shared identity and global Muslim solidarity, not only with the Palestinians but also with the Tatar Crimean and Chechen Muslims whom Russia continues to oppress to this day, may also lead people to question whether Russia has genuine intentions to be an “ally of the Muslim world”. As we have shown in our analysis, pro-Russian narratives, especially in the context of the Israel-Hamas war, overlap significantly or even stem from the distorted image of Russia as being “Muslim-friendly”. Therefore, we believe that highlighting Russia’s contradictory domestic and foreign policies towards Muslim countries and its domestic Muslim communities is a critical aspect that needs to be taken into account when designing counter-narratives.
